

The making of totalitarian city in Pyongyang:
The spatial transition from free to ideology, and for marketization

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Abstract

Keywords totalitarian city, Pyongyang, North Korea, spatial transition, ideological space, colonial city, socialist city, space of terror, space of ideology, location game, marketization

Space is a social product and a social producer. The main aim of this thesis is to reveal ‘the process of totalitarian city making in Pyongyang’, especially in the light of the interaction between the power and urban space.

The totalitarian city of Pyongyang was born out of modernization in the process of masses formation. During the growth of colonial capitalism and Christian liberal ideas, Pyongyang was modernized and displayed the characteristics of a modern city with industrialization and urbanization. During the introduction of Japanese colonial capitalism, peasants, women, and slaves became the first masses and urban poor, and they later transformed into the mob; their violence was finally demonstrated during the Anti-Chinese Riot.

After the 1945 independence, Kim’s regime formed the one-party state with a cry for revolution. They produced an atmosphere of imminent war to instill fear and hatred into the psyche of Pyongyang citizens. The regime eliminated all political opponents in 1967 and finally declared the totalitarian ideology in 1974. During this process, Pyongyang demonstrated two main characteristics of a totalitarian city: the space of terror and of ideology. The space of terror produces the fear of death and the space of ideology controls the thought and life of citizens.

After entry to the market, to keep Kim’s controlling power, the regime used the strategy of location exchange. The camp, market, and Foreign Currency Shop were effective tools to prepare for executives’ gifts. However, the market also produces the desire not only for consumption but also for freedom and truth; it is tearing down the foundation of the totalitarian city of Pyongyang.

This research focuses primarily on the interaction between political power and urban space. In the process of making a totalitarian city, the power produced urban space and it influenced the psyche of Pyongyang citizens. Even though this spatial transition has created the totalitarian city and helped maintain political power, it also led and produced intended or unintended social variation in Pyongyang society.

Zusammenfassung

Schlüsselwörter: totalitäre Stadt, Pjöngjang, Nordkorea, räumlicher Übergang, sozialistische Stadt, Raum des Terrors, Raum der Ideologie, Vermarktung

In dieser Arbeit werden die Prozesse und Eigenschaften der totalitären Stadt Pjöngjang und die Verbindungen zwischen Raum und Gesellschaft in dieser beschrieben. Im Kontext des räumlichen Übergangs Pjöngjangs von einer freien Gesellschaft zu einer mit einer einzigen Ideologie war die Macht eng mit der Transformation des Raums verbunden. Dabei führte der räumliche Übergang als sozialer Produzent zu sozialer Variation.

Die Hauptfragen der vorliegenden Forschung sind folgende: Durch welche Prozesse ist Pjöngjang zu einer totalitären Stadt geworden? Welche sind die totalitären Merkmale von Pjöngjang? Welche dieser Merkmale unterscheiden sich von denen anderer totalitärer Städte? Wie verändert sich die Situation heute nach dem Markteintritt?

Der Prozess, Pjöngjang in eine totalitäre Stadt zu verwandeln, dauerte ungefähr siebzig Jahre und umfasste vier Stationen: Erstens wurden während der Modernisierungszeit nach 1894 Bauern, Frauen und Sklaven befreit und zu einer bedeutenden, weil großen gesellschaftlichen Schicht. Durch den raschen sozialen Wandel und die Verstädterung wurden sie jedoch in die unterste Klasse gestellt, wodurch sie den minimalen Schutz durch die menschlichen Beziehungen verloren. Die vernachlässigte Bevölkerungsschicht wurde schließlich zu städtischen Besetzern; nicht nur Japaner, sondern auch koreanische Kapitalisten ignorierten sie. Zweitens wurden die isolierten städtischen Armen in den 1920er-Jahren unter dem japanischen Kolonialkapitalismus Teil des Pöbels. Sie übernahmen die gewalttätige Gesinnung des Nationalismus, der darauf abzielte, Chinesen zu massakrieren. Diese waren 1931 das Hauptziel der Rassendiskriminierung in Pjöngjang. Drittens schien die Gesellschaft nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs trotz der japanischen Kolonialisierung eine gewisse Freiheit wiederzugewinnen. Unter dem Einfluss der Sowjetunion akzeptierte Nordkorea das sozialistische System und die Idee, in allen Nationen gerechte Gesellschaften zu gründen. Gleichzeitig wurden Statuen von Kim Il-Sung für die Idolisierung errichtet und der Weltraum bedingte die Einschränkung des Handels sowie die politische Voreingenommenheit, die

wiederum als Sprungbrett für die Errichtung einer totalitären Stadt diene. Schließlich wurden 1967 alle politischen Gegner von Kims Regime beseitigt und 1974 wurde die totalitäre Ideologie des Jucheismus proklamiert. Der ursprüngliche Raum von Pjöngjang wurde freigemacht und die Maske einer sozialistischen Stadt wurde entdeckt, um den Raum für eine totalitäre Stadt zu formen.

Die räumlichen Beweise für die totalitäre Stadt waren Terror und Ideologie. Totalitarismus erfordert positiv einen Raum des Terrors und der Raum kann Zeuge der Existenz einer totalitären Gesellschaft sein. Nachdem die Juche-Ideologie verkündet und der Machtprozess um 1980 durch Kims Sohn erfolgreich weitergetragen worden war, wurden viele gekennzeichnete Personen aus Pjöngjang in ein Arbeitslager deportiert. In Nordkorea gibt es fünf Konzentrationslager, in denen etwa 80 000 bis 120 000 Menschen inhaftiert sind. Im Lager konnte niemand seine Menschenrechte geltend machen und politische Gefangene konnten der Inhaftierung nur durch den Tod entkommen. Obwohl sich das Lager nicht in der Stadt Pjöngjang befand, weckten alltägliche Erfahrungen und Gerüchte bei den dort verbliebenen Bürgern die Angst vor dem Tod – ein zweiter Beweis für den ideologischen Raum der totalitären Stadt. Das Leben eines Bürgers in einer totalitären Stadt ist davon geprägt, dass er jeden Tag und überall im Raum der unausweichlichen Ideologie lebt. Pjöngjang hat viele abstrakte, symbolische und religiöse Denkmäler; diese großen Gebäude im nationalen Stil haben die Bürger dazu inspiriert, nicht nur Ehrfurcht, sondern auch Angst zu empfinden. In ganz Pjöngjang wurden Propagandastrukturen mit drei Achsen errichtet, um Kims Familie zu preisen, und manchmal wurden die Bürger selbst zum Vehikel der Propaganda, indem sie an Gruppenaktionen oder Märschen teilnahmen. Schließlich führte der Raum der totalitären Stadt zu einem falschen Lächeln der Menschen. Das totalitäre System versuchte, den Raum der Bürger selbst zu regieren und zuletzt ihren eigenen. Der totalitäre Raum von Pjöngjang war nicht nur ein Ergebnis politischer Aktionen, sondern brachte ein System hervor, das für den Fortschritt des Totalitarismus geeignet war.

Die Merkmale der Stadt unterscheiden sich räumlich und zeitlich von denen anderer totalitärer Städte. Im Gegensatz zum Nationalsozialismus und Stalinismus, die den klassischen Stil Roms und Griechenlands übernahmen, wurden in Pjöngjang viele monumentale Gebäude im koreanischen Stil aus der Zeit der Monarchie errichtet, die nationalistische Emotionen hervorrufen. Aufgrund des langjährigen Aufbaus der totalitären Stadt koexistieren verschiedene Stile wie Neoklassizismus und Konstruktivismus sowie der transparente Raum,

der die Räume moderner kapitalistischer Städte widerspiegelt. Der Hauptunterschied zwischen Pjöngjang und anderen totalitären Städten ist die zeitliche Beständigkeit von Erstgenannter. Im Gegensatz zur hypnotischen Erfahrung des Nationalsozialismus, die nicht länger als 13 Jahre dauerte, wurde die totalitäre Gesellschaft von Kims Regime über einen Zeitraum von 75 Jahren von drei Generationen aufgebaut und besteht bis jetzt. Dies bedeutet, dass die neue Generation, die in ein Lager oder eine völlig kontrollierte Stadt hineingeboren wurde, in propagandistischen Räumen lebt, die auf der Juche-Ideologie basieren. Die Menschen kennen ihre Vergangenheit und Zukunft nicht, weil sie keine Erfahrungen oder Dokumente zum Vergleich haben. Diese Beständigkeit erklärt, warum Nordkorea trotz der großen Hungersnot und des Markteintritts nach 1989 nicht zusammengebrochen ist.

Nach dem Fall der Berliner Mauer und der Hungersnot in den 1990er-Jahren wurde das Marktsystem in Pjöngjang eingeführt und als Instrument verwendet, um Kims Macht über den armen totalitären Staat zu erhalten. Diese ungleiche Strategie von Pjöngjang hat das Spiel des Standortaustausches durch Bestrafungen und Belohnungen auf dem Markt aufgenommen. Für diese Strategie wurden drei Hauptbereiche herangezogen: das Camp, der Markt und der Foreign-Currency-Shop. Diese Räume dienen als Kontrollmittel und wecken den Wunsch nach Konsum. Im Laufe der Zeit bezieht sich dieser nicht nur auf materielle Objekte, sondern auch auf die Konzepte von Freiheit und Wahrheit. Gegenwärtig erschüttern diese Entwicklungen das Fundament und den Raum von Pjöngjang, die in der Vergangenheit geschaffen wurden.

Die Wirtschaftsstruktur Nordkoreas ist bereits zusammengebrochen und die ungleiche Strategie mit dem Marktsystem gerät an ihre Grenzen. Die neue Generation hat keine Erinnerungen an die vergangene liberale Gesellschaft und glaubt eher ihren Erfahrungen als ihren Gedanken, weil Letztere zur Gänze von der totalitären Stadt erfunden wurden. Pjöngjang verändert sich – die neue Generation und der gewonnene Freiraum könnten die Ideen von Gleichheit und Freiheit in der Gesellschaft verändern und zerstreuen.

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
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Seoul, 01. 03. 2020

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Ort, Datum



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Sihyo Lee

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to understand the present Pyongyang through a study on the spatial transition from a free society to a totalitarian city and a city for marketization. The methodology of this study follows the idea proposed by Lefebvre (1991), namely that ‘the condition of being today’ cannot be understood ‘without studying from now to the past or its opposite direction’. The questions of the research are listed as follows:

- 1) through what process has Pyongyang become a totalitarian city?
- 2) what characters were seen in the totalitarian city of Pyongyang?
- 3) what characters are different from other totalitarian cities?
- 4) how it is changing after the market entrance?

The scope of this research is limited to the city of Pyongyang. With regard to time, the study covers the modern era to the present, given that totalitarianism in Pyongyang emerged with the birth of the modern city and the masses. The space is also limited to Pyongyang; this North Korean city was developed using the growth-pole strategy and, therefore, Pyongyang as the capital of North Korea is the most appropriate city to see how power and ideology produce urban space.

After the Second World War, many scholars studied totalitarianism with Nazism and Stalinism, and their studies led to worthy results. Thus, this thesis is based on the works of Hanna Arendt, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Carl Friedrich, Leonard Schapiro, Theodor Adorno, Masao Maryama, Henri Lefebvre, and George Orwell. The most influential idea for this study is from *The Origins of Totalitarianism* by Arendt and *The Production of Space* by Lefebvre.

Although this study largely relies on many influential existing works, it attempts to break new ground in three areas. The first area identifies the differences found in other totalitarian cities. There are some similarities with Nazism and Stalinism in North Korea’s historical transformation from a free society to a totalitarian society. However, in light of time continuity, there are also a number of different characteristics. While the totalitarian regimes

by the Nazis and Stalin collapsed after the death of the leader, Kim's regime has maintained the totalitarian system even after the market system entered the state. Therefore, a new generation of North Korea was born in the totalitarian space and society; in turn, this also means that the new generation will be largely ignorant of the past memories and literature has disappeared with the demise of the older generation.

The second area deals with understanding the connection between the totalitarian system and the urban space of Pyongyang. This study analyzes how totalitarian power produces space and how the making of space simultaneously influences the totalitarian society's continuity.

Lastly, this research studies the city of Pyongyang based on urban sociology. In South Korea, many North Korean experts feature in the fields of politics, economics, and sociology. However, there has not been a thoughtful study on urban space and urban life from the perspective of urban sociology.

In the process of the research, the most significant difficulty is that the researcher was unable to visit Pyongyang. Obtaining permission to visit Pyongyang is a very difficult process, especially for a person of South Korean descent, such as in the case of the researcher who tried several times but failed. Jane Jacob (1961: 440) presented the methodology of understanding a city, namely to "work inductively, from particulars to the general." Based on her view, this study has many limitations.

To compensate for these limitations, the researcher examined many primary and secondary sources from North Korea and interviewed four escaped Pyongyang citizens. In the national library of South Korea, many primary sources are available, such as newspapers, magazines, books, and textbooks issued in Pyongyang from 1945 to the present day. To investigate the actual life of citizens in Pyongyang, the researcher conducted in-depth interviews with four escaped Pyongyang citizens: Lee, Kim, Park, and Choi. For example, one of the interviews was conducted over a course of three sessions spanning seven hours in total. The four interviewees are different in age, class, and gender.

In spite of these limitations, the researcher considers this present time to be a suitable time for studying the totalitarian city of Pyongyang. As mentioned in Hegel's *Owl of Minerva*, 'the things emerge their essence clearly at the time of collapsing.' Totalitarianism in North Korea began in 1967 and was completed around 1980. However, after 1989, its purity has

been steadily disintegrating and changing, particularly after the great starvation and entry to the market. The market system has brought the desire for freedom into the totalitarian city of Pyongyang. As in the case of Eastern Europe, this desire could cause all oppressive systems to collapse, and the truth behind the regimes may be gradually revealed. However, in the case of North Korea, it is not easy to compare it to other socialist countries due to the continuity and completeness of the system. This heritage would lead Pyongyang to become a post-totalitarian city (or post-socialist city in a wide view). Although the future remains uncertain, the suitable time for research on Pyongyang is now because as time passes, with global capital entering, there will be greater disorder and difficulties, and the movement would not allow sufficient resources to be available later.

This study is composed of three parts. The first part, Chapters 2 and 3, defines totalitarianism and a totalitarian city. The second part from Chapters 4 to 7 addresses the spatial transition from a free society to an ideological city, as well as the characteristics of a totalitarian city. The third part, Chapter 8, is about changing the characteristics of a totalitarian city with marketization.

A more detailed overview of this study is given as follows. Chapter 2 shows how the power is implemented and operated in the actual life and space of Pyongyang within the history of Lee's four generations. This account demonstrates the authenticity of Pyongyang in its urban life from its modernization to the present, and the contents of this account relate to other chapters. Chapter 3 defines the concept of totalitarianism and the city by using Arendt and Lefebvre's work. Chapter 4 studies other totalitarian cities in the era of Nazism and Stalinism for comparative study with Pyongyang. Chapters 5 and 6 study the rise of the masses and their transformation into the mob during Japanese colonial times. Chapter 7 reveals the illusion of a socialist city and how the citizens became the standardized masses in the urban space during the Korean War. Chapter 8 presents the character of the totalitarian space of Pyongyang. The concrete questions of this chapter concern how terror space supported ideological space and how the ideological space governed the citizens. Chapter 9 investigates the present condition of Pyongyang in the context of the market system. This chapter reveals how the poor totalitarian state keeps its power through the exchange of inhabited space.

Instead of having an elaborate conclusion, this work merely presents the findings of the research as a starting point to the relatively new research area of totalitarian cities in North Korea. In the words of Barbara Denick (2010), the researcher hopes that “one day North Korea will be open and we will be able to judge for ourselves what really happened there.”

Chapter 2

A brief report on Lee's family history

If the frame of thinking and humanity is molded before 12 years old (Rousseau 1761), the foundation of one man can be found in their past legacy and memory. Likewise, as with present society, life and space are affected by the past. 'The space of city is the space of history' (Lefebvre 1991). Especially, according to the study of the life of Pyongyang, the legacy is crucial because it is formally related to an individual's present job, rations, and residential district.

This chapter intends to complement the lack of research due to the writer not being able to visit Pyongyang. In addition, it attempts to produce 'a new meaning'¹ between the data and the life history. The chapter addresses three generations of Kim's family in Pyongyang, from the Japanese colonial period to the present. The writer interviewed Sulhwa Lee (assumed name²) three times, which amounts to seven hours. She has memories and experiences of conscription during the Japanese colonial period, the Korean War and purge, religious suppression, forced migration, and marriage to high class. Even from its restrictive perspective, the family history shows details of urban life that could never be present in the data.

2.1 The war and 'brand', 1905-1950

Lee's grandfather was born in Pyongyang in 1905. From her father, Lee heard about conscription in the Japanese colonial era in 1941. Since it was dangerous in North Korea to tell the family history to the children, her father had not told her about her grandfather until she noticed the 'brand' of family history. When her grandfather was 36 years old, he was taken to

¹Max Weber (1904:119) mentioned two types of meaning production; 'a hungry throat of "data collectomania" could be filled only through many documentaries and statistics. However, they are insensitive to the delicacy of the new view. On the other hand, "meaning collectomania" lose the taste of the fact but continuously make the distillation of new meaning'.

² Assumed name is used because of political danger. Her other family and relatives live in Pyongyang until now.

the Japanese military base of Gwando in Manchu state and he drove military trucks. He was able to take the maintenance-engineering course, which was an advanced skill at that time, and he could return to Pyongyang after World War II.



Figure 2.1: The location of Lee's grandfather forced military service in 1941 and Lee's family's forced migration in 1981

The Soviet military that was stationed in Pyongyang after WWII asked him to repair a fighter plane. Subsequently, the North Korean army, founded in 1947, asked him to work for air force maintenance. In 1950, the Korean War broke out. Even though most young and prime-aged people were conscripted to the War, he remained home because he had eight children.

However, the problem arose when the UN forces invaded Pyongyang. Due to a lack of engineers, the UN forces looked for an engineer from among the people, and armed UN soldiers requested that he work for them. He had no choice but to comply, even though he did not want to work for the enemy. However, unlike their neighbors, Lee's family was able to avoid hardship and hunger with foods and clothes from the UN forces (see Chapter 7.3.2 regarding the historical background).

During December of 1950, the North Korean and Chinese forces recovered Pyongyang and immediately compiled a list of those who cooperated with the UN forces. Lee's grandfather was publicly executed in front of his wife and children, amid shouts of 'Mr. Lee served the puppet government (meaning South Korea) and the US army' in the arena of Pyongyang (see

Chapter 7.3.2 regarding social background). Thereafter, Lee's family members were officially branded as 'executed person's family'. The list was passed down from generation to generation and the family was forcibly removed to a coal mine after 30 years.



Figure 2.2: The public execution in Pyongyang arena in 1950 [Source: Kim 2004]

Lee's grandmother was born in the working-class area in Eastern Pyongyang in 1905. She studied at a Christian high school during the Japanese colonial period. The education opportunity for a woman, especially the daughter of a laborer, was possible in the church because she lived in Pyongyang. She attended Jangchung Church, and after graduation, she became a preacher.

Due to the founding of the North Korean socialist regime in 1948, many Christians moved to South Korea to escape suppression. During the Korean War, moreover, most churches in Pyongyang were destroyed and Lee's grandmother could not officially establish a religious gathering. According to Lee's interview, however, her grandmother frequently met other Christians in a national noodle shop and read the bible secretly until the late 1960s³. She kept and read the bible until 1980 before it was burned by her daughters-in-law.

³ Until the late 1960s, surveillance of religious meetings was not serious. However, after the time of the Kim Il Sung deification, such meetings were not allowed.

In 1980 at the age of 75, Lee's grandmother was forcibly moved to a coal mine with all her family members, where her preaching activities became stronger. Furthermore, she spoke about Jesus in a loud voice in public places, such as a distributing station and grocery store. Hence, the public poured dirty water on her and threw a stone hard enough to cut her forehead open. They shouted, 'She is crazy to say such things about God'. Lee, at the age of 15, asked her to stop the speech but her grandmother continued, saying, 'No, I have to say the words even if I am going to die. Then you can get God's blessing.' Because of the event, Lee's parents were criticized at the coal committee. When Lee's grandmother bought a lunch box for Lee, schoolchildren threw a stone and spit and swore, calling her 'crazy grandmother'. When Lee went to school, children grabbed her by the hair and dragged her from in front of the gate to the classroom because she was the 'granddaughter of crazy'. Lee's mother started doubting that the reason for their forced migration was because of the grandmother's past religious behavior.

In 1981, Lee's grandmother became sick, but her son and daughter-in-law did not take care of her. After a few months, she died. After her death, Lee never again heard about 'the God' in North Korea. The persecution and terror against the 'branded family' was greater from neighbors than from the regime.

2.2 The hope of socialism, 1967- 1980

Lee's father lived in Sadong near the Mirim airfield in eastern Pyongyang until 1967. This residential area for laborers and coal workers was frequently flooded. He was able to graduate from the college of light industrial technology even though he had been branded as a member of an 'executed person's family'. Until the late 1960s, the social mood of Pyongyang was calm and anyone who had been branded could enter college and acquire a job, except those involved in political activities. Lee's father was employed as an engineer in a silk mill in Pyongchon in western Pyongyang and he married a factory worker there. After waiting for one year, they received a flat from the national factory.




Figure 2.3: The silk mill factory of Pyongyang in 1956 [Source: People Joseon Press, Pyongyang, 1956]

Lee's flat was on the fourth floor of an eight-floor apartment known as 'Harmonica House'. One floor housed 15 households and each flat had one room, a toilet, a kitchen, and a porch, but it did not have a living room and bathroom. Five people (Lee's grandmother, parents, Lee, and her older brother) lived in the flat. There was no television, washing machine, or refrigerator. However, there was a radio. Only three televisions were to be found among all the apartment households.




Figure 2.4: The unit of standard housing known as ‘Harmonica House’
[Source: Lee 1993, 61]

Even though it was a one-room type flat, Lee's family experienced living with another

household. At the beginning of the 1970s⁴, Kim Jung Il conducted a housing construction campaign and many laborers and their families entered Pyongyang to work as builders. Because of the lack of housing, they lived in citizens' flats together. Two families had to sleep in one room and ate breakfast in rotation. After four months, the family left for another flat in Pyongyang that had a housing certificate. Most large residential areas in Pyongyang were built in this process. Except in the upper class, most people had to share living space and many households resided together with a forced worker, relatives, or an acquaintance, as residences in Pyongyang were as scarce as the labor pool was.

Even under these circumstances, young Lee was happy until the beginning of the 1970s. The distribution was not overlooked and the meal quality of Pyongyang was much better than that of other regions⁵. She had never seen the neighbors fight in Harmonica House, even though many households lived together. Since her parents were always busy at work, Lee spent most of her time at the preschool and with her grandmother. Lee and her grandmother would frequent a noodle shop on Chunrimsa Street near the Pyongyang station. There were just two stops by electric car from home and Lee's grandmother met her church friends there. Lee would frequently eat a cookie and rice cake and her father took her to the Moranbong national amusement park. In 1979, Lee entered a Pyongchun middle school that was famous for its young women's group gymnastics. Lee recalls that time as the happiest of her life.

2.3 Forced migration: the effect of 'brand', 1980- 1991

After the power succession was completed in 1976, the purifying work (called *Soge*, which means forced migration) was started on a large scale. Until the beginning of the 1970s, Lee's father was unrestricted. He could graduate from college and be employed as a factory engineer. After 1976, however, Lee's family sensed the fear of forced migration, and the main target list of those who would be included in forced migration was as follows:

⁴ Before and after the 1970s, it was time for idolizing Juche ideology and preparing the power succession to Kim's son.

⁵ Pyongyang citizens could receive rice and good flour at the ratio of 7:3. On the other hand, other local citizens were given rice and corn at the ratio of 3:7.

- Cooperator for the Japanese Empire in the colonial period
- 'Executed person's family'
- A man of religion, wealth, and an intellectual in the colonial period
- A man who has overseas relatives or an escaped family member from North Korea

One summer day in 1980, when Lee returned from school, the family's luggage was being loaded onto a truck. Lee's grandmother tearfully said to Lee, "We are being purified". The men stated that the reason for purifying was to protect Lee's family from the possibility of war breaking out. In that time in South Korea, there was a student democracy movement and many young men and citizens were killed by the military government. However, Lee thinks the real reason for forced migration was the family's brand. The removal men waited until nighttime and the truck took Lee's family away. Even though they made a great deal of noise, no neighboring householders watched the happening, except a friend of Lee's grandmother. The truck drove half the day and arrived at Pyongchon coal mine. When they arrived, there was no housing for them. They slept at the miner lounge, which served as a dressing room for the miners. The rations and environment were far more miserable than Pyongyang's, and Lee was very aware of the difference between Pyongyang and the local city. Unlike in Pyongyang, the road was unpaved and the boiler worked with coal instead of oil. Lee's family was always under observation, and observers often visited home without an announcement.

Lee's mother often blamed her father and grandmother with the words, 'This difficulty is caused by your family history'. She wanted to return to her parents in Pyongyang but gave up because of the birth of her third child.

Lee's father received much discrimination at his workplace as 'an excluded'. The method of mining included kneeling and hoeing without a machine as used in the Japanese system. When the entrance was small, Lee's father had to enter because he was an 'excluded'. Although Lee's parents worked hard, they could not receive party membership.

Lee's class had over 60 students and there was always a shortage of desks and chairs. Most students were the children of the excluded or of ex-convicts. They lived according to the law of the jungle and violence. Instead of Lee's real name, classmates called her '*Pyongyang Cholle*

(which means excluded)’. She studied hard to escape the coal area and earned good marks in the final exam, reaching the top third of 15,000 graduates. Even though normally a tenth of them could enter Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang, she could not enter and just became a teacher at her coalmine school because of her family brand. Lee noticed that she could not enter Pyongyang with her efforts, but that it might be possible only through marriage with a Pyongyang citizen.

Lee met the son of a senior military official in Pyongchon with Kim Jung Il’s command of ‘the group disposition’⁶. While members of the upper class of North Korea normally did not marry lower class citizens because ancestry was so important, Lee did marry him. Finally, in 1991, she could escape the coalmine and enter Pyongyang again.




Figure 2.5: Lee’s family’s movement out and in of Pyongyang

2.4 The hope with market system, 1991- 1997

Since a relative of Lee’s husband was of the highest rank, Lee was able to visit the best

⁶When Kim commands ‘the group disposition’, any class could not move until the period finished (normally one year). If someone breaks the rule, he or she is regarded as a traitor. The period of military service in North Korea is more than seven years.

apartment on Changwang Street in central Pyongyang. In the entrance, three security officers and an older relation used the entire floor, which was composed of eight rooms. In the living room was a Japanese color television, a video player, and a large Japanese refrigerator containing Russian lobster, mutton, and beef.

After Lee's husband graduated from the school of political science, he worked at the recoding department of Kim Jung Il's writing. For the promotion, he worked hard even at home, and Lee helped him with her talent for story writing. Through the work she did, Lee noticed that most of Kim's writing was fabricated or exaggerated. While living in the Moranbong area of Western Pyongyang, she gave birth to a daughter in 1995 and worked in the middle school. At that time, her daily life was as follows.

- 0630-0700 Go to work by streetcar from Renovation Station to Comrade Station. It was during rush hour and there was often sexual molestation in the public transportation
- 0800-1225 Morning inquiry and five classes, 45 minutes class and 10 minutes rest
- Lunch Break
- 1400-1800 After-school activities such as group gymnastics or athletics.
In local school, students gather the recyclable material, iron, and paper, grass cuttings for rabbits, or loaded dropped coal on the belt (at coal mine area)
- 1800-2000 Write teaching plan for next day or review on every Monday
- 2000-2100 Return home
- 2100-2230 Family affairs

The harmonious married life deteriorated after three years. While her husband achieved good recognition and works, he was not promoted because of Lee's brand. To be in a high position in politics in North Korea, the backgrounds of generations and relatives must be approved. As a result, her husband's family ignored her openly, and finally, her husband asked for a divorce. Even though she did not want a divorce, she had no choice but to accept an allowance in 1996.

While there was no legal alimony, Lee's husband provided the flat, a large refrigerator, and the ingredients for making ice cream. In 1996, the distribution of food to the common class was stopped and starvation broke out even in Pyongyang. After 1990, a teacher's income was

not enough to live on and irrationality became common in Pyongyang society. Lee felt the sting of conscience as a teacher but received US dollars from a student's parents in an effort to enter politics through her ex-husband's position. In addition, she started running a business to support herself and made ice cream with the refrigerator. Most ingredients were from South Korea and it was sold at the market. At six in the morning, a student's parents came with an icebox and Lee sold them the ice cream for three *won*. They then sold it for five *won*.

With the introduction of the market, the inequality between citizens grew. According to Lee, the space of Pyongyang in 2005 was segregated as a mosaic city (order of number relates to the quality of life).



Figure 2.6: The mosaic city of Pyongyang in 1990s, *Green is the highest resident area

- 1) Middle District: home to the high class and trader (rich man)
- 2) Botong River District: comprising the soldier and the artist. Many military facilities. Many athletes were training. Even though there was good view, the citizen did not enjoy going there because nearby water had a bad smell.
- 3) Pyongchon District: location of the thermoelectric power plant. Citizens preferred to live there because of the good heating supply.
- 4a) Moranbong District: home to the writer, artist, and immigrant from Japan. (According to the other interviewee, this district was better than Pyongchon district)
- 4b) Mankyongdae District: residential area for the common people. The housing unit was

near athletics town. Not good heating supply. Even though there was a subway and streetcar, there were many people waiting for transportation in the rush hour. There was also an amusement park. From the middle of the 1980s, the market was installed and most products from China were sold. Chinese capitalism thrived.

- 5) Rackrang District: similar situation as Mankyongdae district.
- 6) Deadong River District: here lived artists, laborers, and students. Location of the college street and the embassies of poor countries.
- 7) Sunkyo District: lived the laborers. Eastern Pyongyang industrial area contained factories producing necessities, leather, food, flavorings, rubber, furniture, etc.
- 8) Sadong District: lived the peasant. They grew vegetables and sold them.
- 9) Outskirts of Pyongyang: the rural area. The living conditions were worse than those of downtown.

In addition, the urban space expanded to the outer side of the city after 1990. The urban expansion of Pyongyang has continued to the present with the market system growing. A comparison of Google satellite pictures between 2000 and 2019 shows the stream of expansion clearly.




Figure 2.7: The urban expansion of Pyongyang between 2000 and 2019

2.5 Escape from Pyongyang to China, 1997-2012

Lee escaped to China in 1997. Her escape was because of not only a failed marriage but also a move brought on by the hope for a new future. After the opening of a Foreign Currency Shop in 1984, citizens became increasingly aware of the world beyond themselves (see Chapter 8.2). Lee's desire for the outside was also growing. She would watch Mansudea Channel on the television. Unlike the censored news of Joseon Central, it introduced movies from other socialist countries and showed the outside world and places such as the Eiffel Tower and the Great Wall of China. After she escaped to China, Lee married a Chinese man⁷. She gave birth to a daughter and then escaped again to South Korea with her Chinese family in 2012.

According to another interviewee (who was born in the upper class in 1961 and escaped in 2007 from Pyongyang), the most common reason is the economic problems. However, Pyongyang citizens escape due to fear of political reprisals. Such cases are below.

- Speaking against Kim's regime, such as 'Let's change the system like China'
- Speaking a taboo issue about Kim's family
- Opening one's heart to a friend but the friend is a hidden member of the Security Department or had broken the friendship⁸
- Discovered watching South Korean TV or sexual videos

2.6 The hope of the fourth generation?

The place (Pyongyang) has my happiness and lots of heartbreak but is never forgettable. I never want to live here again, but I want to visit. The place is where my

⁷ If the escape is failed or escapee is caught by the Chinese police, they are returned to North Korea. Then, they are imprisoned in the camp or are publicly executed. Many North Korean women are sold to older Chinese farmers or on the sex market. They live in China without nationality or human rights because China does not regard them as refugees.

⁸ Because of Kim, the distrust is rampant in North Korean society, and there is a saying: "don't believe even your ear".

mother, younger brother, and my daughter live until now (interview with Lee).

Lee has two daughters. One is at a prestigious university in Pyongyang without her mother, and the other is the international Chinese ‘stranger’ in South Korea with her mother. What hope is there for these new generations?

Many socialist countries collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s. At that time in North Korea, around one million people died of hunger (Lee 2004). Many specialists expected that the North Korean regime would collapse soon. However, even though 29 years have passed, Kim’s regime is going stronger. How?

Lee’s family history states that, currently, North Korean society has no one who will fight for freedom and truth. Most of Lee’s grandmother’s generation has died. They are accustomed to discrimination and suppression. The great totalitarian ideology and space control their life like a fish in a bowl. Even the careful system of surveillance and terror appears to be no longer needed to rule them. There is no earnest seeking for truth among Pyongyang citizens. As the metropolitan people embrace ‘anonymity (Simmel 1903)’ to protect their psyche, the totalitarian citizen learns ‘indifference’ about the truth to protect their daily life.

However, in Pyongyang, new desires emerged among citizens because of the market system. Women want cosmetics and clothes produced by South Korea and the man wants the prostitute at the cheap eating shop⁹. In history, the desire for freedom shows its power by even collapsing the closed society. Seo (2001) argues that ‘like the meaning of *Juche* (subjective) ideology, it will break the system by itself’. However, ‘the man with deathly wounded experience knows the law of life’. The legacy of totalitarianism is like the untruth, indifference, and ‘the fear’. It will protect the system with a duality. On the other hand, ‘the hope’ would try to destroy the system by the desire from the market system. It is because ‘on the actual obedience, especially powerful motives are fear and hope: the fear of the revenge of spell and authority, and the hope of guarantees of this world and the next’ (Weber1919).

About 100 years ago, Christianity and modernity brought the hope of freedom to Pyongyang and destroyed all traditional chains (See Chapter 5). Nowadays, the new great

⁹According to Lee, her husband went the high rank hidden bar with prostitutes in the beginning of the 1990s. It was on western part of Pyongyang station.

power of neoliberalism and globalization enters from the outside world and desire emerges from the inside. Neoliberalism could work as ‘the millstone of the devil (Polanyi 1944)’ but also may give new hope of freedom through its liberal power.

Chapter 3

Arendt and Lefebvre's theories as foundational research

3.1 Analysis of totalitarianism according to Arendt's theory

3.1.1 The definition of totalitarianism

Before the modern age, there was no crystallized pure power because of the lack of ideology and technology. The birth of the nation-state in the 20th century developed technology and administration systems, and the terrifying pure power was born (Giddens 1987). Unlike the existing power, it could regard total terror and obedience against all the nations as not only for the means but also for the ends as the enemy of democracy and freedom. The total domination that aims for 'the destruction of humanity where it has ruled' is totalitarianism (Arendt 1979: viii).

Totalitarianism is different from dictatorship or absolutism. While dictatorship aims to control the body of masses through seizing military power, totalitarianism aims to control man's spirit through terror and propaganda. Unlike dictatorship, totalitarianism is not satisfied with the monopolization of production methods, surplus, or human activity. It is satisfied only with the total blind obedience of people who live in its political boundary. While the leader of a dictatorship tends to achieve power from the subject, the leader of totalitarianism, as the representative of the masses, tends to share 'the communal historical consciousness' with the subject. 'The total domination is the only form of government with which coexistence is not possible (Arendt 1979: xxviii)'.

	Dictatorship	Totalitarianism
Aim	Power domination from the subject (obedience by the power)	total blind obedience (active and religious obedience)
Strategy	control the body of masses (lawlessness control)	control man's spirit (the destruction of moral humanity)

Nature of Governance	Unlawfulness (*non-dictatorship is lawfulness)	Terror
Means	Military control	Police control, Terror, Ideology injection
Character	- By one party by one man - Controlled by Military power	- By support of the masses - Shared historical destiny (Movement) - The pseudo-religious coloring

Table 3.1: The Comparison between Dictatorship and Totalitarianism

Fridrich (1965: 21) presents six characteristics that make up the ‘syndrome’ of totalitarian dictatorship: 1) ideology, 2) one party by one man, 3) terror, 4) monopoly of communication, 5) monopoly of weapons and 6) central economy. In addition, Giddens (1987: 348) states the social characters as follows.

The nature of totalitarian control includes

1. Intense surveillance activity: a) intelligence gathering of the nation b) surveillance of the nations’ activity, reinforcement of police force
2. Moral totalitarianism: as a political community, shared historical consciousness of destiny
3. Terror: maximization of the police force, random attachment of property
4. Personality cult for ruler: not by military power but by the support of the masses

However, the monopoly of surveillance and power is also a basic characteristic of the modern state. Max Weber (1921: 189-192) states, ‘a state is a kind of political organization for government, and it needs the monopoly of physical power’. As a result, ‘nowadays, the violence could be justified only with national allowance’. Similarly, Polanyi (1944: 598) contends that ‘freedom for all is nowadays possible by state control and surveillance’. As a result, the monopoly of surveillance and power by the state is not evil in itself but is the nature of the modern state. Therefore, totalitarianism is not a mutation of history. It is ‘the backside’ of technical development regarding surveillance and violence (Giddens 1987: 340). Therefore, totalitarianism is the other side of the modern state that shows the pseudo-religious coloring.

The foundation of this movement is the belief of 'natural law' and 'historical law' toward evil.

I believe that my fighting against the Jews is the will of the Creator. At the same time, I am convinced that I am fighting for the Lord (Hitler, 1926: 38).

Finally, the religious coloring of totalitarianism asserts millenarianism. The leader of totalitarianism believes that he is just a representative of the masses, marching to 'natural law'. Arendt states the following regarding totalitarian movements and its different characteristics compared to Fascism:

The true goal of Fascism was only to seize power and establish the Fascist "elite" as uncontested ruler over the country. Totalitarian movements are mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals.... Totalitarianism is never content to rule by external means, namely, through the state and a machinery of violence... it eliminates the distance between the rulers and the ruled and achieves a condition in which power and the will to power, as we understand them, play no role, or at best, a secondary role. In substance, the totalitarian leader is nothing more nor less than the functionary of the masses he leads (Arendt 1979: 325).

The ruler of the totalitarian movement is not an oppressor but 'a spokesperson' for the masses. When the movement has matured, it follows its own 'law' instead of the needs of the nation; the movement tries to root out democracy and humanity.

3.1.2 The process for totalitarianism

According to Arendt (1979), the transition toward totalitarianism is a long and complex historical process with regard to the formation, expansion, and collapse of the nation-state and racism. Walter Benjamin (Moss 1991: 88) compares this series of processes to the metamorphosis of a butterfly that was born from the first republic of Germany. He mentions that "the German Empire by Hitler was evolved from the Weimar Republic ... A revolutionary spirit of German bourgeois had been modified into a pupa, and then from here, 'the deathful




Figure 3.1: The birth history of Nazism
[Source: Moss 1991: 88]

When this long transition process is simplified, it can be divided into two phases. The first is to eliminate all resistance organizations, and the second is to complete total control.

In the first phase, the mob assumes the main role. The core aim of the process changes the masses to the mob. In the case of Nazism, while the masses were born from starvation during industrialization, the mob was born out of the brutality and loneliness arising from the First World War and the Economic Depression. Initially, the mob consisted of the atomized masses, especially the ex-serviceman who “had nothing to lose and regarded the war as their home”. The mob destroyed the existing authority and fascinated the elite. The alliance between the mob and the elite destroyed the existing class system within the revolutionary atmosphere. However, the class disintegration caused the collapse of the party structure. Consequently, the masses became suddenly cold and hostile because no party had their interests in mind. As a result, the masses became the mob and they cried for a ‘stronger’ and ‘great leader’ (Arendt 1979: 30, 242).

After the solidarity between groups was destroyed, the second phase toward total control began (Arendt 1979: 69). The broad hostility blinds the masses' objective view. With the hostility, the totalitarian movement watches and rules the body and psyche of the masses. At the same time, the leader starts to make him an eternal ruler. In the case of Stalin, it needed 30

years and about 20 years for Kim Il Sung. The total control by Jucheism in North Korea was evolved from the birth of masses in modern society and passed socialism to purge all counterforces and completed it in the 1980s.



During the second phase, the main tool for total control is terror and ideology.

The uselessness of the camps, their cynically admitted anti-utility, is only apparent. In reality they are more essential to the preservation of the regime's power than any of its other institutions. Without concentration camps, without the undefined fear they inspire and the very well-defined training they offer in totalitarian domination, which can nowhere else be fully tested with all of its most radical possibilities, a totalitarian state can neither inspire its nuclear troops with fanaticism nor maintain a whole people in complete apathy (Arendt 1979: 456).

In the second phase, the masses are destroyed in concentration camps and in the city with ideological injection.

The process of Jucheism¹⁰ was different from Nazism. Nazism was born from German national pride. However, similar to the mention of colonialism by Fanon (1961), Jucheism stands on the hostility and violence against colonial control. The hostility and racism of

¹⁰ Jucheism is the totalitarian ideology of North Korea. 'Juche' means subjective in Korean. After Jucheism propagated around 1970s, North Korea made the camp for terror and radically showed the character of totalitarian state.

Pyongyang citizens were born from the sense of inferiority rather than from pride. Hence, Jucheism moves inside and stays in the present as ‘the millennium’, while Nazism had a strong historical consciousness for the progressive future. Unlike the endless war by Nazism, Jucheism of North Korea has not been at war for over 60 years even though it always encourages the mood of war.

	Nazism	Jucheism
birth	The national and racial pride	The sense of inferiority against Japanese colonial control
Character	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Being the object of hatred, the Jew - Movement for outside and for the progressive future 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - on rice, rearrange the class Movement for inside and for the timeless present
means	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Terror and ideology injection - Invasion for extending territory - No prepared the successor 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Terror and ideology injection - Encourage the mood of war but no break it - Achieved the succession of the power
length	13 years (1933~1945) 1 Generation	75 years (1945~2019) 3 Generation

Table 3.2: The Comparison between Nazism and Jucheism

The most specific difference of Jucheism is a temporal continuity over three generations until the present. All Nazi power was concentrated on one leader, so its system could not produce a successor. Accordingly, Nazism had obediently followed ‘the natural history’ toward evil and it was destroyed in a moment with Hitler’s death, and the case of Stalin was similar. However, Jucheism has continued, even beyond the first and second generation since Kim’s death, despite the fact that the regime experienced the Great Starvation around Kim Il-Sung’s death because of economic collapse. In social action, quantity is as important as quality. The time continuity gave the official market an opening in the totalitarian city of Pyongyang after 1994. The continuity in total control space produced a new generation who are ‘only a rebel from the waist downwards. They know when to cheer and when to boo, and that was all one needed’ (Orwell 1949: 196).

As a result, the transition process of totalitarianism in Pyongyang is divided into three phases. The first was to delete all resistance groups and political enemies between 1945 and 1967. The second was to establish the camp and ideology for total control between 1967 and 1989. The third is from 1993 until the present, which is totalitarianism overlapping the market system after the economic system was demolished.

3.2 Analysis of the totalitarian city: According to Lefebvre's theory

3.2.1 City as a social producer

Only with 'the thought' could a man not prove his time of life, because 'living is acting' (Rousseau 1761: 28). The time and life could be proved by the real being and acting. 'In the action, the actor gets a 'feeling' rather than 'understanding', and in most cases, it is done on impulse and is customary (Weber 1921: 142).

The core point of theory with Lefebvre (1991: 26) is '(social) space is a (social) product. The space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action; that in addition to being a means of production, it is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power; yet that, as such, it escapes in part from those who would make use of it. The social and political (state) forces that engendered this space now seek, but fail, to master it completely'.

He also states that 'a new society produces a new space' and 'a new space produces also a new society'. Rather than the time deciding the space, the space is ahead of the time. As the text outlives the moments of the speech, the space outlives the instant of time. Consequently, without a suitable spatial product, the words of 'changing life' or 'changing society' are empty echoes. If the thought cannot produce its own space, the shout of 'change' will remain just an idea (Lefebvre 1991: 115, 270). From this perspective, Arendt (2005: 160) contends that 'to keep the political freedom, "the agora" as a free space is needed'.

Then, according to Lefebvre's theory, what spaces are the social product of totalitarianism? The totalitarianism is not just an ideology but a movement. In order to go on the movement, it

asks two main engines and their space. One is the space of ideology as a fundamental thought that is able to control the masses as a law of nature and the other is the space of terror as a practice and driving power of the movement in everyday life.

Space of Ideology - fundamental system of thought

as the natural law of total control

Space of Terror - driving power and practice in everyday life

as the continuous movement with fear

3.2.2 The space of terror


In history, has the totalitarianism produced its own space? Yes. The decisive evidence that Nazism existed is not according to Albert Speer's idea of 'Berlin reconstruction' but is at Buchenwald in a small city of Weimar. The characteristics of the concentration camp are fundamentally different from the modern prison and hospital that Foucault (1975) mentions. The aim of Buchenwald was not to reform the abnormal into usable parts in society. The core aim of the camp was 'to make the peoples who are walking to the death like a puppet doll'. It was possible by gradually invoking the fear of death. In a totalitarian society, terror is not the means but the end (Arendt 1979, Friedrich¹¹ 1965, Orwell 1949). Without the concentration camp and its vague fear and strict training, the totalitarian state could not drive the core unit into fanaticism and maintain the nations' indifference (Arendt 1979: 246, 547). The concentration camps are laboratories for the experiment of total domination (Arendt 1979: 436). The terror is the starting point and the end of totalitarian control and the concentration camp is the social product and the producer of the totalitarian movement. The main evidence of totalitarianism is the existence of the concentration camp for terror.

In the phase of total control, the totalitarian city produces the space of terror and ideology in earnest. The two spaces then work actively together. In all ripe ideologies, the theoretical doctrine is injected through experiences and desires (Arendt 1979: 321). In addition, at the core

¹¹ Friedrich (1965: 129) mentioned that 'two main characters of totalitarian control are propaganda and terror, and especially terror is the most important element to unite the mass and to accept the propaganda'.

of the experiences are the destruction of humanity and the presence of fear (Orwell 1949: 373). The fear of death supports the ideology, so without the space of terror, the space of totalitarian ideology cannot gain power for its movement.

According to Bauman (1989), the progress of extinction and massacre in modern society has six steps as shown below:



In the case of the Jews, preparation of the isolated space at the center of the city is the starting point of terror. However, the extreme and durable fear is caused by the vagueness rather than by the visible substance. Even though the concentration camp was established outside of the city, the citizen could see that Jews had disappeared and they witnessed the empty train returning from beyond the city. The location of the camp is not less important than allowing citizens to feel certain that somewhere there was a terror as terrible as hell.

3.2.3 The space of ideology

According to Friedrich (1965: 88), ideology is essentially an action-related ‘systems’ of ideas. It typically contains a program and a strategy for its realization and operational code,

and its essential purpose is to unite organizations. On the other hand, 'an ideology as 'ism' is a recent event. From a historical perspective, there had not been the pure political potential of ideology before Hitler and Stalin. The word 'logoi(logic)' of 'idea', implies the continuous changing process, in other words, 'movement'. An ideology subordinates all experiences into its idea. Accordingly, all ideologies involve the nature of totalitarianism, but its full bloom is only possible under 'the movement' of totalitarianism (Arendt 1979: 269-273)'.

Incidentally, the separation of thought from all experiences is possible through the repetition of everyday life (Gramsci 1935: 183), and the separation process demands the total control space (Lefebvre 1991: 328). It is because the theory holds that the 'essence' of totalitarianism is 'to be seen in such a regime's total control of the everyday life of its citizens, of its control, more particularly, of their thoughts and attitudes as well as their activities' (Friedrich 1965: 16).

Lefebvre (1991: 415-418) postulates that the space of ideology is the space of power and it abstracts the experiences as an idea. This abstractive space is used as the tool for sweeping aside the differences and all resistance. The real subject of the space that is the political power hides its body within transparency. The space is talked about and written about. However, in reality, it has nothing to say and to experience.

In the abstractive space, the controlled space coexists with the practiced space, and two spaces continually interfere with each other. However, the controlled space always wins and it abstracts all difference by the three elements of homogeneity, in other words, the elements of geometry, visual, and phallic. Finally, the abstractive space from ideology controls the reproduction of meaning through the experience. Then, the totalitarian city under the total experience only produces suppression and fear, even though the space appears full of happiness and pleasantness (Lefebvre 1991: 230, 260, 415).

Chapter 4

The historical witness of totalitarian cites

4.1 Nuremberg: a sacred city under National socialism

This chapter comparatively studies past totalitarian cities to examine their characteristics in order to guide the direction of the study.

Many studies claim that the representative ideologies of totalitarianism are Nazism and Stalinism. While the era of Mussolini and Franco are sometimes mentioned, it remains unclear whether these regimes produce the spatial characters of totalitarianism as a social product. For example, Neri (2013: 2) presents two different features of urban development that were repeated during the 20 years of Mussolini's regime. First, a directional city would lie along either the north-south axis (Flaminia-Appia) or the Tiber. Second, a decentralized and unevenly distributed city would spread out in all directions, and polycentric residential neighborhoods were located around social services, such as schools, post offices, and sports centers. However, these characteristics were not very different from western modern cities of the age as much as admitting it for the totalitarian city.




Figure 4.1: The Masterplan for the Foro Mussolini (1932-33)

[Source: , 'Landscape and City during Fascism: Enrico del Debbio's Foro Mussolini', In: Bauhaus-Institut für Geschichte und Theorie der Architektur und Planung Symposium, November 21-22, 2013]

Nazism influenced urban space planning throughout Europe during World War II, but the most affected cities were near the homeland, such as Berlin, Munich, Düsseldorf, and Nuremberg.

In the early years of National Socialism, Hitler wanted to make Munich the capital of the Nazi movement (*Hauptstadt der Bewegung*) and incorporate the neoclassical buildings, such as Königsplatz (the chapel for Nazi's martyrs), *Verwaltungsbau der NSDAP*. In 1940, Hitler suggested a new city plan for Munich in which the great axis would lie in an east-west direction, but the plan was never realized.



Figure 4.2: A model of the new Munich

[Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3561575/Hitler-planned-Nazi-metropolis-Germans-won-war.html>]

At the start of World War II, Hitler considered making Berlin the capital of the Third Reich. During the preparations for the 1936 Summer Olympics in Berlin, to help disseminate propaganda through the city, the regime constructed a colossal stadium and redesigned Lustgartenplatz with paved slabs and Hakenkreuzflags. The Third Reich's plan for Berlin laid the legal groundwork with "the law of German cities reconstruction (*Gesetzüber Neugestaltung deutscher Städte*)" in 1937. According to the law, the chosen area for reconstruction limited the private property rights, and the rights devolved to the Nazi regime (Kwon 2011: 105). Hitler dreamed of establishing Berlin as Reich's capital with Albert Speer – Hitler's favorite architect and, later, armaments minister – but the goal was never realized because of Germany's loss in World War II.

Among the cities affected by the Nazi regime, Nuremberg was a specific city in the context of demonstrating the characteristics of a totalitarian ideology. While Nuremberg was smaller than Munich and Berlin, the city plan during the Nazi regime was realized, especially with the mass movements of marching and religious actions. The existence of space for movement is an important aspect of totalitarian cities because, unlike in dictatorships, totalitarianism is not satisfied with physical control but seek psychological control of the masses. Nuremberg was important not only for being the first capital of the German Reich but also for, as Lefebvre (1991: 81) mentioned, having the needed space for a religious and political movement that could enhance practical actions.

The new construction program of the National Socialists occurred between 1934 and 1938, and during its development, architects distinguished themselves from the modern style (Fischer 2008: 5). In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler (1926: 18) claims the state needed monumental buildings for the public (such as churches, cathedrals, city halls, and towers), rather than buildings for profit (such as department stores and hotels owned by Jews). However, the Nazis' architecture style was not new; it imitated the art of antiquity because Hitler believed that "it is better to imitate good than to produce new bad" (Fischer 2008: 5).




Figure 4.3; Roll call of the Reich Labour Service (*Reichsarbeitsdienst*) on the Zeppelin Field in 1936 [Source: Siegfried Zelnhefer, *Zeppelin Field - A Place for Learning*, City of Nuremberg, 2017]

In addition, Nazi architecture borrowed much from Prussian and Schinkel's classicism, which embodied the form of an exaggerated neoclassicism. The oversized, neoclassicism-

inspired buildings appeared blocky because of the monumental symmetry (Fischer 2008: 6). Hitler presented the aim of his architecture as “to hand his era and the spirit into posterity.” He mentioned the architectural value of imperishability with the following words: “What is the legacy of the Roman Empire? If there aren’t buildings, how could we watch that era in present days?” (Speer 1966: 93). As Speer explained, *architecture* was a “magic word” to Hitler because it could shape the population and leave a lasting legacy that would endure far into the future (Macdonald 2006: 108). Hitler wanted to instill the power of the Third Reich into the architectural property of eternity.

However, his concept was not limited to imitating the image of the historical authoritative style. His final purpose for the Third Reich’s city was not to borrow from the past but to draw absolute power in the future. The absolute space would help the absolute power naturally settle there because “when the time is not separated with the space, the meaning of space is directly permeated in the present time” (Lefebvre 1991: 356).

The Nazi regime embarked on an ambitious building program that would refashion German cities with new monumental spaces and structures intended to encourage Germans to focus on the glory of their country, as well as on the goals and values of National Socialism. Architecture, in particular, was considered a powerful expression of national greatness (Hagen 2006: 158).




Figure 4.4: 'Ugly' to 'beautiful': building on Enbersgasse, before and after renovation in Nürnberg [Source: Hagen 2006: 170]

To shape Nuremberg into the symbolic city of the Third Reich, the space and images of the old town were redesigned as well. For example, to make Nuremberg appear medieval was a historical allusion to the imperial First Reich, which had a base in Nuremberg, and the Third Reich intended to appear as its eminent successor. The Third Reich began by renaming the square (originally called the Hauptmarkt) to Adolf-Hitler-Platz. Toward the end of 1933 and early 1934, more substantive measures were undertaken to redesign and improve Adolf-Hitler-Platz for the 1934 rallies. Nuremberg's Jewish synagogue regarded as the worst building was demolished in 1937. The Telegraph Building, built in the 1870s in the neogothic style, was renovated with a simplified facade (Hagen 2006: 167).

In addition, most of the historic municipal buildings underwent some degree of restoration during the Nazi period, including the town hall, the Holy Spirit Hospital, and many of the town's churches. In 1941, the administration claimed that municipal funds were partly responsible for the restoration of approximately 400 buildings. Because of the renovation, Nuremberg became the most preserved large city left over from the German Middle Ages, and it connected the image of the Third Reich with the golden age of the Holy Roman Empire. The renovation was not limited to the buildings' images: their functions occasionally changed. For example, not only was the Nuremberg Castle's exterior altered, but also its function was converted into an immense youth hostel, with facilities for Hitler Youth Leaders (Hagen 2006: 168–169).

Party rallies took place not only on the designated rally grounds but also through the streets of Nuremberg's old town. Hitler's procession moved along the backdrop of the steep gables, timber, and leaded windows, thus bearing an imprint an "eye impact" of imperial processions of earlier times (Macdonald 2006: 111). The construction for military parades was 60 meters wide and was planned with a length of two kilometers, though only 1.5 kilometers were completed.¹² The area was intended to accommodate the troops' marching or standing next to the street, though this intention was never realized (Birkholz 2013: 3).

¹² The road for military parade in Pyongyang is about 25 meters wide with a length of two kilometers.




Figure 4.5: Model of the Nazi Party Rally Grounds in Nürnberg, 1936
[Source: Hagen 2006: 161]

The main characteristic of National Socialist architecture is the selected materials. Granite, partly because of its hardness and durability, was chosen for Congress Hall (Maxdonald 2006: 112). The exaggerated monumentality and gray stone of the buildings created a particular effect and their cold, menacing appearance generated awe in the people. The heavy horizontal stone facades conveyed a sense of impenetrability and eternal size. The colorless architecture indicated that the National Socialists wanted to be taken seriously (Fischer 2008: 7).

In the National Socialists' era, the characteristics of urban space and architecture in Nuremberg were as follows:

- Neoclassical style
- The scale of awe for monumental building¹³
- Redesigned the existing building for the medieval style
- Colorless architecture
- Using gray stone
- Parallel rows of columns as military symbols
- The large axis street crossed the city
- Propaganda across the city with the symbol of the Swastika

¹³During Hitler's speech for construction workers in 1939, he said, "Why must it be huge always? What I want is to construct the German Nation's pride" (Speer 1966: 112).

The reason that the National Socialists raised Nuremberg as their ideal city was reflected in more than the physical characteristics. The principal elements that portrayed the attributes of a totalitarian city were in the spaces for experiencing religious and political rituals.¹⁴ Erving Goffman (1956: 2) claimed, “A man’s impressions are created by his or her expressions.” Nazi political celebration was a central component of the party’s ideological system, and it toward an increasing reliance upon political ritual as a means of ideological presentation (Taylor 1981: 505). In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler (1925: 492) describes the emotional mechanisms of mass parades within a socialist rally in Berlin, which occurred right after the end of World War I:

A sea of red flags, red scarves, and red flowers gave to this demonstration, in which an estimated 120,000 took part, an aspect that was gigantic from the purely external point of view. I myself could feel and understand how easily the man of the people succumbs to the suggestive magic of a spectacle so grandiose in effect.

Hitler wanted the rally, which would start on November 9 and last eight days, to encourage a sense of battle, enhance the pride of the Third Reich’s citizens, and instill obedience. During the Nuremberg Rally in 1935, Hitler suggested the aims of mass rallies when addressing the German youth:

My German youth. You are here today in this place, in the whole of Germany. And we know that you German boys and girls are taking on everything we hope for from Germany . . . we want to see one Reich this day. And you must train for it. We want our people to be obedient. And you must practice obedience (from the documentary film *Triumph of the will*).

The rallies were extraordinary political spectacles. They drew heavily on a tradition of German national festivities and public celebrations dating back to the mid-nineteenth century,

¹⁴The experience of religious ritual was celebrated at the Schlageter Memorial in Düsseldorf, but the largest ceremony was performed in Nuremberg.

but they were designed to employ every conceivable tool that could transport crowds to a state in which they would subconsciously surrender themselves to the high drama and mystical euphoria of the moment. The result was often thought of as a “total work of art” (Hagen 2006: 162).

The visual and acoustic effects of the rallies were designed to inspire religious emotions in the minds of participants and spectators, and all architectural devices for religious experiences were delicately prepared. For example, the Zeppelinfeld in Nuremberg could hold almost a quarter of a million people, and its massive terrace, about 400 meters long, was topped by a white stone column. These grandiose architectural surroundings isolated the space from the outside the world to concentrate the participants’ attention upon the Führer’s stand (Taylor 1981: 512). In addition, the quasi-religious effect was further stimulated by the use of light Speer’s *Lichtdom*, or a “cathedral of light” being projected by numerous searchlights into the night sky (Macdonald 2006: 112).




Figure 4.6: The cathedral of light in Nürnberg Reichsparteitages, 1936
[Source: <https://diewahrheitistwieeingewitter.wordpress.com/2015/08/16/>]

The “sound out” in the entire city landscape was integral to dispensing propaganda. Hitler said, “Sound is more suggestive than the image,” and using sound was an intrinsic part of the desire to orchestrate sensory experiences and facilitate the consumption of national mythology, such as that of nationalist martyrs (Birdsall 2012: 32). During the marching, enthusiastic voices praised the Nazis, filling the entire city space with enthusiasm for the party. During the ceremony at the *Feldherrnhalle*, in which the 16 “martyrs” were to lie, Hitler called out their names and addressed the Hitler Youth and party members with the following comment:

Again and again, the thousands roar “Here!” . . . The testament of these first blood-witnesses is thus raised up to our entire Movement, whilst their spirit lives and works for Germany as its Eternal Watch (Taylor 1981: 508).

The aim of the Nuremberg Rally was not limited to spreading myths of national power or the future of the Third Reich. While the flag of the swastika expressed “our creed, of God and Volk, and land” (Taylor 1981:510), the ultimate aim of the rally was to establish messianic obedience to the Führer. Moreover, the Blood Flag and much of Hitler’s apparent charisma were derived from an analogy with the Christian concepts of the cross and the messiah. In practice, this meant that the NSDAP uprooted the sanctifying mechanisms of the church and replaced its holy objects with those of National Socialism in the following manner (Taylor 1981: 510-514):

Symbol world: (Representation of Volks gemeinschaft)	Method of presenting the ritual imagery of:
Bloodflag/swastika	Sun and light or fire and blood
Führer-Hitler	Messianic ethos of Christ
The Volk	Blood and earth
Martyrs of the Movement	Salvation through a blood sacrifice, The foundation of an “eternal Reich”

On 9 November, the manifestation took place of the party’s ideology of the “new beginning” with the coming of the Third Reich. While at Nuremberg on Reichsparty Day, Hitler said, “I am never without you, and you are never without me” (Taylor 1981: 511). The redesigned urban space and elaborated architectural devices in Nuremberg acted as the “front stage” for the new messiah, whom the entire German nation obeyed. However, this front stage experience was used only at one event, but it affected the people’s “backstage” of daily life when they

went back to their living spaces, because “the expressions of social life [was] treated as a source of impression given to or taken by others, and it has been treated in terms of communicative role it plays during social interaction” (Goffman 1956: 160).

4.2 Moscow: mythical capital under Stalinism

In the process of establishing a totalitarian state, Stalinism purged millions of people from 1933 to 1938, even though most political hostilities had been eliminated. At the same time, Stalin reconstructed Moscow as the mythical totalitarian city. Stalinism implemented a visible artistic strategy and focused on supplying specific problems and specific solutions. Stalinists reprimanded everything that was specifically and clearly defined because the perfect building had to be absolute, total, and all-inclusive. This totalitarianism required unification within itself of all sources of opposition. It discarded nothing but took on everything and searched for fitting places for everything. People who insisted on a specific claim were judged guilty because they had (from the perspective of the party) lost sight of this crucial unity of opposites. The message of unity of contradictory opposites formed the essential foundation of Stalinist totalitarianism (Groys 2003: 113).

During this most formative decade in socialist realism, architectural schemes and tropes became dominant sources for political rhetoric (Cleark 2003: 4) for a particular reason: the arming of the eye involved learning to see. This learning was an epistemological training flight, one ending in ideological competence, disciplined blindness, and heightened vision. During the shaping of Stalinist subjects, space as discourse is used in three dimensions through which the subjects move. One may define ideological space as the language that seeks to transform life on a poster into life on the skin. Instead of bringing a poster to life, discourse can transform life into a poster, producing subjects all too aware of the ideological inadequacy of the three-dimensionality sham (Naiman 2003: xii).

In June 1931, a plan for rebuilding many of the major Soviet cities was first announced and then in 1935, “The Master Plan for the Reconstruction of the City of Moscow” was introduced. Instead of St. Petersburg, Moscow was selected as the capital to symbolize the nation’s renewal,

because of its unique urban structures and images. From the Stalinists' perspective, St. Petersburg's broad streets and grid-like street plan represented modernization and Westernization. The detractors believed those features represented soullessness and a fatal distortion of Russia's historical path. On the contrary, Moscow had historically developed in outward circles, with the medieval fortresses' dynamics eventually replaced by those of ring roads. This historical urban space was made onion domes and narrow, higgledy-piggledy lanes, which seemed to be veritable embodiments of a more spontaneous, spiritual, and organic Russia (Cleark 2003: 6). The Master Plan reflected the historical ring road more to be a concentric expansion; according to the plan, the streets were made broader and straighter (Zinovieva 2014: 2). When explaining the point in *Stalin and Voroshilov in the Kremlin*, Jan Plamper (2003: 29) describes the figure of Moscow in the following manner:

Finally, we see the city sprawl of Moscow. The new Moscow, reconstructed according to Stalin's general plan, is signified by the "House of the Government," newly built Big Stone Bridge across the Moscow River to the far right, and the smokestacks beyond. The old Moscow, symbolized by the three cupolas of a Russian Orthodox Church, has moved to the background. The Old Russia, as it were, had been overcome. The House of the Government was specifically moved into the picture, as Gerasimov admitted, perhaps to imply the closeness to Stalin of the Party and intelligentsia elites who resided there.

In the 1920s, the Soviet state constructed simple, asymmetrical, and flexible designs for factories, office buildings, schools, workers' clubs, and communal houses, with the idea of social equality and communal life, work, and leisure time. During this decade, the Soviet government declared its industrial revolution and many nonproduction constructions; for example, apartment buildings or clubs bore images of industrial facilities or machines. While prioritizing the public space, Soviet planners ignored the individual space and purified it by driving out the market (Clark 2003: 5). However, the characteristics of the urban space in Moscow during the 1920s were not quite different from the space of Western modern cities. In less than ten years, the constructivist architects in the Soviet state were reflected by Western architects, such as Le Corbusier. In addition, the constructivists attempted to change society by

promoting not only a desire for equality, democracy, and freedom but also dreams of a new and happy city that would be good for all (Zinovieva 2014: 3).



Figure 4.7: Okhotnyi Riad (Hunters' Row) district in the 1920s. This was the site for the proposed Palace of Labor and , later, Hotel Moskva. [Source: Paperny, Vladimir (2002), *Architecture in the age of Stalin: Culture two*, Cambridge University Press, p9]

The dictatorship's urban plans borrowed many similar approaches from 1930s Germany, Italy, and Spain. Similar to totalitarian cities in the 1930s, Moscow's architecture expressed the classical style, which originated from ancient Greece, such as neoclassicism, revivalism, or pseudo classicism, to link the Stalinist empire to Russia's respectable past and promises for the future. The absolute spiritual passage supplied the best possible description of architecture in the Stalinist period and allowed all historical styles and aesthetic systems to rise from the dead. Stalinist architecture, in this way, wanted to direct every historically founded aesthetic style to its own place in the whole. Thus, Stalinist architecture became a constructed ideology (Groys 2003: 117).




Figure 4.8: The Plan, *Avenue of the Palace of the Soviets* by the Second Architectural Planning Studio, 1936 [Source: Parerny 2002: 63]

The reconstruction of Moscow in November 1934 was somewhat more confusing for the citizen. The new culture demolished many architectural objects and then immediately started to imitate places such as the walls of Kitai Gorod, Sukharevskaya Tower, and the Iverskaya Chapel. The new culture established itself in a peculiar way: by destroying the kindred and decorating the hostile. On July 18, 1931, as propaganda and a smokescreen, an architectural competition for the Palace of the Soviets was announced, which would be built on the site of the demolished Cathedral of Christ the Savior. In 1933, the classical and authoritative style of the project achieved a final prize, but this achievement was not final: the design process did not stop until the early 1960s. Regarding the situation, Le Corbusier wrote the following words to Aleksandr Vesnin in 1934: “It is hard to accept the fact that they will actually erect that odd thing which recently had flooded all the journals” (Parerny 220: 1–3).




Figure 4.9: Left- demolished Cathedral of Christ the Savior, Right - first prize of the Palace of the Soviets in 1933 [Source: Parerny 2002: 2, 5]

One distinguishing characteristic of Stalinist architecture, in contrast to other totalitarian cities, was the widely adapted ornaments. Between the 1930s and 1950s, the Soviet Union used an Art Deco for the propaganda-related needs much more than other totalitarian cities. In the United States and later Western Europe, architects stopped building with Art Deco during the war, and they then incorporated simplistic designs that reflected the economic, political, and social changes after the war. In contrast, between 1947 and 1953, the Moscow landscape represented the peak and the swansong of the Stalinist era, which were elaborately decorated with sculptures, ceramics, mosaics, and natural stones (Zinovieva 2014: 1-9). The top decoration on the building was the statue of Stalin similar to the Nazi's use of the swastika.



Figure 4.10: The project for the Moscow State University Building
[Source: Parerny 2002: 204]

The new odd style did not lend rational and logical interpretations to all citizens. Nevertheless, communication was taking place through other channels and with other codes. The messages of the new culture, which the theoreticians of the previous one did not comprehend, were received and understood by somebody (Parerny 2002: 12). Adorno (1969: 70) mentioned that the regression of thought into the uniformity was caused by the lack of not only “thought” but also “experience.” To live in Moscow during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s meant living in urban spaces filled with authoritative decorations. In the public space, the citizens could see only their surroundings and it would help if they could accept “unified thought”.

To mold and retain the citizens of unified thought, Moscow had to produce the myth of progress for the endless ideal city. The Moscow under the Stalinist regime constantly changed to accommodate the symbol of the endless city in an ultimate era. Between 1932 and 1954, the whole process of Soviet architecture comprised the following three elements:

1. A continuously working machine for the production of projects, of which only an insignificant portion made it to the construction site
2. The uninterrupted demolition of architectural constructions—often those that, according to the reconstruction projects, were the focal points of the composition
3. Construction according to continually changing projects—for example, an oral directive given by a leader as he drove by, which could take the place of a project (Parerny 2002: 252)

The mythical image of the continuously changing city is not produced only in an actual urban space. Similar to Hitler's unshaped architectural desires, the spatial myth of Moscow was repeated on the "paper architecture". After 1933, millions of square meters of drafting paper bore the execution of facades, plans, and axonometric and perspective drawings. These projects were then corrected by Moscow's city committee (which belonged to the Communist Party) and Moscow's city council, and in Arplan, they were redone and redrawn so that they could be moved aside, destroyed, or used for some other purpose, often in another studio (Parerny 2002: 251).

In the process of creating mythological space, the Moscow Metro played a central role in the Stalinist architecture. To establish a heaven on earth, Stalinist culture constructed heaven underground because that space could not be inherited. The space was completely dependent on the will of those who created it. The citizens of the western metropolis experienced the underground not as a utopian space but as a mere technical convenience. The Moscow Metro of the Stalinist era functioned in an entirely different way, and traces of this earlier utopian function are still there today. The Moscow Metro of the Stalinist era was not, primarily, an ordinary source of public transportation but rather the design for an actual city of the communist future (Groys 2003: 117). Moreover, in contrast to the aboveground palaces for the

rich, the underground palaces of the metro were not owned privately but by the collective, and entrance to them was open to everyone. The metro represented a structure of ritual and splendor that, by definition, could not be owned by one person. Its very existence was seen as the manifestation of “Stalin’s concern for the common man” (Ryklin 2003: 226).

The 1935 Master Plan included the Moscow Metro. The first metro line (the Red Line) was opened in May 1935 and by Stalin’s death in 1953, 40 underground stations had been created along lines that stretched up to 50 kilometers long. The stations were decorated with stained glass, mosaics, majolica, semiprecious stones, stucco, sculptures, and reliefs looked more like underground palaces from a fairy tale than transportation nodes (Zinovieva 2014: 8). The mythical effect of the metro was created not only after the metro’s completion but also during its construction, with the expectation and the experience of seeing and working.

In addition, during the 1930s, the metro was the subject of a number of children’s books. For example, in the enthusiastic book *Ready! Stories and Poems of the Metro*, an old peasant visits the metro station where his daughter has been working (Ryklin 2003: 265):

They rode the train in a comfortable car, went on the escalator, and saw all the stations. The old man still couldn’t bring himself to put his hat back on, but kept it in his hands, saying, “Who would build such rich palaces for you, Katyasha, underground?”

“Who would build them for us?” Katya answered. “We built them ourselves; we did the digging, and we put up the palaces.”

Nikita Potakov put on his hat, embraced his daughter, and kissed her soundly, saying, “What a wonder you’ve shown me, daughter! I’m staying with you; I’m going to live in Moscow.”

During Stalin’s reign, the Moscow Metro network was designed and constructed to enhance efficiency and accommodate propaganda. Heavily decorated, temple-like Stalinist buildings with their unpractical lodges, balconies, galleries, and spires now required expensive maintenance (Zinovieva 2014: 2). The metro was replete with marble, gold, silver, and other expensive materials associated with the glorious past, which was thus occupied by the utopian present. In the construction of the Moscow Metro, all traditional artistic styles were severed

from their historical ties and used in new ways. In the process, the past became indistinguishable from the present and future. Even in the depths of antiquity, all one could see was Stalin, Soviet flags, and people who looked optimistically toward the future (Groys 2003: 119).



Figure 4.11: The Metro in Moscow constructed during Stalin's five-year plan of 1928-1933
[Source: <https://eithnenightingale.com/2015/09/11/the-magnificent-moscow-metro/>]

In the metro, passengers could “see” the logic of the new ideology: the people had built these palaces for themselves. Moreover, the images of the Moscow Metro were not to be contemplated, understood, or admired; instead, the images themselves were to observe the passengers, the masses, in transit. Stalin and others (the depicted administrators of the utopian hell) continually observed and judged the behaviors of the people rushing past them, and people in the metro continually sensed the observant and judgmental look that followed them. Today, all of the gods have fallen, but not long ago, one might notice how differently Muscovites behaved when they set foot on the holy ground of the metro (Groys 2003: 120).

The authoritative and mythical style of architecture affected other cities under the rule of Stalin’s regime. For example, a Stalinist utopia was built in East Estonia during the 1940s and 1950s to enable the Soviet regime to exploit local mineral resources. In 1949, approximately 20,000 inhabitants of Estonia were deported to Siberia within one night, under so-called liberal Stalinism. The political pressure radiating from Moscow compelled local Estonian architects to design urban spaces a style similar to that of Moscow. For example, the town of Narva and Kohtla-Järve suffered irrational demolitions and got axially arranged representative, sometimes

enormous but fairly perspective and functional plans (Sultson 2014: 4–7).



Figure 4. 12: The Stalinist Center of Kohtla-Järve that built in the early 1950s
[Source: Sultson, Siim (2014), *The Stalinisation of Estonian town planning: visions and heritage. p10*]

Nazis and Stalinists constructed totalitarian cities that could produce unified masses for total control. Both produced spaces of terror and borrowed the eternal authority from the neoclassical style of architecture, and through the repeated daily experience, the spaces functioned as highly effective propaganda. However, each regime's spaces emphasized different things: the Nazis' spaces, with their dull colors, had stronger characteristics that supported the masses' religious and political actions, and the Stalinist cities incorporated more brilliant and mythical properties.

4.3 Warsaw Ghetto: Space for terror

Since a space changes with a society, a city has the space of history (Lefebvre 1991: 29). Total control by terror produced a space of terror in the city, and it is one of the most important aspects of a totalitarian city. By studying Warsaw and the spatial process of the ghetto, this chapter shows how a space of terror can play a role of total control in an urban space.

The starting point of terror is distinction (Arendt 1979, Bauman 1989). In the context of Nazism, it was anti-Semitism. After Nazism radically changed its target to have a Europe

without Jews, the social designers of Nazism classified the value of human life between valuable and valueless. The former had the right to living (Lebensraum) with affection, and the latter had to keep its distance. If “keeping distance” was impossible, the valueless had to be annihilated (Bauman 1989: 126). At the beginning of the Nazis’ rule, concern for the Jewish problem was only of minor interest to Germany (Bauman 1989: 216). As time passed, however, the terror experienced by the Jews was implicitly approved. According to Kelman (1973: 46~52), the moral restraint against murderous acts can be destroyed when two conditions are met: routinization and the dehumanization of violence. He mentions, “in keeping with sanctioned massacres, the victims are converted into means in the most ultimate sense possible” and that “such extreme dehumanization becomes possible when the target group can readily be identified as a separate category of people” (Kelman 1973: 50). One of the most effective methodologies to routinize and dehumanize violence is to produce space in the center of a city in which attackers, victims, and observers can share the daily experience. Thus, Nazism constructed many ghettos not only in the home country but also in the German-occupied areas in Warsaw contained.

Ghettos were set up almost exclusively in Eastern Europe for two main reasons: First, many European cities (as opposed to those in Western Europe) already had large Jewish districts, so confining all Jews to those areas made the process of establishing ghettos more practical. The second reason was the perceived cultural and “racial” difference.¹⁵ Among those ghettos, Warsaw had the largest scale and many testimonies from survivors. In the space of terror, Hitler’s law taught and promoted unconditional obedience and asked all of the masses to say, “You have to kill” instead of “Thou shalt not kill” in the civilized country.

The revelation of the “banality of evil” with the prohibition of words and thoughts required a long process. Arendt (1963: 56-111) has classified the process of solving the Jewish problem in three steps: expulsion, concentration, and killing.

The First solution: Expulsion

¹⁵Yad Vashem, 'Lesson 4: The Ghettos', p105, Source: The international school for Holocaust Studies, <http://www.yadvashem.org/education/about-school.html>

The racism inevitably colligates with the strategy of alienation, and it leads the deportation and destruction: “Germany could get an amazing accomplishment by deporting Jews in stages. On the phased program, the remaining people rationalized the necessity of sacrificing the few for the many” (Bauman 1989: 126). The Nuremberg principles challenged the claims of “superior orders” and the “head of state” as ways of avoiding personal responsibility for war crimes (Kelman 1973: 46), and the principles contributed Jews to be second-class citizens. Though they were no longer citizens (Reichsbürger), they remained members of the German state (Staatsangehörige). The complete separation of Jews from other citizens was needed for only a few weeks and months (Arendt 1963: 95). Eichman’s assembly line for deporting Jews functioned in the following manner:

This is like an automatic factory, like a flour mill connected with some bakery. At one end you put in a Jew who still has some property, a factory, or a shop, or a bank account, and he goes through the building from counter to counter, from office to office, and comes out at the other end without any money, without any rights, with only a passport on which it says: “You must leave the country within a fortnight. Otherwise, you will go to a concentration camp.” (Arendt 1963: 102)

In the early process of identifying Jews, the separation of public spaces occurred in most of the cities occupied by the Nazis. For instance, in Prešov, the eviction of Jews from selected streets was launched in early 1941, and it was connected to restricting the rights of the town’s Jewish population. As early as 11 January 1941, the occupied government of Slovakia restricted the movement of Jews in public spaces. Jews were prevented from entering the public marketplace until nine o’clock in the morning, and other temporal and spatial restraints were imposed: only two cafés were left available for use by Jews. A section of the Hlinkova and Hlinka Streets was delimited for the Jews to use, and they were assigned places in local cinemas, baths, and on sports grounds (Pekar 2014: 4).

In Warsaw, the technique of Jewish differentiation first focused on contagious diseases, primarily typhus. The German press insistently pressed the conclusion that because of the danger carried by the Jews, there must be, as the slogan went, “*Keine Beziehungen mit den Juden* [no contact with Jews].” This was the basis of a regulation allegedly issued to protect

the health of the Aryan population. Jews were barred from restaurants, cafes, movies, parks, and so forth; they had separate sections in streetcars, trains, and shops; and they had to wait in different queues at post offices and other bureaus and live in separate quarters (WJC 1943: 12).

The Warsaw Ghetto was established in October 1940 and was the largest population center of its kind. The exact number of inhabitants could never be determined, but considering the influx of Jews from Western Germany and other places, the maximum population was estimated to be between 450,000 to 500,000 people. The unofficial calculations circulating in Warsaw, estimating the number to be between 600,000 and 700,000, were definitely exaggerated. By the end of the first year and a half, the population of the ghetto had diminished because of deportations to labor camps, escapes, and so forth and the number of births was insignificant (WJC 1943: 16).




Figure 4.13: Location of Warsaw Ghetto(Red Line) upon the map of Jewish community at the beginning of the 20th century (Basic map from: <http://jri-poland.org/warsaw/districts.htm>)

In the first solution of expulsion, the Jewish space in Warsaw was differentiated, and the area of the ghetto was matched with the existing Jews' community districts in some measure. At its peak, 500,000 people lived in the Warsaw Ghetto that is, about 40 percent of the population of Warsaw was crowded into a space comprising less than 5 percent of the city's total area (Winick 2005: 1).

The Second solution: Concentration

The Warsaw Ghetto had two primary purposes: The first was to get unpaid labor, whether skilled (tailors, shoemakers, locksmiths, etc.) or unskilled (street cleaning, clearing wreckage, local transportation, etc.). The second, which was strongly underscored by the offensive German propaganda, was not only to discredit the Jewish population in the eyes of their neighbors as non-productive speculators, lazybones, and people who lived off the work of others but also to indicate the “credit” of the German authorities (WJC 1943: 12). Arendt (1963: 142) has described the relation between the camp and enterprises in the following manner:

The camp was calculated according to the “absorptive capacity” of the various killing installations and according to the requests for slave workers from the numerous industrial enterprises that had found it profitable to establish branches in the neighborhood of some of the death camps. Apart from the not very important industrial enterprises of the S.S., such famous German firms as I.G. Farben, the Krupp Werke, and Siemens-Schuckert Werke had established plants in Auschwitz as well as near the Lublin death camps. Cooperation between the S.S. and the businessmen was excellent; Höss of Auschwitz testified to very cordial social relations with the I.G. Farben representatives.

The timetable of Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto was the following: From 6:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m., groups of Jews planning to work in various shops would gather in triple rows to march off to their workplaces. Everybody would hasten to the ghetto’s sole exit, at the crossing of the Gesia and Zamenhof Streets, where they were separated and went, under the escort of the securities and German soldiers, to their workplaces. After 8:00 a.m., a deathly silence would descend on the ghetto. The streets were deserted and no one was seen. Only SS men passing in cars or motorcycles would enliven this cemetery like ghetto during this period. During the lunch hour, shop wagons would appear in the streets, carrying kettles of soup for the workers in each block. At 6:00 p.m., the dead city would slowly return to life. Groups of sweating Jews would return from their shops and working units. In the evening time, dusk descended quickly, and the people hid in their homes, fearing the German patrols (WJC 1943: 34).



Figure 4.14: The isolated bridge connection the small and gig ghetto in Zielazna Street of Warsaw, June 1942 [Source: <http://ww2today.com/7th-june-1942-hope-and-despair-in-the-warsaw-ghetto>]

Working conditions in the factories were extremely severe. A Jewish worker would labor for 10–12 hours and received about one liter (less than a quart) of watery soup; some factories provided one-fourth of a kilogram of bread in addition to the soup. There was no question of wages (WJC 1943: 24). Aryan commercial enterprises were removed from the ghetto by the spring of 1941, but industrial enterprises employing Aryans and Jews remained. Because one kilogram of bread cost 10 zloty (two dollars) and one kilogram of potatoes cost about 5 zloty (one dollar), the daily trade amounted to about two pounds of bread or four pounds of potatoes for every 100 persons in the ghetto. The food ration cards that were issued were sufficient only for 5–7 percent of the daily needs. Official statistics list the number of deaths that occurred in the Warsaw Ghetto during the first quarter of 1942 as 14,692. During March 1942, 300 deaths took place on the streets alone, from starvation and exposure (WJC 1943: 14).



Figure 4.15: A starving man and two emaciated children begging on the street

[Source: <https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/daily-life-in-the-warsaw-ghetto>]

As time passed, the ghetto was filled with the fear of starvation and death. Abraham Lewin, a survivor of the Warsaw Ghetto, said, “The abyss is getting closer to each of us with the words: death, destruction, extermination, painful agony and eternal uncertainty; endless fear is the most terrible feeling among all our experience and suffering - so rough and tragic” (Janczewska 2013: 115). In addition, Rachela Auerbach (another survivor) expressed her mental state of that time as follows:

I was slowly growing a conviction that all the activities performed by our charity institutions should be called death in installments. We should finally realize that we cannot rescue anyone from death; we don't have such means. We can only postpone death, prolong it, but not prevent it. (Janczewska 2013: 120)

Though the poor condition of labor, the life of Jews in the ghetto depended on the labor license. If the factories and shops for food closed down, the Jews would have lost the right to live. Without that right, they would have become modern slaves.

The signs of modern slaves in the Warsaw ghetto:

1. Numbered and stamped of second citizens
2. Lived in barracks—without their wives
3. Wives and children removed, because slaves did not require families
4. Walked in crowds, not individually
5. Beaten and terrorized at work
6. Inhuman exploitation, like that of slavery labor
7. Ban on organization of any kind
8. Ban on any form of protest or sign of dissatisfaction
9. Every slave's life is dependent on his or her master. At any moment, a man could be sent to the Umschlagplatz.
10. The murderous disciplining and the sending of workers to forced labor camps because of lateness, as happened at Schultz's
11. Compulsion to work, even when a worker was sick with temperature

12. Worse off than slaves, because they had to look after their own food
13. Confiscation of property from a dead worker's family, because the right of inheritance has been abolished
14. Locked inside the residential block
15. Ban on leaving in their apartment and walking in the street after work hours
16. Limitation of personal freedom and movement
17. Worse than slaves, because the latter knew they would remain alive, had some hope to be set free. The Jews were *morituri*, or "sentenced to death." Their death sentence was postponed indefinitely.
18. The sick and the weak were not needed, so ambulatory clinics, hospitals, and the like were liquidated. (Sloan 1958: 319)

Though the Jews in the ghetto became the "modern slaves," the Polish government, realigned with the Nazi state,¹⁶ made an effort that the Jews became an object of elimination instead of utilization. In regard to the working conditions, the idea was to kill with labor (Arendt 1963: 142), and the Nazis abandoned the idea of starving the population to death because it would take too long (Winick 2005: 1).

In May 1942, the first signs of anti-Jewish terror appeared, particularly in Galicia, as well as cases of mass execution. Only vague details of the slaughter reached the Warsaw Ghetto because all communications had been terminated. The Warsaw Ghetto and the provincial ghettos were hermetically sealed with special guard formations, which enforced the minutest orders. In addition, the possibility of communication between Jewish centers was limited. The next step was to terrorize and disorganize the Jewish masses and paralyze the centers of possible resistance (WJC 1943: 16).

The Final Solution: Killing

In October 1941, Eichmann was instructed to enact the desirable final solution [Endlösung]

¹⁶ In 1939, the Polish government clarified its intention of eliminating Jews through an official declaration (Arendt 1963: 127).

for the Jewish problem, and he carried out the order. However, in the court of Jerusalem, he protested, “I am not a monster. I am just generated . . . I am a victim of mistake” (Arendt 1963: 148). The Milgram experiment (1974) demonstrated how the man obeyed authority. The executor was concerned only with completing the order, not with feeling moral responsibility. The experiment showed that obedience to the order was enhanced when the executor devaluated victims, and they acted only as the bridge between commander and test subjects. Since the executor shifted the responsibility to the commander, they lost any moral sense about their actions. Milgram (1974: 37) has argued it is a common characteristic of systematized social evil in the modern era.

In the article “My Visit to the Warsaw Ghetto” by Jan Karski, a reporter for the magazine *American Mercury*, he describes his meeting with three of the Warsaw Ghetto leaders in 1942:

The first thing they made clear to me . . . there was the absolute hopelessness of their predicament. For the Polish Jews, this was the end of a world. There was no possible escape for them or for their fellows. . . .

Q: Do you mean that every one of those presumably deported was actually killed?

A: Every last one. The Germans are not trying to enslave us as they do other people; we are being systematically murdered. (Pentlin 1991: 2)

According to the report by a refugee who escaped the Warsaw Ghetto, Germans began to raise their demands on September 1, 1942. They asked for 5,000–6,000 victims daily, sometimes even 10,000. There were days when 15,000 persons were deported. The SS officers, at the head of the Lithuanian and Ukrainian helpers, participated in a real pogrom on a large scale. They cruelly beat and shot at people who tried to hide and accidental passersby. They caught whomever they could manage to seize, but they mainly sought children and old people. In two weeks, some 100,000 people were deported (WJC 1943: 23). The September table of deaths indicates that of a total of 4,244, there were 3,158 deaths by shooting, 69 suicides, and 1,017 natural deaths. The percentages of deaths due to shootings were the following:

From September 1 through September 15: 94.2 percent

From September 16 through September 30: 5.72 percent

The daily average number of deaths due to shootings in September: 105.2
The number of deaths from July 22 through September 30, 1942: 10,380.
Of the total, deaths due to shooting: 5,961 (WJC 1943:32)

A picture of the Warsaw Ghetto in September 1942 showed the conditions of the streets: barbed-wire entanglements, wooden fences separating individual street blocks, and the complete absence of the throngs who, two months ago, had crowded the main streets of the ghetto, hastening to their occupations, buying and selling, and working. A human form sneaking stealthily along the walls, a curb spattered with blood, the smoke of smoldering fires, and the sharp odor of burning—such things made up the atmosphere of that city of fear, where before the day of July 22, close to 370,000 Jews “lived” in the shadow of the 16-kilometer wall enclosing the ghetto (WJC 1943: 11).

Once the slaughter for Jews was operating, it generated its own inertia (Bauman 1989: 186). On October 15, 1942, the tens of thousands who remained on Niska Street were killed, as well as 70 people in one apartment on Wolynska Street. In two days, 1,000 people were killed. During the selections for camp, hundreds were forced to kneel on the pavement but were soon killed (Sloan 1958: 312).



Figure 4. 16: Warsaw Ghetto roundup in 1943
[Source: <https://www.pritzkermilitary.org/explore/museum/>]

Psychologically, the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto were completely crushed. Certain questions continuously plagued them: “Why did we allow ourselves to be led like sheep to the slaughter? Why did everything come so easy to the enemy? Why could 50 SS men (some people say even

fewer), with the help of a division of some 200 Ukrainian guards and an equal number of Letts, carry the operation out so smoothly?” (Sloan 1958: 310). The news circulating throughout the streets inspired fear of death, pushing them toward insanity (Janczewska 2013: 117). Conversations during their long, sleepless nights focused on a sole question: When would it happen again? The dread of being deported to Treblinka tormented them incessantly (WJC1943: 34).




Figure 4. 17: Treblinka Camp established in 1940 near the Warsaw-Bialystok railroad line.

The above-mentioned path (9) skirts that building and runs along its western wall (11) and finally ends at the next building (12), near death house No. 1 (14). This building is at right angles to death house No. 2. [Source: WJC 1943: 4]

On April 19, 1943, at the beginning of the Passover feast, the Germans surrounded and attacked the Warsaw Ghetto. An uprising broke out, but if the total number of Jews is considered, not many Jews resisted. Arendt (1963: 62) has mentioned that only a small group of Jews rejected their being “massacred like lambs”. In response to the resistance, the Nazis destroyed the ghetto, leveled the buildings, and killed the few survivors (Winick 2005: 1). Massacring the Jews became a continuous activity, and with each passing day, the number of people decreased by the thousands. The entire city was filled with the smoke and stench of

buildings put to the torch and of burning flesh. Hunting the Jews became a national sport.¹⁷

In the Warsaw Ghetto, located in the center of the city, were the sounds of shooting and screaming every day. However, the citizens of Warsaw remained silent. The scene of death and destruction suppressed the masses as much as it encouraged them. Lifeless indifference and silence followed each occurrence of severe destruction. When they were overwhelmed with the desire to step back, it was too late (Bauman 1989: 266).

The spaces of terror, especially the ghetto and camp, are a major witness of the existence of the totalitarian state in human history, but it is not only for the past. Bauman (1987: 37) has claimed, “Buchenwald was the Western product as much as River Rouge in Detroit. The final solution (Endlösung) reveals the failure of the industrial system in Europe.” It means the space of terror such as the Warsaw Ghetto could reveal at any modern society and the space appeared in North Korea as well (See chapter 8.1).

¹⁷ Renata Zajdman, *A day in the life in the Warsaw Ghetto*, Mishpocha!, Source: www.holocaustchild.org

Chapter 5

Modernization and birth of ‘the Masses’

Modernization of Pyongyang was started by Christian liberal ideas. It emancipated the slave and woman and built many modern schools in Pyongyang. In addition, colonization by Japan changed urban space into a modern city. Christian liberal ideas and the colonial policy of Japan allowed the slave and the poor farmer to become the masses apart from past thought, rank, and land. However, radical colonial capitalization by great Japanese bureaucracy led to many social problems. It finally allowed Pyongyang to get a name not only as ‘the religious city’ but also as the ‘criminal city’. In the process, Christian liberal ideas lost their purity, and the citizen became an atomized mass as the urban squatter.

5.1 Christian liberal idea and city change

Simmel (1896: 11) mentioned that ‘the modern times broke the past community, land, feudal coalition or guild. However, this demolition of harmony helped the individual to be an autonomous man, and it gave inner and outer freedom of movement.’ In western history, modernization was started with the faith of man’s reason away from God and people moved from ‘human religion’ to ‘civic religion’¹⁸. However, modernization of Pyongyang was started with the faith of God because liberal ideas, as Medieval times, had not existed before.

5.1.1 Why Pyongyang?

Why in Pyongyang had the Christian liberal idea been in bloom? Saint Simon said ‘any social order cannot make the change if it had not been already in hidden conditions’ (Harvey 2003: v9). This chapter reveals the ‘hidden conditions’ of social change with Christian liberal

¹⁸ Rousseau (1754: 285) classifies ‘human religion’ and ‘civic religion’. Human religion serves God, but civic religion serves state and laws.

ideas. One main key is the political regional discrimination of Pyongyang for 600 years.

Firstly, the city of Pyongyang was constructed by the *Koguryo* nation in 247. In 586, the capital of its nation had been moved to Pyongyang with the great fortress and palace. In that time, Pyongyang and its boundary had about 200,000 inhabitants but it was destroyed by Chinese forces in 668.




Figure 5.1: Spatial expansion of Pyongyang, 586-2012

At the end of the 14th century, the *Joseon* Dynasty was founded and moved the capital from Pyongyang to Seoul and paid a tribute to China to avoid a military threat. With the disappearance of the military importance of Pyongyang, the region was discriminated for 600 years. Then, the northwestern nobleman could not get a high-ranking bureaucrat and this area was ruled by the southern part. The control by southern bureaucrat led the persecution of peasants by tax and forced labor was harder and the situation continued until colonization by Japan around the 1900s (Cumings 1981: 38).

The northwestern aristocrats had no basement and space to birth the high-ranking bureaucrat. The fertile land of Pyongyang was owned by a royal member from Seoul, government office, or migrant from the southern. The inhabitant was a victim of persons from other regions. The northwestern people had heavy dissatisfaction against

the southern aristocrats. Hence, the riot against the regime was more often and stronger than in other areas. (PLHCC 1957: 158)

‘The stranger comes from the merchant in whole economic history’ (Simmel 1908). In the early part of the 17th century, the aristocrats around Pyongyang entered into commerce, especially national trade with China, and they became the stranger in traditional society. Their status was like ‘enfranchised individuals’ in Ancient Rome as Weber(1962: 232) mentioned that ‘as a stratum, they were withdrawn from the specific type of ancient political capitalism; they were sent on a course of development toward a relatively modern type of burgher business.’

After the war with China in 1636, many peasants became personal craftsmen. During the war, most agricultural land was desolated, and bureaucracies took large portions of land. The peasant of Pyongyang who lost their land made up the redundant labor force. Even though the war demolished the land and the manual industry, the demand for high-quality handcrafts for the upper class was not reduced since they became the owner of large land and the demand for exclusive products for the Chinese high class increased. Accordingly, many peasants became personal craftsmen and established a guild called Ryusang. It collaborated with other existing guilds in the nearby cities of Keasung and Uiju (PLHCC 1957: 152). In that time, three guilds out of four, only one in the capital city of Seoul, appeared in the northwestern region around Pyongyang.

The national unified money was firstly issued in the northwestern region in 1784 and it promoted faster social change. Simmel (1896: 16-22) describes ‘the money is sometimes humble as an equivalent of all things’, but also ‘it gives a critical contribution to prepare a base of mutual understanding, to enact the regulation of equal act, and to construct the ideas of universal humanity’. The development of commerce and money made Pyongyang society more equal. In not only the city but in each town, a market was established, and the merchant and peasant participated (PLHCC 1957: 153). The commercial vitalization with the money equivalency began to destroy the boundary of traditional classes. In particular, the rich merchant could buy the aristocratic class with his money; the purity of aristocracy was damaged. The business community contributed to the spread of equality and mutual understanding of social relationships.

Nevertheless, the new promising class of merchants could not easily emerge from

traditional society. As ‘a merchant, as a stranger, is practically and theoretically a freer man about tradition, faith, and precedent (Simmel 1908)’, the merchant of Pyongyang was exposed to western liberal ideas during the trade with China and took an interest in them. For those who had experienced extensive political discrimination, the Christian liberal idea of ‘all people are equal and free in front of God’ was very attractive. In Korea, Catholicism entered not by a missionary but by a neglected aristocrat or merchant and the Christian liberal idea was an academic object at first but it progressed to an object of faith. Then it grew up as a revolutionary idea to awake modern society.

5.1.2 Birth of free space

In the early 20th century, Pyongyang became the center of Christianity with commercial development and produced much free and equal space. The role of Christianity was similar in the time of the medieval city that was out breaking by the ecclesiastical community in dissolving clan associations.

Christianity became the religion of these people who had been profoundly shaken in all their traditions. Indeed, it was possible for Christianity to become so important precisely because of the weakness or absence of this kind of magical barriers and taboos. Christianity itself was the final element in the destruction of the religious significance of the clans (Weber 1962: 106).

After visiting in 1892, William Hall assessed the condition of Pyongyang as that of ‘the disorderly city but with the great possibility of change’.

Pyongyang is the best location for missionaries in inland areas because of the following: 1) as the city is named the most disordered and dutiful, it provides missionaries with a challenge, 2) the city is famous for gangsters who hit anyone even a member of the public or a bureaucrat, 3) the population is over 100,000¹⁹ and there

¹⁹ In the 15th century, Pyongyang was local city with 8,128 household, but in the 18th century, the city became the

is a possibility for growth because the inhabitants are positive and enterprising, 4) the location is on the road between Seoul and Beijing, so conditions of road and even marine transportation is good, 5) the city has a brilliant history. (Hall 1978: 100)

In 1894, the Chino-Japanese War changed the mood of Pyongyang. Instead of Chinese merchants, 150 Japanese merchants entered Pyongyang after the war. At once, the Japanese changed urban space with railroads, telegraphy, and a bridge. In addition, during the Chino-Japanese, Pyongyang citizen experienced the brutality of modern war.

The corpses near the city were mostly covered by soil but at some distance, it was just spread. More than 20 corpses were just piled up... Somewhere, there was a heap of corpses and dead horses on the street over a hundred. This situation was after three weeks of war. (Hall 1978: 170)

The war produced a noticeable shock to Pyongyang citizens because they had not experienced a war last 270 years since 1627. In Pyongyang during the Chino-Japanese War, the Japanese army burned a private house for the smoke operation and killed civilians who did not serve Japanese. According to the experience of modern war, all citizens felt a fear of death.




Figure 5.2: Public execution of Pyongyang citizen by Japanese army in 1894

[Source: <http://www.clouds.or.kr/>]

secondary city of Korea with 30,905 household, 150,000 citizens. (Gang and Lee 1986: 30)

The medical work of the missionary left a deep impression on Pyongyang citizens²⁰. After the War, Pyongyang became a wasted city with infectious diseases spreading. In the situation, for example, missionary William Hall promoted the medical work and Korean Christians helped to carry patients. Even though he died from overwork at that time, his wife worked continuously and constructed Pyongyang Hospital in 1897. During four months, she treated 1,334 surgical patients and 1,011 general patients, which amounts to 32 to 84 patients per day. In 1898, she also constructed the hospital for women and the school for the blind in Pyongyang (Hall 1978: 184). The sacrifice of missionaries and Christians led to the diffusion of Christianity to the citizen and the first protestant church was established in Pyongyang in 1895.

Another reason why the citizens had an interest in Christianity was the political power of missionaries. Since the missionary had diplomatic immunity from the government, powerless persons attended to get the protection of their life and property under ‘the shape of a missionary’ (Yu 2006: 19). Harvey (2003: 298) states, ‘if there isn’t any relative system to get help in a crisis, a man could rely on only nation or charity’. Pyongyang citizens lost relatives and a national system after the war, and then they searched the mental and practical resources in the church.

According to Osterhammel (2003: 150), ‘the effect of the missionary appeared clearly in the field of education, welfare, and mediation of western cultural values’. The broader and direct effect of missionaries in Pyongyang also appeared in the field of educational work. While medical work connected only with the patient, the educational work dealt with the public. One missionary presented the effect of Christian schooling in Korean society as below (Mun 2004: 11).

²⁰ One of reason why Christian liberal ideas spread radically and led social change in Pyongyang is many missionaries were from America and Canada. Osterhammel (2003: 149-160) states different characteristics of American missionaries: ‘the developed colonialism always accompanied the disregard of the native culture in educational area. There were rare missionaries and teachers who were interested in the native culture. Especially, New England Puritan regarded that natives are ‘son of Satan’... However, American hoped not only elites but also native masses and introduced America cultures. American missionaries considered one of importance is to educate natives in colonized countries.

- 1) Technical treatment for the patient
- 2) Systemic protection for the poor and orphan
- 3) Decrease of superstition
- 4) Respect for children
- 5) Improvement of early marriage and marriage custom
- 6) Improving attitude to and treatment of women
- 7) Democratic ideas and revaluation of nation
- 8) Improvement of (cultural) education and supply of Korean language
- 9) Development of democratic communication and the demise of class discrimination
- 10) New interest in social welfare
- 11) Enlightenment regarding alcohol, drugs, etc.
- 12) Increasing request and respect for modern education

One noticeable effect of modernizing in Pyongyang through Christianity was the decrease of illiteracy. The Korean church taught reading and writing to enable the reading of a bible. An illiterate person who was below 30 years old could not receive baptism and a man until his wife who could not read was not allowed the baptism in a church (Mun 2004: 14-23). According to the process, common men and women could read not only a bible but a newspaper and magazines as well, which introduced ideas of modern society.

In 1897, American missionary W. Baird opened the Soongsil School for public education. It was established in western Pyongyang near the poor area, and it gave the opportunity of education for the public and the poor. Accordingly, the four-year college opened in Pyongyang in 1905 for the first time in Korea and taught modern law, philosophy, physics, and biology. With the college, the opportunity for education was now expanded into the son of a slave. The college was built by donations from Pyongyang Christians and produced active individuals for freedom and national independence. Similar to ‘agora’, the college served not only a place for studies but also an athletic venue, a place for speech, and a forum on a nationwide scale. This kind of liberal space had never existed before in Korean history. It assisted Pyongyang to be a modern city.



Figure 5.3: A forum in Soongsil college of Pyongyang [Source: <http://www.ssu.ac.kr>]

In 1903, the Soonguei Women's School in Pyongyang was established by American missionary S. Moffett, and other Christian women's schools followed. It gave women a chance at education, women's rights, and public affairs. They participated in the nationwide public forum and became doctors, pastors, drivers, etc. The neglected woman in traditional society could expect a new hope in the Christian community. At that time, there were more Christian women than Christian men in Pyongyang (*Dona Daily News*, 9 Feb. 1922).

In the atmosphere, 'the Great Revival Movement of Pyongyang' arose in 1907. With the movement in Pyongyang and its spread, the number of Korean Christian between 1906 and 1907 grew. For example, the Presbyterian members grew from 54,987 to 73,844 (34%), the Methodist church increased from 18,107 to 39,613 (118%), and the number of Christian schools grew from 208 to 344 (Mun 2004: 30-34). Furthermore, the movement emancipated the slave and the woman. The slave had already been freed according to the law in 1894 but it was not realized in daily life. During the movement, Christian owners proclaimed the freedom of their slaves in the church.

Christianity changed the urban space of Pyongyang with many large constructions such as churches, schools, orphanages, and hospitals. In that time, 'the sound of church bells surrounded all space of Pyongyang in the morning and evening. Around 1920, the largest chapel was completed, eating 3,000 people, and the city was called 'Jerusalem of Korea' (Ju 1994:23)



Figure 5.4: Soongsil Collage of Pyongyang in 1929 [Source: <http://www.ssu.ac.kr>]

Against ‘the modernization in the western part was the process of “secularization” (Harvey 1989: 30)’, in Pyongyang, the modernization was the process of ‘sanctification’ with Christian liberal ideas. It changed the citizen’s psyche and life, and the space of Pyongyang.

5.2 Modernization under colonization

5.2.1 City change under colonization

While Christianity changed the Pyongyang society around 1900, the colonization produced the modern urban space through the process of industrialization. Around 1910, the Japanese colonial government built Pyongyang for an industrial city. Unlike other colonial states, Japan built the industrial facilities in the area of the colony because the homeland had a lack of material and the colony was nearby (Hobsbawn 1994: 291). The main city of industrialization in Korea during the colonial era was Pyongyang. The Japanese colonial government transformed the psyche and space in Pyongyang because ‘plunder is destined by the condition of the plundered object (Marx and Engels 1845: 119)’.

There is a trend that Koreans are fair and unbiased new people but it is decisively not... They seem like a clown at the circus... Don't compare them with Japanese laborers who have all things like neatness, agility, and diligence. Generally speaking, all Koreans lack dignity, intelligence, and power. They are a corrupt product of oriental culture. - George Kennan, 1905 (Cumings 1981: 29)

The process of the colonization of Korea was similar to 'the internal imperial construction' (Osterhammel 2003: 58) as shown in the following: 1) trade monopolization (monopolizing trade in 1906), 2) securing a military rule and demilitarization of local powers (dispersing Korean army in 1907), 3) securing the authority of taxation (land surveying in 1910), 4) the stabilization by comprehensive regulations and bureaucratic administration (securing monopolized military and police in 1910), 5) intervention in the native society with reformative aims (the cultural ruling policy in 1919).

The actual social and other changes in Pyongyang by the Japanese colonial government were started after the Chino-Japanese War in 1894. After the war, the political and military hegemony was passed from China to Japan. While China had stationed troops in Pyongyang to protect the outer power, Japan occupied the city to colonize and extend the colony into China and the Asian Continent. Japan placed Japanese troops and merchants in Pyongyang, and they immediately constructed the railway, electrical cables, and a bridge. Japan changed Pyongyang into the base city for material supply, consuming market, and war supplies. In 1898, Japan opened the market and constructed the Japanese residential area with a Japanese school and post office in Pyongyang.

	Japan	China	Russia
1893	50.2	49.1	0.7
1895	72.2	26.2	1.6

Table 5.1: The trade changing in Korea before and after the Chino-Japanese War (%)
[Source: PLHCC 1957: 235]

After the war in 1894, the Japanese took the land through a system of unsavory loans known as loan sharking. In addition, after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, not only Japanese

capitalists but also the Japanese government took the land through political and military power. Especially in Pyongyang, during the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese government acquired over 1,300ha around the Pyongyang station at an unrealistic low price to support its military aims, and removed the settlement by military force. During the event, the Japanese army fired and killed hundreds of Pyongyang residents who resisted the displacement (An 1997: 6-35). Through the taking of the land, Japan prepared the foundation for Japanese capital.

	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910
Gold (bar)	33,234	177,328	110,074	184,837	169,102	219,786	488,438
Sum (<i>Won</i>)	137,450	706,586	439,837	713,375	656,904	853,201	1,843,809

Table 5.2: The accumulation of gold bar purchases in Pyongyang branch of Japanese First Bank, 1904-1910 [Source: PLHCC 1957: 241]

Pyongyang had many advantages for industrialization: 1) comparatively large population, 2) advantageous location for extending into China, 3) rich underground resources and grain, 4) cheap labor, 5) transport center, 6) large consuming market, and 7) holding the empty lot to city expansion (PLHCC 1957: 259). Therefore, the colonial government structured Pyongyang as a main industrialized city instead of the capital city of Seoul. After official colonial control by Japan in 1910, industrial urbanization of Pyongyang was taking place in earnest. For ten years from 1916, factories and laborers had grown nine-fold, capital seventeen-fold and production thirty-fold.

		1916	1925
Factories	Pyongyang	28	235
	Pyongyang/All Korea (%)	2.6	5.5
Capital (1,000 <i>Won</i>)	Pyongyang	2,442	41,000
	Pyongyang/All Korea (%)	9.9	24.7
Labors	Pyongyang	786	6,800
	Pyongyang/All Korea (%)	2.7	8.5

Production	Pyongyang	911	28,000
	Pyongyang/All Korea (%)	1.5	8.3

Table 5.3: The growth of factories, capital, laborers, and production in Pyongyang, 1916-1925 [Source: PLHCC 1957: 197]

Similar to the process of ‘globalism around the First World War’ (Harvey 1989: 309), the space of Pyongyang was di-territorialized and re-territorialized for the convenience of colonial ruling. In the process, the urban space of Pyongyang showed the character of Japanese colonial imperialism (see Chapter 6.2 about dual-city by colonial discrimination).

5.2.2 Railway and modern city

Today, the enthusiasm and sincerity for constructing railway by civilized nations could be compared with the church construction a few centuries ago.... Actually, the word of religion is from ‘religare (bind)’... Much more than normal thought, the railway is closely connected with the spirit of religion. Until now, there is nothing as powerful as the tool to unite separated nations. – Michel Chevalier (Moss 1991: 126)

From the railway construction, Pyongyang gained the face of a modern city. While Pyongyang citizens had the liberal and modern thought from the early part of the 19th century with Christian liberal ideas, the modern spatial face of Pyongyang appeared after the railway construction began in earnest. The railway made Pyongyang into a modern industrial city in a short time with imperialism and colonialism. The railway crossed the northern and southern Pyongyang over Deadong River and connected other cities and other countries with China in 1905. With the railway system, Pyongyang became the core of the transport network of Korea. According to Heinrich Heine, ‘the space was killed by the railway and the basement of time and space started shaking’ (Cumings 1981).

Lefebvre says that ‘the space is a social product but also the society is a spatial product’. In the early stages of introducing the railway, it was unfamiliar to citizens so they resisted. However, before long, the citizens became accustomed to and ruled by the railway in the process of modernization and industrialization. Japanese colonial government made

Pyongyang into a modern city in order to plunder not only the raw material but also the labor and products. ‘The metropolitan monetary economy is needed as is the modern mental life-like accuracy, the ability to count, and elaborateness’ (Simmel 1896: 40). As a psychological element, the railway is a more effective space than a school is because the railway could contain all citizens, urban space, and daily life.²¹ To change the psyche of the modern worker, spatial change is certainly needed. The railway timetable changed the outlook of people. Hobsbawn says that ‘between 1830 and 1850 “the railway timetable” had a revolutionary effect on the society of Britain’ (Cumings 1986: 43). It gave the citizen the concept of ‘accuracy’ and ‘minuteness’

Early on, Pyongyang residents realized the railway not as the faith of ‘progress’ but the tool of plunder. While the French railway preempted the social revolution (Cumings 1986: 43), the railway construction in Pyongyang foreshadowed the colonial plunder. Actually, the largest transportation by rail was not of people but of grains and materials into Japan.

Year	Passenger		Freight	
	Departure	Arrival	Departure	Arrival
1907	73081	64711	10811	13274
1908	70211	71490	30117	43739
1909	66174	69966	71009	42196
1910	82691	85443	128374	53120

Table 5.4: The volume of transportation by railway in Pyongyang Station (Unit: *Won*), 1907-1910 [Source: PLHCC 1957: 245]

While the railway united the nation, the streetcar united the city. In 1923, the streetcar was opened in Pyongyang. It became the main public transportation for Pyongyang citizens and it affected the citizen’s life deeply.

²¹ In the early stage of colonization, Japan expected the Christians to allow Pyongyang citizens to be modernized and it was partly achieved. However, it could not contain all citizens and could not control completely because it contained liberal ideas.



Figure 5.5: Streetcar of Pyongyang, opening in 1923 [Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Heijo_Station.JPG]

The railway operated as a main tool to transport workers and material into the Chinese continental war. Unlike other colonies, Japan constructed railways in the colony of Korea and the Manchuria nation (a colony of China). South Manchuria Railways Corporation (SMRC) connected Korea and Manchuria and it carried not only material but also many people and products. SMRC was not just a railway company, because it dealt with car hire, a hotel, a hospital, and a coal mine.

The great corporation (SMRC) assumes the role of master and servant in Manchuria... The traveler hires a car and stays in a hotel from the subsidiary company of SMRC. The coal for heating at the hotel is also from the subsidiary company... If he or she gets sick while traveling, they would doubtlessly enter the hospital managed by SMRC (Cumings 1986: 44).

The railway received colony expansion into the Chinese continental area and carried vast amounts of materials and many people from and into Pyongyang. During the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the railway connected all Korean main cities with Manchuria, and right to the national boundary of Russia in 1926. The railway carried not only the products and resources like grain, tobacco, hemp, gold, silver, copper, and iron, but also the workforce such as forced

labor, serviceperson, and even women for sexual extortion from Korea to China, Russia, and Japan (PLHCC 1957: 246). Especially, Pyongyang was the crossroads of the railway toward the Chinese and Russian continent.

More than any other technical innovation, the railway allowed the public to participate in the war. It supplied young men from the city to the front line of war continuously (Giddens 1987: 263). Pyongyang was the military basement and it supplied large amounts of military materials and labor. The colonial plunder and the war on the Chinese continent were possible because of the railway.




Figure 5.6: The railway network between Manchuria and Korea in 1930s
[Source: Cumings 1986: 45]

While Christian liberal ideas destroyed the traditional attitudes of the Pyongyang citizen, the railway destroyed the traditional urban space. The railway deconstructed not only the Pyongyang fortress but also the boundary between inner and outer Pyongyang and it delivered the city to the modern industrial space and society. The railway freed northwestern from the local loop and led to the modern masses. In addition, it allowed systemic control. ‘The modern state was possible with the surveillance technology to watch all the individual people’ (Giddens 1987). The railway reinforced the role of surveillance by Japanese control. Finally, the railway allowed the attitudes and the space of Pyongyang to be changed into the colonial industrialized city.

5.2.3 Prison for freedom

Trotsky said that ‘all states are based on violence (Weber 1919: 81)’. In addition, the ‘modern state’ presents the administration and law as the justification of rule. The modern state monopolized the violence and the surveillance for all nations (Weber 1921: 189-192). The monopolized violence by the modern state is like two sides of a coin. It could allow the total rule by the minority but it is also needed to protect the democracy from the powerful man (Giddens 1987).

The law in the modern state needs the space of prison as a tool of surveillance and punishment. According to Giddens (1987: 128), the development of the legal system has the following characteristics: 1) the dissemination of written law for all the people, 2) expansion of property rights into private property ownership, 3) the monopolizing and restrictive methods of the state. An effective restrictive means in the modern state is the prison. Foucault (1975) mentions that ‘the aim of punishment in the modern state is not to instill fear but to remold the psyche. For that aim, the prison is more effective than noisy public corporal punishment.’ Actually, ‘when the power advances the work without noise by the systemic custom, it could gain the most effective durability (Giddens 1987: 15)’.

Japanese colonial government ruled Korea under the great bureaucratic system. After the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, the first three works by Japan was extortion of land, the arrangement of the military police system, and construction of prisons. Japan, with Samurai heritage, ruled the people according to the great bureaucratic system and the state substituted the role of an enterprise to complete industrialization and imperialism in a short time (Clammer 1995: 10). This great bureaucratic system was also applied in the Korean colony.

While France took mostly the native bureaucrat in their colony, Japan took home nations. During the time of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, 42 percent of Japanese in Korea were bureaucrats (Cumings 1986: 41). Japan encouraged immigration into the colony for radical and total extortion by exhausting the home’s source. The number of subjected persons by one Japanese colonial ruler in Korea was 18 times more than French’s one in Vietnam.

	Vietnam colony by France	Korean colony by Japan
Subjected population (a)	17,000,000	21,000,000
Ruler (b)	2,920	246,000
Native ruler (b')	10,776	63,000
subjected population against one colonial ruler (a/b+b')	1241.2	68.0

Table 5.5: The comparison of colonial bureaucratic system between France and Japan
[Source: Cumings 1986: 41]

The construction of the prison by the Japanese in Pyongyang had the process of three steps. The first construction was in 1910 with official colonization. It introduced the modern law system and punishment in Pyongyang. The prison was located on the main street between the Korean and the Japanese residential area near Sungsil College. It showed who the ruler of the city was. The second construction and extension processed in 1919 immediately following the Korean national independence movement. After the movement, the Japanese colonial police placed many demonstrators in prison. The extension of prison aimed to protect the emergence of other independence movements. In addition, in 1920, women's prison was constructed when a Christian women's organization had been established and began a social movement against colonial oppression. The extension of prison space did not rely entirely on the number of crimes but relied instead on colonial policy and movement. The number of prisoners was set by the prepared size of prison²².

²² 'The criminal act in 1917 before reforming police system of Korea was in numerous cases just 4,000 per a year but in 1923 it was radically grown until about 7,200. The reason is the completion of police system, complicated society.... and radical deterioration of Korean life condition' (*Donga News*, 11 Nov. 1924).




Figure 5.7: The number of Pyongyang prisoner, 1910-1926 [Source: PLHCC 1957: 195]

The third construction of Pyongyang prison showed a different character. In the time of the entrance of Japanese Fascism in 1934, just before the Sino-Japanese War, the large prison was constructed in Pyongyang. It aimed to inject the death fear into the citizen rather than remolding or conducting the legal system. The name of the prison was *Kyohwaso*, which means the place for mental reforming. It was placed on the outskirts of Pyongyang near the Japanese troops. Arendt (1979: 87, 282) says ‘the main character of the modern masses is they don’t believe the visible clear things. They think only the worst case’. The vague fear gives a greater effect than the real punishment (Rousseau 1761: 78), and the total control is ‘only possible by injecting the vague fear’ (Arendt 1979: 247)’. The *Kyohwaso* aimed to fulfill that role.




Figure 5.8: The location of Pyongyang prisons in Japanese colonial period

However, the construction of the prison in Pyongyang brought freedom like the double-sidedness of violence. The prison allowed the introduction of modern law in Pyongyang society and it contained the civil rights for all citizens with equality. ‘Even in the extreme opposite side of freedom, the light of freedom inevitably leaked out because of the ruling failure of material’ (Adorno and Horkheimer 1969: 275).

The total rule by the Japanese colonial government adapted the modern law and destroyed class discrimination. Before modern times, Pyongyang had regional and political discrimination (see Chapter 4.1.1). Pyongyang bureaucrats took taxes and forced labor without the law, and the unlawful extortion by local powers was rampant. Since the traditional law system was ineffective because of the lack of central power, in that time, many peasants of Pyongyang became thieves or escaped to places like Manchu in order to avoid the plundering (PLHCC 1957: 155). In addition, the Japanese colonial government destroyed the traditional class system and introduced the modern law system. The colonial law discriminated against the race but did not discriminate against the class. The total control by the Japanese government showed the possibility of freedom and equality in light of ‘giving justification of violence by the equal law’. It means that even the slave of Pyongyang was punished as much as the nobleman was.

In the 1920s, with the radical industrialization, Pyongyang was named ‘criminal city’ (*Donga News*, 24 Oct. 1929). Japanese police managed this criminal city by the law. While there was no protecting system for the public before the modern era, the strong colonial government could control public crime by the modern legal system.

A flood-damaged Pyongyang nowadays needs a lot of labor power. By seizing the opportunity, a crafty man gathered laborers with an advertisement and paid a much cheaper wage than that which was paid by the regional office. A few days ago, near the city center, a great disturbance occurred involving about 600 laborers. The police from Pyongyang police station rushed out and the laborers were calm. Police are investigating. (*Donga News*, 10 Aug. 1923)

In addition, Pyongyang prison provided the bare necessities for life, which was more than the urban destitute poor received. According to *Donga Daily News* (1 Oct. 1930) about ‘the

life in prison', a prisoner worked between nine and eleven hours a day in summer and 12 hours in winter. In addition, the prisoner could collect a wage, albeit a small one, and were allowed to carry a book or newspaper, even 'The Capital'. It was better than life outside the prison because, in those days, the younger workers at the textile factory generally worked 12 hours per day to a maximum of 15-16 hours. Moreover, many were unemployed and urban residents were poor. The socio-economic condition was so grim that members of the neglected class often committed a crime to enter the prison.

Sicksoo Byun was caught stealing a month after his discharge from prison. He pleaded to let be allowed to remain in prison for 10 years because there was food and a comfortable place to sleep. He wandered after losing his parents and lived in prison from the age of 15 years old. (*Donga News*, 13 Jan. 1936)

With the advent of colonial suppression, the modern surveillance system with the space of prison also brought the concept of equality to the people, especially for the poor and neglected class. For the urban poor, the prison was a symbol of fear but also of equality.

However, as Goffman mentions, 'the means of surveillance of what is strictly organized space, such as a prison, leaves harmful surrendering in persons of modern society' (Giddens 1987: 221). After 1931, with the rise of Japanese fascism, the duality of the modern surveillance system was destroyed. Through the great prison construction on the outskirts of Pyongyang, the space showed only an evil aspect, such as the oppression of freedom, destroyed humanity, and violence as a means to inject fear. 'The thing has a tendency toward destroying the equality' (Rousseau 1745: 205). Japanese fascism devoured all liberal ideas and the good effects of surveillance. Finally, the prison of Pyongyang just expanded the vague fear of death to total control.

5.3 Birth of the masses

At the beginning of the 19th century, the bonds of the traditional class in Pyongyang were cut by the Christian liberal ideas and Japanese colonial power. The tenant farmer, slave, and woman were released from traditional social and local constraints, and they drove into the city.

They received legal freedom and became the modern masses. However, legal freedom was helpless against poverty and political power. Then they became the urban poor without any community from which to ask help. As Vladimir Lenin notes, ‘the capitalists always used the term “freedom” to mean freedom for the rich to get richer, but for the workers to starve for death.’

5.3.1 Rural collapse and the formation of the masses

Japanese colonial government had to transform the peasant to the labor to extend Pyongyang as an industrial city. After the land concentration, the rural exodus occurred in Pyongyang between 1910 and 1930 and the peasant became the uprooted masses.

Before the colonial era, the peasant of Pyongyang lived an unstable life (see Chapter 4.1.1). While labors, military personal, and many others moved into Pyongyang, peasants could not leave their hometown because the taxes and forced labor imposed on escapees were passed on to their relatives or neighbors. The peasants near Pyongyang were prepared to leave if the system was abolished and the Japanese colonial government demolished the traditional system that shackled the peasant.

From 1910, Japan annexed the farmlands of Koreans in the name of ‘the land survey project’. As a result of the project, the tenants were rapidly lessened and ownership of the land was concentrated in a minority of landowners. The land concentration was an effective tool for the Japanese colonial government to take the surplus farm produce (Cummings 1986: 33). It led to the appearance of not only a Japanese landowner but also a Korean one.

	More 10ha	7-10ha	5-7ha	3-5ha	2-3ha	1-2ha
Korean	10	4	14	83	264	1,447
Japanese	7	1	0	2	2	2

Table 5.6: Classification of Landowner in Pyongyang by race and scale in 1912 [Source: PLHCC 1957: 238]

The urbanization of Pyongyang led to an increase in the price of farmland, and the land now cost between three to five times more between 1906 and 1913. It helped Japanese landowners

to gain an economic advantage. In addition, it provided the economic benefits for Korean landowners. There is no proof that Korean landowners were less ‘exploitative’ or ‘parasitic’ than the Japanese landowners were.²³ Many Korean landowners kept their ties with the Japanese colonial bureaucratic system. In fact, the powerful Japanese police and government supported them with sufficient resources, which cannot be said of the previous Korean government. The Korean landowners shifted the productivity cost, such as that needed for farming equipment, seed, fertilizer, or other necessities, to their tenants (Cumings 1986: 83-84). They could enjoy the benefits without losing their vested rights, and it was true that ‘the enclosure movement was the revolution of the rich against the poor’ (Polanyi1994: 167).

With the development of market and trade systems, agriculture was negatively affected by the world market depression. At that time, 80 percent of the poor farmers had to reduce their personal food consumption and became bankrupt then their farms were acquired by the wealthier landowners. Many poor peasants had heavy debts and the harmful effects of loan-sharking were prevalent in rural areas. However, land concentration helped the Japanese government to seize taxes and grain. The poor peasant could not see the rice. They produced but were affected by the exorbitant global price of rice (Cumings 1986: 88). As a result, the independent farmer descended to a tenant or migrated into the city to find any job for their life.

		1916	1920	1926
Landowner(a)	Household	1,572	1,932	2,534
	Household/all (%)	0.9	1.2	1.6
Landowner(b)	Household	3,838	7,715	9,189
	Household/all (%)	2.3	4.7	5.6
Independent famer	Household	40,077	38,858	34,460
	Household/all (%)	24.0	23.5	21.1
Independent and tenant	Household	77,469	68,232	63,641
	Household/all (%)	46.4	41.3	39.0

²³ ‘Mr. Park in Pyongyang district gathered his tenants and threatened with the word of that “I will send my son’s wedding present then you have to supplement the money. If you don’t, I will take the tenant right” (*Donga News*, 25 Apr. 1923).

Tenant	Household	44,144	48,541	53,352
	Household/all (%)	26.4	29.4	32.7
Total		167,100	165,278	163,176

Table 5.7: Changing classes of rural area in Pyongannam District (center is Pyongyang), 1916-1926, *Landowner(a) is giving all land to the tenant and landowner(b) is farming some of them by himself. [Source: PLHCC 1957: 185]

In addition, the decrease in tenant collapsed the cottage industry in Pyongyang. Before colonization, the number of cottage industries in Pyongyang district was 17,815, which was 56 percent of all households and 80 percent of rural households (PLHCC 1957: 240). The collapse of the rural area, therefore, added to the cottage industry collapse. It aggravated the peasants' living conditions and led to an increase in dependence on Japanese products.

Finally, the link between the peasant and the land was cut. They were 'freed' and moved into the city of Pyongyang. They became the masses. However, since the industry was not sufficiently developed to absorb the arriving migrants, many of them became the urban poor instead of the laborer (*Donga News*, 14 Jun. 1920). 'The ultimate thing that the man wants to keep is a social position, social right, or social assets more than physical goods' (Polanyi 1944: 185-187). The peasant lost not only the land but also their social position and their assets. Most importantly, they lost 'the function of territorial character in that of the redistributing system with family and relative'.

5.3.2 Freed slaves and the masses

The most significant fruit of freedom in Korean modernization was given to the slave class. They received freedom in the wake of modern law entering in 1894. However, 'the revolution of new thought cannot lead the revolution of the system at once in their old house (Nietzsche 1885: 238)'. The legal emancipation for slaves could not connect with the economic and social freedom immediately. They continued to live in the old system until the traditional Korean dynasty was destroyed in 1910. During the modernization, the slave left behind the traditional chains and entered the masses. Similar to Paris after the Revolution, however, the slave of Pyongyang after the Reforms could not receive any social and economic heritages and descended easily to the daily worker or prostitute within the process of colonial capitalism. The

situation mirrored the presentation of Nietzsche (1886: v457) that ‘slaves live in every respect more happily and in greater security than the modern worker, and that the work done by slaves is very little work compared with that done by the “worker”’.

Before the legal emancipation, the slave was regarded as an animal instead of as a man. The class discrimination was clear that the lowest class of slaves was treated as subhuman. They were an object for trade, succession, and even as gifts, and the price of one slave was equivalent to that of a horse (Mun 2004: 20).

After the Reform in 1894, the slave was emancipated by law. However, the Korean traditional dynasty intended to maintain its existing rights and did not accept the change. According to Giddens (1987: 284), ‘German and Japanese traditional elite did not come about by liberal democracy, industrial development, or national political change. It was caused by losing the war and being ruled by America and the Allied Nations’. In the case of Korea, the traditional elite accepted class equality when strong Japanese colonialism destroyed the hierarchical society.

However, the main aim of the Japanese colonial government was not to help the slaves but to transform them into the labors. In order to extract modern products from Korea, first Japan had to release the Korean tenant, slave, and woman from the land and clan chains in order to make them modern labor. As Weber states, ‘in the modern era, the fruit from labor with the wage penalty was larger than the slave’s one’ (Giddens 1987: 157).

Even though the slave was freed after the Reforms, the powerful conventional discrimination continued. For example, the Japanese government wrote the name of a slave in red ink on the official papers, which led to national division with class discrimination.²⁴ In 1923, 30 years after the Reforms, *Hyungpyungsa* (the equality institute) was established to eradicate the inequality of class. It showed that class discrimination was ongoing even though the law had changed.

Despite legal emancipation, the slave was discriminated against in the field of not only politics but also economics. Without an economic foundation after the reforms, the slaves received the lowest jobs such as butcher or tanner. In 1923 in Pyongyang, the wage gap between

²⁴ Source: <http://jinju.grandculture.net/>

laborers was more than three times. The emancipated slaves lived in ‘*Beacjung* (means slaves) town’ together. They gave up the hope of equality but hoped for the next generation with education in the city (*Donga News*, 14 Jul. 1923; 8 Feb. 1925).

Reporter: Is your name *Beacjung* (meaning slave without name)?

Man: Yes, we make leather shoes and sell them. The noblemen call us *Beacjung*.

R: Then, until when will you keep quiet with even this discrimination?

M: Well, what can we do in this social condition? We just teach our growing sons for the best.

R: Can you get any mail from your union in Seoul?

M: Sometimes, but it can’t be helped because the people of this town have a narrow opinion.

The only hope of those slaves was to send their children into the city to become educated. In addition, the cost of education in the countryside was more expensive than the city because city education was subsidized by donations. Moreover, the graduate from the local school had to go to the city to find employment. Since most schools in rural areas only offered four years of elementary schooling, more advanced education was only possible in the city (*Donga News*, 10 Oct. 1935). As a result, the city of Pyongyang was inhabited by hundreds of children who worked as labors without receiving sustainable wages or dwellings. In 1923, approximately 200 children in the draper labor union of Pyongyang requested the following three things: 1) reopen the night school, 2) establish proper wage, and 3) allow the first Sunday off in each month (*Donga News*, 22 Dec. 1923).

The seed of emancipation of the slaves was spread by the Christian liberal idea from the 19th century onward and it yielded the fruit of the legal emancipation in 1894. They were freed from the traditional masters and moved into the city of Pyongyang, and thus became the masses. However, without any political and economic assets, they were left in the position of the lowest class. Finally, they had become the rootless masses without any community from which to request help.

5.3.3 Freed women and the masses

The movement of freeing women in the colonial period was affected by two ideas. First, Christian liberal ideas changed women's social position. Second, the political organization by socialists allowed the women into the social movement.

Christian liberal ideas led the emancipation of woman and it provided education for women in many Christian schools and churches. Korea was traditionally a patriarchal society. Before the modern era, for example, a woman could marry only after the age of 12 years, and a widow was not permitted to marry again. Even these laws had been changed by the legal reformed in 1984, the society rejected it but only the Christian community accepted the reformed laws and prohibited polygamy in 1985 (Mun 2004: 20).

In Pyongyang, the awareness of women's rights took place earlier and at a greater level than in other cities. The women's hospital was built in 1898 and the first Korean woman doctor, E. Park, worked in Pyongyang women's hospital from 1900 (Hall 1978: 184). The women's school was opened by the Christian community in 1903 and its numbers continued growing. In 1921, the number of women graduates were 69, men were 104 from Pyongyang private school (*Donga News*, 13 Mar. 1921). There were fewer female graduates than male graduates. In the past, women's education was almost ignored.




Figure 5.9: The woman's Bible class of Jangdeahyun Church in Pyongyang [Source: Korean Christian History Museum, <http://www.kchmuseum.org>]

After the national independence movement of 1919, the women's movement progressed

from influencing the individual and took on the character of a social organization with a patriotic character. Immediately following the independence movement, a secret women's organization, named 'patriotic women's group' was formed and the members took care of an imprisoned Christian independence activist. This led to the women becoming politically aware. In 1920, a women's speech contest was held in Jangdeahyun Church of Pyongyang and thousands participated in (*Donga News*, 17 Aug. 1920).

With the influence of socialism after 1924, the women's social movement was extended into society through the Christian intellectuals (*Donga News*, 6 Jan. 1928). The women's union accepted Marx's argument that 'women's rights show the progress of history'. The doctrine of *Guenwo* (*patriotic companion*) woman association established in 1927 is a reminder of 'the Communist Manifesto'.

Human society produces many problems and asks us to solve them. The problem of women is one of them. The world acts about demand busily... How the Korean woman could stay only behind historical and universal progress... The Korean women's movement of the past was dispersed. There was no unified organization, aim, and leading thought, so the effect was not enough... Korean woman, Rise! Come! Strive! The future is ours. (*Donga News*, 6Jan. 1928)

With the industrialization of Pyongyang, the number and power of women's labor grew. After the First World War, Japan led the industrialization of Pyongyang and constructed a number of factories. Between 1914 and 1923, the population in Pyongyang doubled and the laborers increased to nine times that of earlier numbers (PLHCC 1957: 195). The urbanization and industrialization of Pyongyang were more rapid after the middle of the 1930s with the Sino-Japanese War.

	1910	1921	1923	1927	1934	1942
Popular	38,626	77,926	89,978	156,379	159,022	389,105

Table 5.8 Growing population of Pyongyang, 1910-1942

[Source: Jo1990: 450, *Donga*, 21 Dec. 1921, 29 May. 1923, 29May. 1935]

In 1929, the number of women factory workers was about 29 percent of all 93,000 Korean

workers and it contained many women teachers, drivers, doctors, reporters, officers, and traders (*Donga News*, 17 Aug. 1932). With the expansion of women's social role, the women of Pyongyang became leaders of social movement and they took to lead the labor movement enthusiastically.



Figure 5.10: The demonstration of women workers during the general strike of Pyongyang rubber factories [Source: *Donga News*, 31 May. 1931]

However, the class awareness and political movement of women did not provide them with freedom in the reality of everyday life. The women were released from the traditional family system and became the masses. Incidentally, the life of women labors was as miserable as that of the English labor during the Industrial Revolution and they became daily workers or prostitutes. During the time of Pyongyang, many women became *Gisaeng* (Korean geisha) or worked as prostitutes because of poverty. In addition, baby abandonment was very common.

Furthermore, when the socialist women's organization united with other political parties, the voice about women's rights was drowned by the aim of socialism construction. The significant numbers of women who were unemployed, poor, and prostitutes were isolated from the women's movement. Especially after the Great World Depression in 1929, many surplus women's workers became unemployed and the urban poor. In that setting, while 18 percent of all citizens (its number were 28,688) were unemployed and the amusement industry of Pyongyang had a boom (*Donga News*, 8 Aug. 1935). The radical and one-way socialist women's movement excluded the poor and unemployed, especially in the case of prostitutes

and the neglected woman couldn't receive any aids from both the Christian and socialist communities.

Christian liberal ideas and the socialist movement released the women from the traditional shackles and allowed them to be the masses. However, they could not enjoy economic and political freedom under colonial capitalism and fell in the condition of urban poor and rootless masses.

5.3.4 'Atomized' masses

The Christian liberal ideas and colonial capitalism brought freedom to the peasant, slaves, and women, and it allowed them to be the masses. Through modernization and reform, the slave was emancipated by the law and women were allowed education. In addition, colonial capitalism released peasants from traditional chains and space. Pyongyang expanded with a large number of migrants during the urbanization. However, without any economic and political foundation, they instantly became the urban poor instead of free men because 'an impoverished man is not a free man' (Harvey 2005: 221).

The plundering of rural land by Japan and the industrialization of Pyongyang led to the devastation of the rural community and gave rise to many social problems. During the thirty years after 1910, the population of Pyongyang grew to 10 times and most migrants from rural areas became labors or retailers. In addition, there was an increase in surplus labor and large numbers of unemployed people. In a Pyongyang employment office, 1,008 people applied daily for a job over a period of a month, but only 63 were employed (*Donga News*, 21 Nov. 1923). After the Great Depression of 1929, rubber and shoe factory retrenched 1,500 people and the number of unemployed intellectuals reached 650 (*Josun Daily News*, 8 Jul. 1930). This continued until the 1930s and a number of peasants and businessmen became daily workers or remained unemployed.

		Agricu lture	Fis hing	Industr y	Comm erce	Official business	Etc. business	Jobless	Total
1914	Korean	2,656		2,246	11,993	4,921	11,402	1,752	34,970
	Japanese	110		924	3,140	2,490	1,784	165	8,613
1935	Korean	3,663	39	32,833	54,051	20,962	28,942	8,878	149,368
	Japanese	91		2,106	6,796	11,290	805	608	21,696
1938	Korean	1,343	213	61,045	71,724	23,990	3,868	12,931	175,114
	Japanese	122		4,764	8,853	10,206	590	812	25,347

Table 5.9: The popular distribution of Pyongyang according to the job and rice, 1914-1938
[Source: Jo 1990: 451]

Between 1920 and 1930 in Pyongyang, the labor market grew to three times the original size and most of them became surplus labor under colonial capitalism. Generally, they were unable to find a stable wage and job. For example, most factories owned by Korean capitalists, such as sock manufacturers, rice-polishing factories, and rubber factories employed predominantly seasonal labor. Wage discrimination was pronounced. The wages paid to Korean labors were half of what was paid to Japanese labors, while women and children received less than a quarter of what was paid to Japanese labor. With regard to working hours, the general working day consisted of more than 10 hours, up to a maximum of 15-16 hours. The labor of textile factories consisted of 87 percent of child labor and they worked more than 12 hours a day (Park 2010: 277). In addition, there were age requirements in place for specific jobs. *Sansip* filature in Pyongyang hired only men between 15 and 25 years, and women aged between 13 and 17 years (PLHCC 1957: 199)

	Number of person	%
Independent farmer	2,938	3.9
Indep. and tenant	9,094	12.1
Tenant	28,892	38.5
Peddler	1,153	1.5
Retailer	1,497	2.0
Labor	30,164	40.2
Etc.	1,278	1.7
Total	75,016	100.0

Table 5.10: The job construction of Pyongnam District in 1935
[Source: *Donga News*, 14 May. 1935]

‘Urban spaces are continuously (re)constructed in planning processes, as well as in everyday practices (Eckardt 2008a)’. According to job construction in 1935, most people were the tenant and laborers. At that time, the poor in Pyongyang numbered 40,837, of which was 26 percent of all citizens. Among them, 72 percent were unemployed. Most of the poor lived in earthen or deteriorated houses, which was 20 percent of all households of Pyongyang. They lived together on the outskirts of the city (*Donga News*, 8 Aug. 1935). In the slum area, even those who had a job earned, they had merely one or two meals (Seo 2010: 14).




Figure 5.11: The poverty area of Pyongyang in 1935

The growth of the urban poor led to an increase in the crime rate. Before 1920, the gap between civil and criminal crime was negligible. However, after industrialization commenced rapidly in Pyongyang, most crimes were related to poverty and included theft (60%) and fraud (21%) (*Donga News*, 11 Nov. 1924) and most trials in Pyongyang were civil cases




Figure 5.12: The number of civil and criminal crime in Pyongyang court, 1908-1926, *R is a court of review and D is a district court [Source: PLHCC1957: 193]

The difficulties of life, also, filtered through to the intellectuals. The article entitled, ‘a victim of capitalism, suicide of salaried worker’ shows how difficult the lives of the white color had become.

He was graduated from Pyongyang commercial school and was at once hired in the post office. He worked more than 12 hours a day... For five years, he worked hard from 8 in the morning to 9 or 10 or even 11 in the night but the wage was still just 78 won. However, he couldn’t complain because of the fear of dismissal. To find another job was far more difficult (*Donga News*, 22 Nov. 1924).

Christian liberal ideas and colonial capitalism allowed peasants, slaves, and women to be released from the chains of traditional society and they became the masses with legal freedom. However, the ‘release’ also meant release from a traditional distribution system that supplied the minimum needed for living. The duty of traditional owners disappeared in colonial capitalism and no one assumed the duty to address the poverty of the masses. ‘The freedom doesn’t make the fruit at any climate’ (Rousseau 1745: 230). The liberal ideas brought legal freedom in Pyongyang but it could not produce the freedom of space and of daily life. The life of the masses was worse than before, as like the Russian peasants of the end of the 19th

century.²⁵ Finally, ‘they were poor without freedom. It is the worst situation that a man can fall into (Rousseau 1761: 261)’. Finally, they became the rootless and atomized masses and searched what they could get rest and their requests and pour their frustration.

²⁵ ‘The position of serf was better. It was enough to work, eat, and sleep. Then there was not any worry and concern. In the lunch time, we ate a cabbage soup and Cachaca and it for the dinner. We could eat a cucumber and cabbage enough, means enough as much as we want. That time was stricter, because all people knew what they had to. -Anton P. Chekhov, *Peasants*’

Chapter 6

Toward ‘the Mob’ in a racially segregated city

6.1 Violence of Nationalism and the Mob

The modern state uses violence as a means to keep order (Weber 1919b: 81). However, when its position of the means and the end is overturned completely, the dictatorship or totalitarian state is born. The process of overturning is possible when the people of a nation become not only the object but also the subject of the violence. As mentioned by G. Sjoberg, ‘to explain correctly the growth, development, and collapse of the city, the mechanism of how the city serves the ruler has to be discussed’ (Giddens 1987: 51). In the case of Pyongyang, the mechanism of changing the masses into the mob was related to nationalism and spatial segregation.

The ‘Principle of National Self-determination’ was announced by Wilson in 1919. Whatever the practical reason for the principle, it gave them hope of independence to the colonized nations, and it led to the birth of nationalism in the colony as a principle of self-development. Simultaneously, the principle generated conflict between the national majority and the minority. In particular, the minority nation regarded the use of military power as an important means that had never been considered before (Giddens 1987: 303). In the background, the Korean community embraced the national independence movement in 1919 and it made the racial union of Korean Nationalism.

In Pyongyang, Christian liberal thought also greatly influenced the independence movement. On the very next day following the establishment of the nonviolent movement, labor participated by joining the strike, merchant by closing market, and student by absence. In every quarter of Pyongyang, the movement confronted the colonial police and military. Especially, on 4 March in Gangsegun of Pyongyang, the Japanese police fired at peaceful protesters and about 60 persons died and around 200 people were arrested. Within 14 days from the beginning of the protest, about 3,000 Pyongyang citizens were arrested (PLHCC 1957: 190).

Because of the movement, colonized Korea received limited freedom of the press,

publishing, and assembly. In China, the Korean Provisional Government was established and Korean nationalism was born. During the 10 years after the commencement of the movement, the Korean community held the nationalism to gauge the unified power. However, Korean nationalism did not lead to independence because, generally, the stronger win the power game. Rather, the Japanese government attempted to use the power of violence and the exclusiveness of Korean nationalism.

The colonial nationalism shows the different characteristics of western imperialism. 'The struggle of colonized people is always for the struggle of humanity' (Osterhammel 2003: 46). Colonial nationalism aims to recover the freedom instead of to take it. However, both forms of nationalism ultimately show similar characteristics of exclusive violence because of their intrinsic character. Korean nationalism was born in colonial oppression with an emphasis on patriotism to gain national independence. Even though nationalism started with the aim of recovering freedom, during the actual process, the means overturned the ends. Finally, there emerged its own form of exclusive violence. It is because 'whatever the end is, if a man colludes with the means, all of them will be attracted by the own character of means' (Weber 1919b: 176). Since nationalism is based on the masses' response, it does not have a permanent character. Consequently, the effects of nationalism are sometimes related to democracy, but occasionally they result in exclusiveness and violence (Giddens 1987: 256).

In addition, another reason why Korea embraced nationalism positively was not only to gain freedom but also to acquire psychological and economic stability against the fear of loneliness.

The truth is that the masses grew out of the fragments of a highly atomized society whose competitive structure and concomitant loneliness of the individual had been held in check only through membership in a class. The chief characteristic of the mass man is not brutality and backwardness, but his isolation and lack of normal social relationships. Coming from the class ridden society of the nation-state, whose cracks had been cemented with nationalistic sentiment, it is only natural that these masses, in the first helplessness of their new experience, have tended toward an especially violent nationalism, to which mass leaders have yielded against their own instincts and purposes for purely demagogic reasons (Arendt 1979: 317).

Even though Japan had enough political, economic, and military power to rule Korea, they acknowledged and supported Korean nationalism. During the entry of colonial capitalism in the 1920s, the number of Korean capitalists and laborers grew. The Japanese government gave benefits to Korean capitalists for their cooperation and embraced nationalism. On the other hand, they led the division of the nation through the discrimination between the capitalist and the labor.

On the tacit approval and support by Japan, Korean capitalism and nationalism grew. However, while the rule of the colony was concretized, the will for independence by the Korean community was increasingly weaker. After 1931, finally, the Korean community could not resist Japan in any way. It was because of not only the Japanese brutal rule but also because of a Korean community divided by the violence of nationalism. At this point, the masses showed ‘characteristics of mob mentality, a mixture of gullibility and cynicism; ‘in an ever-changing, incomprehensible world the masses had reached the point where they would, at the same time, believe everything and nothing, think that everything was possible and that nothing was true’ (Arendt 1979: 382). The Korean community was divided and the atomized masses were absorbed into the social sameness. ‘The mob as leader of these masses was no longer the agent of the bourgeoisie or of anyone else except the masses’ (Arendt 1979: 318).

During the process from the masses to the mob, the urban space was used as an effective tool to divide nations and communities. ‘The space makes the meaning of action. The space decides what you must do or not do. It directly connects with the power. However, the message of the power is not clear but quite deliberate’ (Lefebvre 1991: 227). This chapter researches the relation between the power and the space.

6.2 Colonial nationalism and the segregated city

After the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, Japan had assumed the economic and political power of Pyongyang. They settled 150 Japanese merchants and soldiers in Pyongyang. In 1898, Japan opened the Korean market forcibly and established the Japanese residence area in Pyongyang, where they constructed the Japanese school, post office, bank, and train station, and the new area became the center of Pyongyang. While Japan constructed the prison in the middle of the

Korean residence area (old city), they constructed the railway and park in the middle of the Japanese residential area (new city).

In the new city of Pyongyang, there were many spectators even in the dark night because many streetlamps illuminated the street and made it like daytime. On the other hand, in the old city, there was not even a pedestrian because of the lack of streetlamps, especially on dark in rainy nights (*Donga News*, 19 Sep. 1921).

The spatial division of Pyongyang led to a silent but certain racial discrimination. The last portion of the official district name was different from that of the old city, which ended in 'Ri' but the name of the new city ended in 'Jung'. It identified who lived what area. While much social infrastructure was constructed in the Japanese area, it was lacking in the old city.




Figure 6.1: Racially segregated city of Pyongyang in the 1920s

The national discrimination of Pyongyang by the Japanese colonial government was clear. In 1924, while the number of Koreans in Pyongyang totaled 78 percent, their total income made

up only 20 percent of the total income of the city. Only 1.3 percent of Koreans earned more than 1,000 *won* per annum, while 8.5 percent of the Japanese earned more than 1,000 *won*. In addition, 85 percent of the Japanese of Pyongyang earned 1,000 and 15,000 *won* and only 28 percent of Korean.

	Korean	Japanese	Chinese and missionary
Population	70,075	17,534	1,814
Taxpayer*	881	1,485	70
Rate of Population (%)	78.4	19.6	2.0
Rate of taxpayer (%)	1.3	8.5	3.9

Table 6.1: The income rate by nation of Pyongyang in 1924, *Taxpayer means those who had an income of more than 1,000 won per annum. [Source: *Donga News*, 22 Jul. 1924, Seo 2010: 9]

The educational discrimination by nation was clear. In 1925, only 20 percent of Korean children were schooled while 95 percent of Japanese children attended school. In colonized Korea, Japanese schools received 30 times more subsidy than Korean schools in 1921 (*Donga News*, 4 Sep. 1921) and the gap grew up to 63 times in 1925 (*Donga News*, 7 Aug. 1925). In the case of Pyongyang, many Korean students could not even apply the school because they could not afford the entrance fee and only one-third of applicants were able in 1921 (*Donga News*, 24 Sep. 1921). At that time in Pyongyang, the principals of all five national schools were Japanese. Since the teacher's income gap by nation was significant, the Japanese principals avoided employing Korean women who had married Japanese (*Donga News*, 8 Feb. 1925).

The segregated space of Pyongyang was used as an effective tool of national discrimination. Unlike the Japanese residential area, the Korean area lacked a drainage system. In addition, in the old city, the sewage lay exposed for three days or a week, which gave terrible smell (*Donga News*, 28 Mar., 8 Dec. 1935). In addition, the discrimination in transportation and road conditions was far-reaching. The rail and tram ran through the center of the Japanese area but the Korean residential area did not have even a paved road (*Donga News*, 9 Sep. 1921). A truck, which was employed to sprinkle water on the roads to reduce the levels of dust, worked many

times a day in the Japanese area but not as often as in the Korean area even though the road condition was worse (*Donga News*, 2 May. 1922). Furthermore, the Korean poor area was located near the river with promises of determining ways to seasonal avoid flood damage, but no effective improvements were noted. On the other hand, the Japanese area was located in the hilly section that never experienced flood damage.




Figure 6.2: The Japanese and Korean residential area of Pyongyang in colonial period
[Source: <http://cafe.naver.com/god82/296>, Douglas Falwell]

The most remarkable example of national discrimination was the Deadon Bridge construction in 1923. Koreans lived in the old city and their number was four times greater than the Japanese in the western city was. However, the bridge was constructed and connected to the western and eastern Japanese residential areas. On the bridge, all railroad traffic passed into China and Japan after the bridge construction and many Japanese companies were established on the new eastern Pyongyang over the Deadong River. In 1925, 95 percent of owners in the new eastern city were Japanese and land prices increased (*Donga News*, 13 Sep. 1925). It means the growing city allowed the Japanese to accumulate economic profit and political power.




Figure 6.3: The new city of eastern Pyongyang and the Deadong Bridge in 1930s
 [Source: <http://www.flickr.com/photos/kernbeisser/3487568395/>]

The spatial division of Pyongyang was a very effective method of silent national discrimination. Each ethnic group received special or unfair treatment in terms of space. Where they lived decided the condition of social infrastructure and its benefit. As a natural result, spatial discrimination allowed racial division and the emotion of violence. ‘The space decides what they have to do or not with the hidden power (Lefebvre 1991: 227)’. For example, the Koreans of Pyongyang could not use the public bath in the Japanese residential area, even though it was not illegal (*Donga News*, 6 Apr. 1923). Through space production, the immigrated Japanese became the owner and the Korean became ‘the stranger’ in Pyongyang. Koreans could think and do only within the hidden or visible boundary of the power.

Under the private monopoly of culture, tyranny does indeed “leave the body free and sets to work directly on the soul”. The ruler no longer says: “Either you think as I do or you die.” He says: “You are free not to think as I do; your life, your property – all that you shall keep. But from this day on you will be a stranger among us - A. de Tocqueville (Adorno and Horkheimer 1969: 202)

To leave Koreans as strangers in their home city was effective for gaining not only physical but also mental control. The spatial division produces a hidden but considerable power. In the hierarchical division, the Japanese could sense their superiority against Koreans. For the

Koreans of Pyongyang, on the other hand, the Japanese in the new city became the object of not only hatred but also of envy and respect as like ‘the colonized African’s behavior (Fanon 1961)’.

The spatial division between the Koreans and Japanese in Pyongyang led to the unequal distribution of social surplus and to the formation of hidden power. While Japan overlooked the birth of Korean nationalism, Koreans with nationalism became a final shifter of imperialism. Koreans were envious of Japanese life, which became the myth. In the daily life of Koreans, the Japanese residential area was the object of hatred but also of hope for their further. As a result, the spatial division made the Japanese as a royal class with silence. In the segregated city of Pyongyang, the Japanese could control the Korean body and their soul.

6.3 Colonial capitalism and Anti-Christianity

6.3.1 Colonial capitalism and the labor ignorance

Christians of Pyongyang regarded the factory establishment as God’s calling after 1920. Koreans considered the failure of independence by the 1919 nonviolence movement as a result of the lack of national power. Korean nationalists and Christian capitalists believed economic independence was the first step to national liberty.

In 1920, ‘the rule of limited company establishment’ was abolished. The main aim of the abolition was the inducement of company establishment by Japanese capitalists. Japanese capitalists accumulated capital during the First World War and regarded colonized Korea as the best investment place. Unlike the Japanese home country, in 1920, colonized Korea did not have any labor law but had suitable elements for the introduction of capitalism, such as modern law with a bureaucrat system, railway, cheap labor and land, and vast underground resources.

After breaking of legal limitation, the Christian capitalist of Pyongyang also established many Korean factories. At the time, many Koreans were unemployed and composed the urban poor (see Chapter 5.3.4) and Koreans regarded the reason for becoming urban poor was the absence of Korean capitalists. Accordingly, Korean capitalists were asked to establish factories to hire the Korean unemployed. In particular, Christian intellectuals and capitalists, Pyongyang

was called the religious city in that time (see Chapter 5.1.2), regarding the establishment of a factory is ‘the actual way of brotherly affection and the only way to satisfy God (Weber 1905:68)’. For instance, most managers and investors in the fabric and rubber factories - the main Korean business in Pyongyang - were Christian (Jang 2000: 263) and they established a night school for the poor child labors (*Donga News*, 19 Jan. 1923).

Among 75,000 citizens of Pyongyang, Koreans amount to 57,000 and Japanese 17,000. However, the Korean industry accounts for less than one third, so it naturally causes poverty among the Koreans. It is a desperate situation. The lack of economic ability rather than a political one allows a nation to collapse. The natural industrial area of Pyongyang has to be Korean’s possession... Furthermore, the establishment of the factory to aid the Pyongyang poor by providing them with jobs is a duty of capitalists, and it would also benefit them (*Donga News*, 25 Dec. 1921).

After 1924 with the labor movement, Korean capitalists noticed that the Japanese had enough capital to destroy their factory. Hence, Korean capitalists requested help from the Japanese government. For example, the Japanese government supplied a substantial subsidy to a Korean cotton enterprise because they issued a daily Korean newspaper (Park 2007: 156). At first, Pyongyang Christian capitalists regarded capital accumulation as a ‘calling’ or a type of brotherly affection, but thereafter, the means and the aim were overturned and Christian capitalists were caught in the logic of colonial capitalism.

Under colonial capitalism, Christian capitalists of Pyongyang ignored Korean labors. The initial strike in Pyongyang was related to the arrival of socialism. In May of 1923, Pyongyang’s young socialist group was established and after four months, the first strike by 1,000 workers occurred in Pyongyang. The reason for the strike was not only the arrival of socialism but also the bad working condition (see Chapter 4.3.4). In 1925, Korean workers in a printing business embarked on a strike demanding a limit of eight hours of work a day, but the Japanese employer fired the Koreans (*Donga News*, 23 Mar. 1925). This led to another strike in the cotton industry with violence against a co-worker. The participants threatened and attacked other non-participating Korean labors (*Donga News*, 26 Apr. 1925). Finally, the strike was brought under control by a colonial police officer (*Donga News*, 4 May. 1925) and Korean capitalists also

refused to rehire and 19 percent of Korean workers lost their job (*Donga News*, 5 May. 1925). Accordingly, Korean capitalists noticed that depending on the Japanese government and police power was an effective means to suppress the labor movement.

In 1925, the socialist community planned an anti-Christian conference on the connection between Christian capitalists and Japan but it was aborted because of interruptions by the Japanese police and the Christian community. The socialist community criticized the Christian community as 'being in the same position with colonial police'. In the situation, many Christian turned to socialists (IKCHS 1990: 49-56).

The phenomenon was more apparent in the strike of rubber plants in 1930. After the Great Depression of 1929, 1,800 workers of Pyongyang rubber factories embarked on a strike against the Korean factory owner's attempts to reduce their wages. The striking workers demanded wage remaining at the same level as well as an improvement in working conditions, which would include payment of medical expenses for injuries, three weeks maternity leave for pregnant women, and free time for nursing. The workers had to pay even for the cost of machine repairs and defective products (*Donga News*, 5 Sep. 1930). However, the strike was blocked and dispersed by colonial police. The negotiation was conducted in Pyongyang police station and finally, 200 workers were discharged. According to the *Donga Daily News* (1 Sep. 1930), the main reasons for the strike's failure were the strong unity of employers and the distribution of colonial police power.

'When religion competes with politics, there can only be one of two results. One is the puritanical grace principle combined with asceticism and the other is the mystical anti-politics result. The puritanical grace principle regards the pressure of calling "even the violence" as God's will' (Weber1921: 231). Korean capitalists, including Christian business owners, turned their backs on Korean labor and became the cooperated with Japanese colonial government around 1930. They used even violence with the power of dismissal and strengthened the anti-Christian mood in the city of Pyongyang.

6.3.2 Asceticism and the geisha ignorance

With the colonial capitalism entering in 1920, the Christian community of Pyongyang conducted the asceticism campaign. The college of Pyongyang by the Christian community

was established in 1905 and it produced many the Christian intellectuals from the lower class for 15 years. The new Christian intellectual received modern education and believed in ‘the progress’ of capitalism. The Christian community of Pyongyang emphasized the puritanical life because most missionaries of Pyongyang came from northern America and were influenced by Calvinism. In addition, ‘if the lowest class aims to overcome their status and to get the initiative, Puritanism and asceticism are an indispensable means of education and reformation (Nietzsche 1885, v.61)’.

In April of 1920, the crusade against alcohol and smoking started in Pyongyang by the Christian community. The movement spread to labors and miners. It filtered through all Pyongyang society and displayed the character of a social movement.

The young community leader of Pyongyang and around 30 young people established the ‘Pyongyang temperance community’... They introduced the American temperance movement and argued that alcohol causes damage to the human body and spirit. Then, they distributed thousands of propaganda papers of the declaration on the streets in Pyongyang (*Donga News*, 8 May 1920).

According to Weber (1920), ‘the asceticism doesn’t escape the present life. It shows their present life with God’s commandments. It functions as an evidence to prove God’s blessing and selection in their real life. The asceticism has two-faces. One side is to escape this world and the other side is to rule the present world by the charismatic power.’

On the surface, the asceticism of Pyongyang appeared to be the reaction of the expanding entertainment culture. Before that time, Pyongyang was a politically isolated place. Since the bureaucrats from other regions did like the Pyongyang people, they exacted heavy taxes and served foreign envoys and central bureaucrats to gain higher positions (see Chapter 5.1.1), which led to the growth of the adult entertainment culture. However, the serious expansion was beginning after the emergence of colonial capitalism in 1920. In 1930, Pyongyang had the name of ‘hedonic city’ and one of Korean Professor said ‘Pyongyang is called the sexual scent and the kingdom of religion (*Donga News*, 19 Oct. 1920)’.

However, the main reason for hedonic culture expansion was connected with the character of Japanese bureaucrat. According to Maryama (1963: 173), ‘the Japanese bureaucratic system

did not have responsible politics. They were a lawless man and did not take ‘the will of the power’ seriously. They were satisfied with the astonishment of the world by resisting and their political passion melted in the adult entertain restaurant’. Naturally, Japanese bureaucrats and capitalists brought the hedonic culture into Pyongyang and the number of geisha increased to 300 in 1924 (*Donga News*, 9 May 1924).

In 1921, the Pyongyang Geisha School was built in the center of the Korean residential area between the bank and the market. In colonial times, the foundation of the geisha school was impossible without the connivance of the Japanese government. However, the Geisha School was not mainly for the Japanese but for Koreans, because most Japanese bureaucratic preferred Japanese geishas instead of Korean. In 1924, the number of Japanese geishas in Korea was 4,891 and Korean geishas numbered 3,413. There were 1,500 more Japanese geishas from their homeland than there were Korean geishas (*Donga News*, 9 May. 1924).




Figure 6.4: The Korean Geisha School of Pyongyang [Source: <http://blog.naver.com/s5we?Redirect=Log&logNo=150050997526>]

The asceticism practiced by the Pyongyang Christian community did not remain a social movement but pressed forward until it became ‘the purgation’ against the geisha. The Christianity of Pyongyang began as the lowest religion and it provided education, medical treatment, and aid for the lower classes. However, after the asceticism movement with colonial capitalism, the mood changed. The Christian community regarded the geisha as an object to remove or displace instead of as a sister for mercy. The Christian community regarded the corruption of women as an issue of morality rather than economic (*Donga News*, 21 Jan. 1927). In 1923, several groups of young people met in the Pyongyang Christian young men’s hall and

resolved to limit the Korean geisha's residential area. The resolution was as follows (*Donga News*, 19 Jul. 1923):

- Let's drive the geisha association outside the city
- Let's drive all geisha houses into one limited area
- Let's prohibit the geisha's from playing instruments and singing in the city
- Let's prohibit a shaman act

However, the main reason for the emergence of geishas was due to colonial capitalism rather than moral corruption. In the 1920s of Pyongyang, women's human trafficking was prevalent and even selling a daughter to forgive a debt because it was regularly permitted in society²⁶. Furthermore, geishas were aged from 12 years and the preferred age of a geisha was 13. Their age was not much over 20. Most of them could not read and write and they did not have the opportunity to express their opinions (*Donga News*, 9 May 1924). The main reasons for the rise of prostitute generation in Pyongyang were economic problems and social acceptance. 'The prostitute is one of the social phenomena like money and religion' (Weber 1904) and Benjamin mentioned, 'since the prostitute sales herself to live, they are a product and also a merchant' (Morss 1991). After colonial capitalism entered Pyongyang, prostitution became a job because the poor women had no other means to earn a living.

Colonial capitalism trapped Pyongyang citizens and Christian capitalists. Then, Korean capitalists relied on the colonial government to keep their company and higher position. Eventually, they lost brotherly affection and ignored the life of the labor and the poor.

In 1930, the Christian community could not show any social resistance during the last national independent movement, while the Korean geisha union of Pyongyang made Japanese police nervous (*Donga News*, 26 Jan. 1930). Finally, the citizens of Pyongyang criticized the Christian community ten years after the entrance of colonial capitalism.

In Pyongyang, there is one hated image and two sounds. First, the housewife

²⁶ According to *Donga Daily News* (7 May 1923), a girl who was said by her real father because of the economic problem escaped to home caused impatient prostitution. However, her father was examined in Pyongyang police station in reference to breach of contract.

wearing only underwear in the house, second is the sound of church bells for heaven, and the third is the sound of the geisha's instrument. (*Donga News*, 26 Oct. 1930)

In 1931, Japan expanded the colony as far as Manchukuo and changed the Korean colonial policy from 'the cultural policy' in 1919 to 'the wartime mobilizing system'. Strikes were not allowed and the capitalists were forced to obey the Japanese colonial government. The capitalists included Christians who were already in positions in the colonial government more so than the Korean poor were. Finally, Japanese Fascism, which aimed for total control, entered without any strong resistance.

6.4 The result: Anti-Chinese Riot

On Sunday, 5 July 1931, in Pyongyang, more than 10,000 Koreans took part in the murder with a shout of 'wipe Chinese rice out!' They attacked and killed even Chinese babies, the elderly, and pregnant women.

If Chinese were seen, hundreds of people followed with criminal intent and overpowered them. Any Chinese person discovered by the mob became a bloody corpse within 10 minutes and their remains were scattered on the road. The corpse of an elder with horrorstricken face, the corpse of a baby, the corpse of a woman with her baby at her breast, and the corpse of a pregnant woman with bruising... On the road, more and more, Chinese corpses were piled up (*Sindonga New*, 25 Feb. 2008).

Furthermore, the mob destroyed most Chinese shops and homes. They destroyed 467 households and burned two households.



Figure 6.5: Destroyed Chinese residential area of Pyongyang during Anti-Chinese Riot in 1931 [Source: *Sindonga News*, 25 Feb. 2008, *Mediatoday*, 15 Mar. 2012]

Why did Koreans kill Chinese who were poor immigrants under Japanese colonial ruling just as Koreans were? Why did the riot take place in Pyongyang rather than in other cities? The main cause of the riot was not because of information fabricated by the Japanese government. It was caused by the violence of nationalism and colonial capitalism. Through the riot, the Chinese position was weakened in Korea, and Japan expanded its colony to northeastern China.

This chapter examines the two causes of the Anti-Chinese Riot. The first was to protect Japanese commerce and the second was the violence from Korean nationalism.

6.4.1 Cause 1: protection of colonial commerce

The Anti-Chinese Riot of Pyongyang was triggered by exaggerated Korean news on 2 July 1931. The distorted news claimed that the Chinese in Manchuria destroyed the waterway of migrant Koreans and killed many Korean peasants who had left their hometowns in Korea for searching for a better life. The riot appeared at once in Korean cities and they attacked Chinese brutally only because of the distorted news. However, the key to determining the real causes of the riot lies in the answer to ‘why they became so angry’ and immediately became ‘the mob’.



Figure 6.6: The mob (up) and Chinese (down) during the Anti-Chinese riot in Pyongyang[Source: *Donga News*, 6 July. 1931]

Because of the Great Depression of 1929, the Japanese economy experienced a downturn after the First World War. Japan, as a latecomer to imperialism, completed the state-dominated rapid industrialization through ultra-nationalism (Clammer 1995). However, the ‘rapid’ imperializing required a continuous sacrifice. The first sacrifice was the homeland people during the period of modernization followed by the colonizing of Korea after 1910 and it expanded to the Asian continent after 1931. While capitalism seeks a market and cheap labor, Japanese imperialism searched for an obedient sacrifice, not only to solve economic and political difficulties but also to maintain the imperialist movement. The ultra-nationalism of Japan reached puberty in the concept of Fascism around 1930 (Maryama 1964: 68). The Anti-Chinese Riot helped the Fascism arrive in colonized Korea.

The general opinion that ‘the Anti-Chinese Riot was instigated by Japan in order to prepare the foothold of continent invasion’ is reasonable. Two months after the riot, Japan invaded Manchu. Moreover, during the riot, Japanese police overlooked the happenings even though it was within their power to control the situation. During the Pyongyang riot, Japanese police did not intervene on the day that the riot broke out or even on the following day²⁷. Under their

²⁷ ‘In the night of Pyongyang fallen in anarchy (July 5), Japanese police man was out of sight’ (*SindongaNews*, 25

ignoring of the situation, Korean hatred emotion was stronger and most damage was incurred on the second day of the riot.

Until on the morning of July 6, the agitated masses were continuously wandering around the streets. After one thirty p.m., about 5,000 people attacked Chinese households again (*Donga News*, 7 July 1931).

As an outcome of the riot, the Japanese merchant could consolidate their position in Pyongyang. In China from 1928, there was a movement to boycott not only Japanese cotton goods, sugar, etc. but also the Japanese currency using official prohibition (*Donga News*, 11 Sep. 1929). Accordingly, 40 percent of Japanese merchants in China were bankrupted and the hegemony for Chinese trade moved from Japan to England and America (*Donga News*, 26 Sep. 1929, 18 Feb. 1929). It led to the destruction of the Shimonoseki treaty after the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and Japanese merchants in China lost their absolute superiority. In 1931, China started collecting tax from the Japanese in China (*Donga News*, 11 Jun. 1931).

This anti-Japanese movement expanded into neighboring Korea. Especially, the Chinese merchants in Korea were expanding the mood in Korean society. Moreover, Chinese merchants had been monopolizing the cotton business in Korea with cheap goods since 1930. It gained the attention of the Japanese because the greatest damage in the movement of China was the cotton business (*Donga News*, 27 Jan. 1931). In April 1931, the Chinese merchant union in Incheon near the capital of Korea proclaimed defiance of the business tax imposed by the Japanese government.

Even unequal tax imposition was a common affair. However, the strong attitude of Chinese merchants to defy taxation would lead to great turmoil. Since the result will be the disobedience of Korean merchants as a necessity, all merchants are closely watching the situation (*Donga News*, 12 Apr. 1931).

Until the 1920s, cheap Chinese labor in the Korean colony was useful to the Japanese

government. It was an effective tool to protect the Korean labor movement and it furthered colonial capitalism rapidly. However, after 1930, the usefulness of Chinese labor decreased because the Korean labor movement lost power according to the connection between the colonial government and Korean capitalists. In 1931, the Japanese government considered the Chinese merchant as a threat to colonize the Korean market.

The riot directly injected fear into the Chinese. They lost most of their possessions and returned to their homeland. A total of 3,070 Chinese immediately left Pyongyang and returned to China and just 483 Chinese remained. Moreover, the remaining Chinese were also bankrupt because their shops and households had been destroyed. Finally, they were forced to live together in temporary dwellings (*Donga News*, 13 Jul. 1931, 22Jul. 1931).



Figure 6.7: Leaving Chinese from Pyongyang railway station under protection (or surveillance) by Japanese police in 1931 [Source: *Donga News*, 13 Jul. 1931]

Eventually, after most Chinese and their households were attacked by the Korean mob, Japanese police suppressed them. After the riot, 1,532 Koreans were imprisoned and the Korean community was destroyed.

The riot showed that the Korean masses had already become ‘the mob’. After 1931, Japanese Fascism entered the colony of Korea and the Korean community could not defend itself against its power because they were also under the logic of power.

6.4.2 Cause 2: the mature violence of nationalism

The other basic cause of the Anti-Chinese Riot of 1931 is the mature violence of Korean nationalism. The violence and exclusiveness were born from nationalism and colonial capitalism fed it. Korean nationalism learned the logic of power from Japanese ultra-nationalism and used their trained violence against the weaker Chinese race. The riot showed how the Korean masses became the mob with mature violence.

The Anti-Chinese Riot had erupted more heavily in Pyongyang than any other city. Among those who were affected by the riot, 77 percent of fatalities were Chinese and 64 percent of property damage occurred in Pyongyang. While Pyongyang had been called ‘the Oriental Jerusalem’ with brotherly affection 20 years before, the brutal riot occurred there in 1931.

	Pyongyang	Incheon	Seoul	Wonsan	*Total
Death	109	2	-	16	142
Injured	161	14	140	-	546
Missing	63	-	-	-	91
Amount of loss (<i>Won</i>)	2,545,000	90,000	1,400,000	-	4,000,000

Table 6.2: The damage of the Anti-Chinese Riot in 1931, *Total data is from the Chinese Nationalist Party [Source: *Donga News*, 3 Sep. 1931]

With the birth of Korean nationalism in 1919, the exclusion of Chinese grew. With the entrance of colonial capitalism, Chinese merchants opened their shops in Pyongyang. Since the first aim of Korean nationalism was to achieve economic independence, the Chinese capitalist was also the competitor. Alongside colonial capitalism and the Christian asceticism movement, the exclusion of the Chinese nation was growing.

Most Chinese restaurants are on a very busy street in Pyongyang. It resonates with the sound of the untidy geisha’s song and instruments all day and night. The fresh air of Pyongyang has been polluted by Chinese restaurants. (*Donga News*, 2 Oct. 1921)

However, the main reason for anti-Chinese sentiments began with the awareness that the Chinese took Korean jobs and capital. In that time, the poor Chinese labor were known as

‘coolies’ and they spread globally into countries such as America and Australia and many of them entered neighboring Korea. According to the Japanese Residency-General, the number of Chinese had more than doubled between 1906 and 1911 (*Hankyoreh*21, 16 Apr. 2012). With the entry of colonial capitalism after 1920, many Chinese entered Korea. In 1924, Chinese merchants and laborers moved into cities throughout colonized Korea and the scale of their numbers became considerable. In many cities, for example, most owners of fabric stores, restaurants, and barbershops were Chinese, and so were many fishermen and stonemasons were. In addition, about 10,000 Chinese peasants cultivated costly vegetables near the city (*Donga News*, 22 Sep. 1924).



Figure 6.8: The Chinese coolie in Korea in 1910s [Source: *Hankyoreh*21,16 Apr. 2012]

In the 1920s, cheap Chinese labor was a useful means to suppress the Korean labor movement. The labor movement of Pyongyang continued after 1923. After the middle of the 1920s, Japanese and even Korean capitalists threatened the labor movement by utilizing the cheaper Chinese labor pool. In retaliation, the Korean labor group went on strike but the Korean factory owner responded with ‘dismiss Korean participant and hire Chinese labor’. The wage of Pyongyang labor was cheaper than that of other Korean cities but Pyongyang Chinese labor was the cheapest. In addition, the Chinese were diligent and had integrity, even in very difficult situations²⁸. The main reason for Chinese job achievement was their diligence.

²⁸ In case of Seoul in 1914, the resident Chinese was 2,500 but about half of them were labor and only 100

Nowadays, the main arm of the Chinese, as our job plunderers, is neither their power nor fortune. It is only their credibility and diligence. Therefore, if we lost in the competition against the Chinese, it is surely because of our dishonesty and laziness. (*Donga News*, 22 Sep. 1924)

The Koreans attacked the weaker Chinese laborers with violence. For example, in 1925, 50 Korean laborers from a Pyongyang fabric factory attacked working Chinese laborers twice. The reason for the violence was that the leader of the Chinese laborers did not carry out a Korean expulsion order (*Donga News*, 12 Apr. 1925). The violence against Chinese labor in Pyongyang continued. A year before the Anti-Chinese Riot, the conflict between Chinese and Korean labors led to dozens of people being injured (*Donga News*, 7 Apr. 1930).

The Anti-Chinese sentiments intensified after the Great Depression of 1929. During the time, the sharp decline of world silver prices affected silver production in China and it led many unemployed Chinese entering Korea. In Pyongyang, the numbers of Chinese merchants grew rapidly and, in 1930, they had monopolized the fabric stores. In addition, three months before the riot, 1,700 Chinese— the largest number of data – arrived in the city and joined with the existing 3,000 Chinese of Pyongyang. Most were seasonal cheap laborer (*Donga News*, 19 Apr. 1931). However, there were already many unemployed Koreans in Pyongyang in 1931, which was exacerbated by the returning Korean labors from Japan after the Japanese economic depression. Even in an atmosphere of growing dissatisfaction and economic upheaval, many Chinese labors were hired, even at ‘the national project for the poor of Pyongyang’ because of their willingness to work for lower wages.

Finally, Korean laborers and the poor of Pyongyang regarded themselves as in a helpless state. The Korean masses of Pyongyang had lost all dependable community structures and interactions during colonial urbanization. They regarded the Chinese as thieves of what employment remained. At the height of the disappointment and dissatisfaction, the masses showed the character of the mob:

Chinese were recognized as a rich merchant. (*Hankyoreh*21, 16Apr. 2012)

They had lost, moreover, without being aware of it, those neutral supporters who had never been interested in politics because they felt that no parties existed to take care of their interests... the loss of the silent consent and support of the unorganized masses who suddenly shed their apathy and went wherever they saw an opportunity to voice their new violent opposition' (Arendt 1979: 315).

In 1931, the Korean masses heard the fabricated news that the 'Chinese of Manchu killed Korean peasants'. At the same time, the riot broke out, which was not caused by patriotism but by a desire to express their hostility. At that moment, the Chinese were as a suitable object because 'the masses couldn't suffer wealth without political power (Tocqueville 1835)'. As a result, all Pyongyang masses participated in the riot, even the general citizen with 'a lip service'.²⁹

After the sound of glass breaking and shouts were heard, the masses crowded everywhere... 'Revenge!'. . . 'With their suffering, we couldn't live anymore.'... 'Wipe out the Chinese race!' When someone shouted, the masses changed at once to a pack of bloodthirsty wolves (*Sindonga News*, 25 Feb. 2008).

Nationalism, even colonial nationalism, has the character of violence within its logic. Korean nationalism was born in answer to colonial oppression to recover national freedom. However, it learned violence from the Japanese oppressor as its father for ten years. The Japanese colonial government finished preparing the essential condition for the total control, as Stalin did in 1928, which entailed 'changing the class into the masses and simultaneously removing all community (Arendt 1979: 69). In 1931, the Anti-Chinese Riot proved that the violence of Korean nationalism was mature and the masses became the mob. Finally, the mob expressed the violence that it had learned from the Japanese oppressor, as Kafka states:

²⁹The thing the society did against the mob was to cover victim only by lip service. When the mob attacked the Jews and their shop on the street, the higher society spoke the radical violence as like a harmless play of children... That word was as like 'have to circumcise the Jews until their neck' (Arendt 1979: 243).

All of us beat mother without any concern. Father was by his way and I by my way.
It was like a rest. – Kafka, *Letter to his father*

During the riot, Japan showed the possibility of total control because ‘totalitarianism desired the mob instead of the passionless follower’ (Arendt 1947: 33). Ten years after the entry of Korean nationalism and colonial capitalism, Japan changed its colonial policy from ‘the cultural politics’ to ‘the wartime mobilization system’. From 1931, the brutal violence of Japanese Fascism, which had already passed their homeland, showed its evil character in colonized Korea with a more impassioned face.

Chapter 7

The socialist city as a stepping-stone

The process of the Kim Il Sung regime constructing a socialist country was used as a stepping-stone for complete control of North Korea. Under the guise of revolution, the regime removed all of its political opponents and appealed to the atomized masses by the party's own enthusiasm. 'Socialist revolution aimed to steal the power and to destroy the democracy quickly' (Hitler 1926: 174). In addition, Arendt states that:

Only after the extermination of real enemies has been completed and the hunt for "objective enemies" begun does terror become the actual content of totalitarian regimes. Under the pretext of building socialism in one country, or using a given territory, as a laboratory for a revolutionary experiment, or realizing the *Volksgemeinschaft*, the second claim of totalitarianism, the claim to total domination, is carried out (Arendt 1979: 422).

This process had been established by the Kim regime after 1945 under the name of 'the ideal socialist country construction'. The process hid the truth and gave its own version of reality. This laid the groundwork for later construction of the ideal socialist city of Pyongyang.

7.1 Did the socialist city ever exist?

Has a truly socialist city ever existed? Lefebvre (1991: 33) states that 'if the socialism has not produced its own space, it means the socialist production system could get its concrete existence not yet'. Moreover, he pointed out 'the reason for the failure of the Soviet Revolution even it boiled up with creativity between 1920 and 1930 is because it couldn't produce the space matched its system'. Furthermore, Katznelson (1992: 28) indicated that 'urban phenomena were not captured for Marxist theory'. David Smith concluded, 'some form of socialism produced cities which are different from those in other kinds of society; the difference

may simply be in the extent to which such features as neighborhood units, land-use planning, and public transport predominated, rather than in a fundamental alternative to the capitalist city' (Andrusz 1996:71).

It might be argued that the socialist city has never existed. Lefebvre (2011) indicated that 'if one system cannot produce its own space, the actual being of the system is called to question'. However, he also states that 'with only the reason of absence of spatial production, the socialist system couldn't be denounced as a failed transitional production system'. Due to this limitation, studies on the socialist city have moved to define the characteristics of its space. Ivan Szelenyi proposed that 'cities in Eastern Europe are "socialist" not in the sense that they are necessarily better or worse than they used to be, or better or worse than comparable cities in capitalist countries. They are socialist in that they are different' (Andrusz 1996:70).

In compliance with Szelenyi view, Ian Hamilton detailed the characteristics of socialist cities in Eastern Europe, defining them as having (Andrusz 1996:73):

- 1) a historic medieval or renaissance core
- 2) an inner commercial, housing, and industrial area from the capitalist period
- 3) a zone of socialist transition or renewal, where modern construction partially and progressively replaces inherited urban or relict-village areas
- 4) socialist housing from the 1950s
- 5) integrated socialist neighborhoods and residential districts of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s
- 6) open or planted 'isolation belts'
- 7) industrial or related zones
- 8) open countryside, forests, or hills, including tourist complexes




Figure 7.1: Model of the growth of an Eastern European socialist city [Source: French and Hamilton (1979), quoted in Andrusz (1996:74)]

However, even with these characteristics, Lefebvre (2011) criticizes that 'had socialism produced their own space? If it didn't produce, the system of socialism could not get their actual existence'. Hence, what is Moscow or Pyongyang's final aim in becoming socialist cities? Here, the criticism of Nietzsche about socialism as the means of total control is paid attention.

Socialism is the fanciful younger brother of the almost expired despotism whose heir it wants to be; its endeavors are thus in the most profound sense reactionary. For it desires an abundance of state power such as only despotism has ever had; indeed it outbids all the despotisms of the past inasmuch as it expressly aspires to the annihilation of the individual, who appears to it like an unauthorized luxury of nature destined to be improved into a useful organ of the community... it is secretly preparing itself for rule through fear and is driving the word 'justice' into the heads of the half-educated masses like a nail so as to rob them of their reason (after this said reason has already greatly suffered from exposure to their half-education) and to create in them a good conscience for the evil game they are to play (Nietzsche 1996: v473).

In *The German Ideology*, Marx (1846: 67) considered ‘human processing by humans’ as being a more powerful component of ‘nature processing’. After Marx, Lenin sought to realize ‘the human processing’ with his own regime, which was later also tested by Stalin. In Nazism, the space of ‘the neighborhood’ was used as a tool for brainwashing German citizens. Neighborhoods were organized in such a way to support the legitimacy of the Nazi ideology, as they were the places where individual perspectives could be most influenced. Neighborhood centers were thus assumed places where ideological brainwashing and social control could be easily achieved. The intention to breach the space of the ‘neighborhood’ was the primary goal of the German communist party in the 1920s – their so-called *Volkshäuser* (people’s homes) outreach program (Eckardt 2006: 55).

The process of the socialist revolution in North Korea is different from that of the Soviets and Chinese. North Koreans had not experienced a victory in proletarian revolts. What they had learned, under Japanese colonialism and fascism, was to obey. ‘If one such totalitarianism disappeared, others may appear to take its place, owing to the endemic conditions that have given rise to them’ (Friedrich 1965: 378). In its concern to radically veil its power in 1945, the Kim regime brought an illusion of being the ideal socialist country. During his process of taming the North Korean citizens to submission, Kim Il Sung was seen as a new master in the new era.

The Kim regime presents Pyongyang as ‘the revolutionary socialist city’. However, it is not easy to define how socialism created space in Pyongyang. In the city itself, there is not a concrete space for class equality or struggle. Even the characteristics of other socialist cities - their neighborhood units, land-use planning, and public transport– are not readily apparent in Pyongyang. Under the Kim regime, class equality was had not ever been considered a priority for its urban plan (see Chapter 3.4 about spatial inequality in the 2000s). However, Kim’s statue and memorialized Kim with the name of a university in Pyongyang was unveiled just after the Kim regime’s establishment in 1948.

In Pyongyang, there is no clear space either for socialist ideology or class equality. It means that the slogan ‘construct, an ideal socialist city’ by the Kim regime could be an illusion. The process of change and the propaganda that followed were only sequential markers on the road to the regime’s total control of North Korea.

7.2 The illusion of the ‘socialist city’, 1945-1948

7.2.1 The inheritance of fascism

The citizens of Pyongyang had suffered under Japanese colonial and fascist control, so it was inevitable that they would welcome and readily accept the later cruelty of the Kim regime. Rousseau considered this irony as such:

Peoples once accustomed to masters are not in a condition to do without them. If they attempt to shake off the yoke, they still more estrange themselves from freedom, as, by mistaking for it an unbridled license to which it is diametrically opposed, they nearly always manage, by their revolutions, to hand themselves over to seducers, who only make their chains heavier than before. (Rousseau 1754: 2).

On the morning of August 15, 1945, a declaration was attached to every street corner in Pyongyang about a preliminary notice of the announcement. At 11 a.m, the unconditional surrender of Japan was broadcast over the radio. Finally, Koreans were liberated from colonial control.

The mood that day in Pyongyang was similar to that of five days before, when the good news of the American B29 fighter had been broadcast on the radio, along with the news of the Soviet army attacking the Japanese. Pyongyang citizens could now see Japanese refugees from the North district near Pyongyang station. However, the streets of Pyongyang were silent after this news of liberation:

By the way, the mood was strange. After the news of liberation, the streets of Pyongyang were very quiet during the daytime. Actually, the shouting of independent began at midnight from the outskirts of the city (Ouh 1971).

On the day that the liberation had been announced, there was not a single joyful cry in downtown Pyongyang. What did his silence mean? During the Independence Movement in 1919, all nations shouted the freedom upon their life (see Chapter 4.2.3). After 26 years had

passed, and on the day of their liberation, the Korean citizens were silent. Even shouting was heard from outside the city. Why was this so?

While other Japanese colonies had only been used for their raw material and market supplies, Japan developed a great deal of its own industry in Korea during the war. This was because Korea had many advantages that made up for Japan's weaknesses, such as the abundance of industrial material and electricity, and the absence of any competitor companies. By 1945, the scale and level of the technology and equipment available in Korea even surpassed that of the Japanese. The industrial output of the northern part of Korea was increased roughly four times between 1930 and 1940. Its product output was responsible for 70 percent of all Korean produce (Michiko 2003: 40-42). The largest industrial and commercial city in northern Korea was Pyongyang.

In the early 20th century, Pyongyang was a base of liberalism and modernity. A number of Korea intellectuals and capitalists aimed to give citizens jobs, education, medical services, and public welfare. However, once colonial capitalism and Japanese fascism had taken hold, Korean intellectuals, the bourgeoisie, and Christians became aggressive supporters of the Japanese invasion of the Asian continent. Fanon (1961) points out that under the colonial control the 'national intellectual' parted ways from the labor and the peasant. The Koreans laid their hope on the benefit to Japanese continent extension. Just before 1945, the Korean intellectuals, the bourgeoisie, and Korean Christians had no expected independence. Rather, they hoped that the Japanese would win the war. Thus, Korea's radical independence at the time only deprived them of their vested rights and made them feel shameful rather than free.

An additional factor might relate to the way the peasants and lumpen proletariat kept silent during this upheaval, as otherwise throughout history, 'only the lower class gathered when the riot or fight occurred on the street' (Rousseau 1754: 58). The first reaction to the news of liberation was from the working class, especially from those who lived on the outskirts of the city. However, they did not begin to protest directly after the announcement but instead around midnight when they could not be identified. They were not silent because of a misunderstanding of the Japanese language, or the radio broadcast. According to Ouh (1971), intellectuals, workers, and peasants alike listened to the announcement together. Moreover, by 10 a.m. that day (an hour before the official broadcast), some had already expected the collapse of Japan and there had been whispers of 'coming independence' on the street.

Fanon (1961: 120) stated that ‘although the peasant is always the victim, the proletarian could be a beneficiary under the colonialism’. However, the positional difference between the labor and the peasant could be equated to the inheritance of an ideology. The fundamental reason for their silence was not caused by different positions on the matter but instead by the ‘inheritance’ of fascism.

After the Sino-Japanese War of 1937, the suppression of Japanese fascism became ever more defiant. From 1938, many Korean women were drafted as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers. In the case of Pyongyang in 1943, 800 Korean labors were drafted for the construction of Pyongyang airport; they were later massacred to keep the project secret. A man could lose their mental disorder when he or she watches a large-scale massacre (Fanon 1961: 262). Japanese fascism produced schizophrenics in colonized Korean society (Cumings 1981: 529). The power of Japanese colonialism had gone in an instant. However, the citizen of Pyongyang could not be happy and could not attack the Japanese Shinto that the symbol of yield. Machiavelli (1513: 79) states that ‘whether it be better to be loved than feared or feared than loved? It is difficult to unite them in one person, is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with’.

Suddenly, absolute rule had diminished. The citizen, tamed for obedience, not feared the political vacuum rather than freedom. Rousseau (1754: 2) states that ‘for it is with liberty as it is with those solid and succulent foods, or with those generous wines which are well adapted to nourish and fortify robust constitutions that are used to them, but ruin and intoxicate weak and delicate constitutions to which they are not suited’.

The possibility for Kim’s dictatorship was not only down to Soviet support (Kim 2008) but also by citizen expectation. In other words, the dictatorship only continued the heritage of Japanese colonial rule (Cumings 1986: 474). After three years of independence from the Japanese, a visitor to Pyongyang said ‘Pyongyang’s citizen enshrined Stalin’s and Kim’s portraits in their houses as they had with the Japanese emperor. I thought the whole procedure was a copy of what had happened during the Japanese colonial period’ (*Donga News*, 27 April 1948).

7.2.2 Land reform and new status-group discrimination

As there were many members of the bourgeoisie, landlords, Christians, and nationalists in Pyongyang, achieving a socialist revolution seemed difficult³⁰. In order to effect a change, Kim Il Sung proclaimed a land reform in March 1946. The official aim of the reform was ‘to get rid of landlord ownership and offer land to farmers for free’ (*Donga News*, 15Mar. 1946). For the working classes who needed ‘land and bread’, it seemed the revolution was out to realize their dream. However, Nietzsche criticizes the revolution as a delusion:

The experiences of history have taught us, unfortunately, that every such revolution brings about the resurrection of the most savage energies in the shape of the long-buried dreadfulness and excesses of the most distant ages: that a revolution can thus be a source of energy in a mankind grown feeble but never a regulator, architect, artist, perfecter of human nature (Nietzsche 1996: v463).

Land reform had great and immediate support from Pyongyang’s citizens. At the time of independence, 16.3 percent of all landlords had 80.5 percent of farmland. Independent farmers only had 3.2 percent of farmland. In addition, the cost to rent a farm in Pyongyang was 20 to 30 percent higher than in other districts (PLHCC 1957: 565). It was that most of Pyongyang’s working classes wanted ‘land’ more than ‘freedom’ (Cumings 1986: 529).

The land reform clearly divided the ideological position between South and North. Unlike the Chinese, North Korea’s land reform would not be possible without fighting because the landlords and pre-Japanese intellectuals had control of the refuge area in South Korea (Cumings 1986: 514). Between the time of independence and the Korean War, about one million, 10 percent of all northern Koreans had moved into southern Korea. Most of them said that ‘the main reason for escape was property confiscation and suppression’ (Han 2010: 228). The Kim regime had become polarized from southern Korea (Cumings 1986: 486). At the time,

³⁰ Lee(2007: 147) states the characters of Pyongyang: 1) industrial city, most capitalist based on the pro-Japanese, 2) best-expressed district of Christian culture, had strong economic fundamental of small business, and citizens’ political tendency is for opportunism, 3) produced many nationalists based on the feudal landlord, so they oppressed the scientific trend.

for the bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and Christians, moving into South Korea seemed the only feasible option.

In Pyongyang, all shops closed quickly at half-past six and citizens avoided walking in the streets past seven o'clock in the evening. The wife of my friend said "it is not a good way of life" and "a few days ago, my neighbor moved to Seoul". Also, my friend said not only his family but also most Pyongyang citizen would move to the South if they could (*Donga News*, 8Apr.1946).

Through land reform, Kim's regime stood to demolish the remaining power in North Korea. The property of the bourgeoisie had been confiscated and all political leaders were removed without bloodshed. Instead, they were relocated to other regions and lived under 'close observation' to protect against their return to power (Cumings 1986: 513). During this process, the regime could monopolize production and so remove the opposition. It was a general process of 'the strong ruler appears in the time of government forming within the social movement (Giddens 1987: 351)'. The Kim regime had been growing since the beginning of the land reform movement.

According to a tailor from the north part of Korea, the labor and the lower class could have a chance to get a political position (Cumings 1986: 526). Land reform removed the bourgeoisie and intellectuals from political power. At once, the political vacuum was filled with working classes, who became political leaders in place of the intellectuals. According to Orwell (1949: 282), 'even in the revolutionary change, the lowest among the three classes always keep their social position of the slave'. However, the revolutionary change that had been affected by land reform in northern Korea demolished all traditional structures and the lowest class now stood as leaders of this new society. In January 1947, 85 percent of all 562,600 members of the Communist Party were from the working classes (Kim 2008: 227). Slaves, then, became the owner. For the great size of its beneficiaries, the Kim regime seemed to be a savior. One manager from northern Korea said as below.

The peasant, divorcee, and party member run wild and control the town...They studied writing with the text from the Communist Party. During the study, the socialist

ideology was rooted in the brain. It was very surprising that the working classes pretend as an intellectual (Cumings 1986: 526).

This phenomenon matched Lenin's own strategy. In the letter to the proletarian volunteer corps, he said that 'for holding the revolutionary results and getting the peace, bread, and freedom, the proletarian has to demolish the past organizations of state and replace the power of police, army, and bureaucrat with a new organization who united with armed people' (Žižek 2002: 69).

These beneficiaries of the land reform did not know the theory of socialism; neither did they have any particular feeling toward the Kim regime (Cumings 1986: 485). However, 'the fanaticism of members of totalitarian movements, so clearly different in quality from the greatest loyalty of members of ordinary parties, is produced by the lack of self-interest of masses who are quite prepared to sacrifice themselves' (Arendt 1979: 348). In an interview, a refugee from North Korea said.

Reporter: What kind of person has been remained in North Korea with a good feeling?

Mr. Yu: It would only be the uncomprehending peasant and the socialist. I, as a peasant, was cheated a lot. There wouldn't be a man left who has any critical insight (*Donga News*. 24Sep. 1947).

Land reform, under the slogan of equality, led to new state group discrimination similar to the racism of hereditary. In 1958, after having monopolized all means of production and eliminating political opponents, the Kim regime went after those groups who opposed them. The re-classification of all nations thus developed into a new state group. The most important factor for a positive future in North Korean society became 'the origin of blood'. The ancestry of the bourgeoisie, landlords, Christians were regarded as 'a contaminated blood', and they were forced out or executed. The ancestry of peasant or labor families was considered pure; the purest blood is from which Kim's family originated. In 1967, with the announcement of totalitarian ideology, the new status group took concrete form with a 'classified citizens' project. In the project, all citizens were classified into three classes: 'the core class', 'the disorderly class', and 'the hostile class' (Lee 2008: 123). In 1974, the matured new status group supported

the ideology of Kim's family as presiding over Juche ideology.

'The totalitarian movement needs the atomized and isolated masses. Also, totalitarianism has to replace all seats of power regardless of their feeling about the regime, from the very top to the madman at the bottom' (Arendt 1979: 43, 69). Kim's regime could replace all seats of power with the name of the land reform revolution.

7.2.3 The myth of the Botong River improvement

On 21 May 1946, after two months of land reform, the Kim regime started to change the urban space of Pyongyang. Its first significant project, under Kim Il Sung's direction, was an improvement to the Botong River. This work was always considered a great achievement for urban construction, completed thanks to 'patriotism and the great effort of the Pyongyang citizen' (PLHCC 1957: 567).



Figure 7.2: Poverty in the colonial-era Botong River district [Source: *A pictorial Pyongyang*, Pyongyang: Chosen Press, 1980]

Why did Kim direct the work, when the district was on the outskirts of the city? The first was out of practical need. The Botong River district was located on the northern outskirts of the city and was the poor residential area in the Japanese colonial era. Until the 19th century, the area outside Pyongyang castle was only farmland, due to frequent flooding. After a period of rapid urbanization in 1920, the peasants who were living there lost their farmland and moved into Pyongyang. Most of them became a part of the urban poor and were then driven out of the city and ended up dwelling in informal settlements near the Botong River. In 1929, 5.5 percent of all citizens lived in the Botong River district. Only 50 of the 1,240 households in the district

were burden carriers, factory clerks, or day laborers, and the others were unemployed people. When they could not find jobs, they had no choice but to starve or begin work in the city. In addition, as the district was geographically low and near the river, there was annual flood damage.

Everybody said Pyongyang is the industrialized city and the kingdom of religion, so day by day, a high brick building, lining Japanese shop, sky-high factory chimney, and superstructure of the church was going on increasing. On the other hand, however, in Susung-Ri and Girim-Ri (Botong River district), there are around 1,200 households, 6,800 people with nothing to live for on a wretched life. They had lost the way of life and their houses were gradually driven into a backside of the city (*Donga News*, 17Jul. 1929).

To protect from flooding and to improve poor living conditions created by the Kim regime seemed a matter of course. The beginning of the improvements came at the right time, practically speaking, because work began just before the rainy season.

However, the change in urban space was politically changed. In May 1946, Pyongyang had many spatial problems, such as narrow roads and cramped dwellings,³¹ but Kim directed the Botong project first. Politically, for Pyongyang's citizens, the Kim regime introduced the idea of 'the caring government for the disregarded and suppressed people' and 'the competent government constructing an ideal socialist country'. The most effective means to accomplish this would be to allow the citizens to live in the changing urban space. For this to happen, it was necessary to produce the space itself (Lefebvre 1991: 383).

From 1923, the Japanese colonial government recognized the need for improvement to the Botong River. They were not, however, interested in the needs of the Korean urban poor. The first improvement work was carried out in 1933, not for the poor but rather for preparing the site for a new Japanese factory. Further, instead of giving the poor any benefits, the colonial government tried to force them out, with threats of flood damage (*Donga News*, 22 Jun. 1935).

³¹ After the independence, the manpower and resources for the urban development absolutely lacked. Accordingly, before the Korean War, the street of Pyongyang was so narrow and the city was not fitted with the modern urban system. The infrastructure of the life also totally lacked. (Jang 2005: 222)

As a result, until independence in 1945, the Botong River district remained a symbol of indifference under Japanese colonial control.

The citizen of Susung-Ri and Girem-Ri (Botong River distant) complain because the area has food damage, even in a little rain. On the 15th day of this month, about 300 houses were flooded again. The citizen thinks the lack of drain system causes flood damage, so among the dwellers, criticism about the (colonial) government is full (*Donga News*, 13 Aug. 1937).

In March 1946, the Kim regime announced its land reforms and received support from the peasant and working classes. However, the regime could neither monopolize all political and military power nor get reform support from all communities. Especially in Pyongyang, many capitalists, nationalists, and Christians were persistent in demonstrating against the land reform and trusteeship of the Soviet Union. For example, in February 1946, students from 16 middle schools in Pyongyang went on a unified student strike for 19 days and about 300 students were imprisoned (*Donga News*, 21 Mar. 1946). In succession, on March 1, 1946 (the anniversary day of independence movement), some students equipped machine-guns and clashed with national security forces. Students demanded that Kim's regime release their imprisoned peers, stop oppression, and allow freedom of the press, assembly, publication, and religion (*Donga News*, 7Mar. 1946). Just before the project took place, the positive mythology that had surrounded Kim was starting to disappear for Pyongyang's citizens.

When Kim appeared in Pyongyang playfield after the independence, the masses were enthusiastic. The whole nation had an earnest mind to seek a leader. However, after Sinuiju students' bloody work, the public sentiment left day by day. On the other hand, the trust of nationalist Cho Mansic was rising after the anti-trusteeship movement (*Donga News*, 9 Apr. 1946).

Getting total control is more possible with the backing of the ignorant masses rather than by the elite minority. At the time, Kim primarily needed enthusiastic elements, such as the mob, to force political opposition because 'the mob is primarily a group in which the residue of all

classes are represented' (Arendt 1979: 107). Furthermore, as Olson (1965) stated, 'the privileged group' worked more effectively than the general group did, with the former changing the opinions of the latter.

With this political intention, the Botong River improvement work started. Work finished in just 50 days at the hands of Pyongyang's citizens, which had not been achieved in the entire 35 years of the Japanese colonial period. According to one book published in Pyongyang introduces the Botong River district; 'it has 9 kilometers canal and 3 million square kilometers amusement park. Today, the name of the flood damage becomes the old proverb. The citizens near the Botong River district are happy without any worry' (Kang and Lee 1986). Through the project, the citizen can literally see the urban space changing and experience this ideological myth as a reality. The project returned citizens' attention to the Kim regime and led the myth of 'the ideal socialist city construction'.



Figure 7.3: Botong River district after 1970s
[Source: *A pictorial 'Pyongyang'*, Pyongyang: Chosen Press, 1980]

The district was redecorated as an ideological space in every time of succeeding the power. During the period of power succession in the 1970s, Kim's son erected 'the memorial monument of Botong River improvement work' and also constructed a great swimming pool, skating rink, and small zoo in this area. The government propagandized the district as a 'paradise river' or 'happiness river'. This was brought to a head, in 1989, as the symbol of totalitarian power - the great pyramid building of the Ryugyong Hotel - was established on the site. In October 2012 during the second period of power succession, Kim's grandson again

labeled the improvement work of Botong River as ‘the great plan of leader Kim Jungun’.

‘First of all, political ideology deals with the spatial agenda. Then, as the name of strategy, the politic intervenes into the space (Lefebvre 1974: 179)’. The Botong River improvement work was the effective means to overthrow opposing powers and return the notion of a new leader to the masses by putting forward the myth of the ‘ideological socialist city construction’.

7.2.4 The cheat of the educational and cultural city

Orwell (1949: 262) states in his book, *1984*, ‘the problem, that is to say, is educational. It is a problem of continuously moulding the consciousness both of the directing group and of the larger executive group that lies immediately below it. The consciousness of the masses needs only to be influenced in a negative way’.

At the same time as the land reform, the Kim regime distributed an education reform. The regime ordered the purging of any vestiges of the earlier Japanese colonial era as the Red Guards of China. In the process, most of the bourgeoisie, intellectuals, landlords, and Christians were forced into South Korea. The vacuum that their emigration had left was filled with the sons of ignorant peasants and laborers. These people were illiterate and their thoughts were as blank as white paper. The Kim regime regarded them as prime targets for teaching the new ideology. They wanted to make ‘a new man’ who entirely obeys the regime. Orwell describes that:

Don’t you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought? In the end, we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it. Every concept that can ever be needed, will be expressed by exactly one word, with its meaning rigidly defined and all its subsidiary meanings rubbed out and forgotten (Orwell 1949: 67).

In 1946, most names in Pyongyang had been changed to the words ‘revolutionary’, ‘unity’, ‘victory’, ‘people’, ‘Kim Il Sung’, and ‘the 00th’ without historical memories.

My friend in Pyongyang said “name changes such as ‘the seventh’ hospital are not

conducive to effective management. It is a preparatory step for making a socialist system. If the nursery is prepared, making a system would be finished.” I wished his thoughts were mere guesses. However, when I saw the name of elementary school change to ‘People’s school’, I could guess the political direction of Kim’s regime (*Donga News*, 9Apr. 1946).

In 1946, the Kim regime constructed the Kim Il Sung University. The construction was affected by Kim’s slogan ‘payoff of the colonial legacy and the education system reform for the people’. However, the construction of schools or universities had political aims; the regime was less interested in giving equal opportunities for education. For the construction of the socialist state, the education reform had two aims; one was to remodel ‘the man’ and the other was to mobilize a ‘system’ (Han 2010: 321).

Before the land reform, the racial proportion of students was quietly changed. In the case of the college of medicine in Pyongyang before 1945, the number of Japanese students was 119 and the Korean students were less than half that. Among these Korean students, 39.6 percent were sons of landlords and capitalists, 29.3 percent were children of merchants, and 18.9 percent were children of the bourgeois. For the sons of the peasant and labor classes, the opportunity for education was very limited (PLHCC 1957: 613). After the land reform, however, most students had been forced out of their homes, together with their families, and the sons of peasants and laborers took those empty seats. In addition, the construction of the Kim Il Sung University, a college of education, five technical colleges, 26 people’s schools, and a number of adult education schools were established. In the progress, around 50,000 youth from the son of labor could get an opportunity for education. Building many schools at the same time was made possible, as the regime had taken semi-mandatory ‘donations’ from labors and office workers (PLHCC 1957: 600). Since the citizens always desired the chance of education (see Chapter 4.2.2), the educational policy set by the Kim regime seemed a new hope for the underclasses. At the time, one educator said that ‘the great work of the communist regime was to give the chance of schooling for the sons of the underclasses’ (Cumings 1986: 526).

According to the announcement of the education ministry, the present entrance

condition of 19 schools in Pyongyang shows that the so-called only ‘hall of admission’ is disappeared. There are 3,465 applicants against 3,200 recruitments. (*Donga News*, 18Jul. 1946)

The content in these educational classes was, however, heavily steeped in ideology and propaganda. All teachers were socialists and the content of the textbook only contained basic information on general knowledge, and focused instead on such spin as ‘down with Kim Gu and South Korean nationalist’, ‘cheer for Stalin’, or ‘cheer for Kim Il Sung’. During the election period in 1946, the regime allowed elementary students to distribute leaflets and campaigns for their parents. Elementary schoolteachers also had to work for middle schools and the requirements for these teachers were not a certain level of knowledge but rather the ability to distribute socialist propaganda (*Kyunghyang News*, 2Mar. 1947).

Kim Il Sung University turned away elites and party officers. Most university professors had a second or third level against Seoul. The regime only allowed them to transmit the ideologies of Marx or Lenin and forced them to hang the portrait of Kim Il Sung and Stalin on the wall. If the students did not follow these rules, they were punished (*Kyunghyang News*, 25 Feb. 1949).

As with education, cultural work was also used as a tool for uniformity and idolization. In October 1946, the ‘General Union of North Korean Culture and Art’ was established to preside over the fields of cinema, drama, literature, art, music, dance, and athletics. The basic direction of the union was ‘unification through patriotism’, ‘exclusion of bourgeoisie culture’, and ‘ideology education for artist’ (PLHCC 1957: 629). Inevitably, in the end, the union suppressed the diversity and autonomy of artists. Finally, culture and art were used as a tool for propagating socialist ideology.

The first aim in changing ‘cultural work’ was to eliminate the artist who as a figure was not compatible with socialism. At the beginning of this process, some musicians were excluded from the criticism with the reason for the ‘spreading of bourgeoisie culture’. In 1947, 100 Soviet realism works were introduced in Pyongyang. In 1948, most anti-socialist artists had been removed from the public eye and young artists who took socialist ideology onboard filled the gaps in the cultural vacuum. After three years of independence, at the National Art Exhibition (1948), most of the works on display involved ‘the figure of Kim Il Sung’s battle’,

‘South Koreans’ struggle for socialism’, or ‘socialist country construction’ (PLHCC 1957: 637).

The Kim regime’s ideology was injected into all areas of art. Cartoons were introduced for the ignorant public and work was carried out on changing performance and dance to better suit the regime. In 1946, at the same time the land reform was announced, the Central Art Performance Group was established to perform such programs as ‘dancing for Kim general’, ‘the song of the Kim general’, or ‘the bright nation’ (PLHCC 1957: 632-637).

The most attractive part of art and culture was the cinema. In October 1946, Kim stated that ‘cinema is an effective means for people’s education and mobilization to construct the democratic state’. Movies were the means to attract ‘patriotism’, ‘Kim’s heroism’, and ‘hatred of people against the regime’. In February 1947, 100 square meters of filming site was established in Pyongyang; the space represented the city streets of Japan, China, South Korea, and North Korea. In the basement, the number of movie audiences grew over eight times from 1946 to 1949. The mass appeal with radio also increased ten times during the Korean War from 1951 to 1953 (PLHCC 1957: 593, 644). In 1967, at the time of earnest preparations for totalitarian ideology and succession, the official position of Kim’s son was Head of Art and Culture. In Kim’s view, the mass media was the best means for distributing his own ideology and achieving total control over his citizens.

The controllers of the mass media don’t even hide the monopoly. As much as the power of monopoly is stronger, the action of power is also more and more conspicuous. The movie and radio don’t need to pretend like art anymore. The junk mass media they made artificially is used as an ideology (Adorno and Horkheimer 1969: 184).

From 1945 to before the Korean War, a number of schools, theaters, and cinemas had been installed in Pyongyang, and radio sets were widely distributed. The media and the space for education and culture became the main means of spreading Kim’s ideology. Finally, ‘the culture monopolized all things’ (Adorno and Horkheimer 1969: 183)’ and political problems were regarded as cultural and insignificant things (Gramsci 1935: 163).

7.3 The war and the monopolized city, 1950-1953

7.3.1 Preparing the war for the city to be monopolized

Shortly after independence, the Kim regime began a period of radical reformation. Through a mood of revolution, the regime could produce atomized and ignorant masses in favor of Kim. Further, the regime had been monopolizing Pyongyang. The citizens gradually came to notice the fictiveness of the revolution. As much as the number of blind followers was growing, the number of passive or active resistance fighters was also growing. The Kim regime, then, needed to take effective and drastic action in order to return the mood. This resulted in ‘the Korean War (1950-1953)’.

A year after the land reform, even the peasants and labors began to notice its fictiveness. According to an official announcement from the Kim regime, the ration amounts were enough for the average citizen. The tax in-kind income was 5.25 million bags of rice, and the quantity of the ration was 3.85 million. However, during spring shortage, half of the peasants had to eat grassroots or the bark of fine trees to supplement their food. The main reason for the food shortage was caused by the heavy tax burdens (*Donga News*, 22 Jan. 1949). At the starting point of the reform, the regime passed only 25 percent of tax in-kind, but in reality, the tax was between 50 to 80 percent of harvest (*Kyungyang News*, 2 Mar. 1947). If the peasant did not pay his or her taxes on time, the regime confiscated his or her land/farm and in severe cases gave physical punishment (*Donga News*, 22 Jan. 1949). Just two years after independence, one of the refugees from northern Korea said, ‘if the free land distribution is like the case in northern Korea, nobody would want to be a farmer. Above all, most crops were taken as taxes, leaving me with nothing’ (*Donga News*, 25 Sep. 1947).

The main reason for heavy taxes was rooted in grain export to the Soviet Union. Before the Korean War, Kim’s major role in keeping power was to support Stalin. With the support of the Soviet army, Kim’s regime could suppress the opposite parties of the nationalists and moderate communists. At that time, the first duty of the communist party member was loyalty to the Soviet Union. The Kim regime helped the export of supplies and grains into the Soviet Union. In addition, people were not given the right to know about all of the government’s policies. If someone doubted the regime, he was branded as a reactionary and was usually imprisoned (*Donga News*, 22 Jan. 1949).

The Soviet army exported even household sewing machines, phonographs, and radios, but the National People's Committee had no comment. By the end of 1946, Soviet occupation forces in Korea had grown to 280,000 and the cost of their presence had become a burden to the Korean nation. Since most taxes were exported to the Soviet Union, there were no rations, enforced on the city laborers or merchant. Nowadays, the cost of 4 kilograms of rice is 1,000 won in Pyongyang and 800 won in the countryside (In the time, a monthly salary was 1,500 *won* on average³²) (*Kyunghyang News*, 2 Mar. 1947).

After the citizens noticed the fictiveness of the reform, they were classified into three kinds of the group: the first were the sons of the 'ignorant' peasants who had received benefits in the reform, so they gave the Kim regime their blind support. 'The young man was swinging the red flag and running here and there of Pyongyang (*Donga News*, 5 Jun. 1946), and 'the security service organized the Boy Scouts with around 15 years old boys and sent their detective activities from door to door in the night' (*Donga News*, 8 Apr. 1946).

The second group was the passive masses that overlooked the situation. Even this group was not a threat to the Kim regime, but the characteristic of this group was not deemed satisfactory for total control.

The third student-centered group was the active resistance; they were a threat to the Kim regime. In November 1945, the first student resistance took place in Sinuiju, near the national boundary between Korea and China. Student protesters resisted, saying 'shoot, if you are going to. We can die for justice'. The regime shot them dead (*Donga News*, 8 Dec. 1945). In Pyongyang, the resistance started in earnest at the time of the regime's support of trusteeship. On March 1, 1946, most middle-schools in Pyongyang went on a unified student strike against the trusteeship by the Soviet Union and some of them attempted an armed protest. On that day, in front of Pyongyang station, someone threw a hand grenade and one of the Korean chairpersons died while two Soviet officers and a number of Korean managers were injured (*Donga News*, 7 Mar. 1946).

³² Data is from "the exploration over the Iron Curtain of 38th parallel line", *Donga*, 24thSep. 1947

Student protests occurred in succession in Pyongyang. In June 1947 was the resistance against the trusteeship in Pyongyang, Sinuiju, and Hamheung. At the time, The Soviet army killed 400 people, 2,000 people were seriously injured, and 10,000 people were imprisoned (*Donga News*, 24 Jul. 1947). The testimony about the May Day resistance in 1946 encapsulates the mood of Pyongyang:

When the May Day parade started, in front of the line, a lot of students shouted out ‘cheer for the people’s republic of North Korea’, ‘cheer for Kim Il Sung’ but nobody reacted. Thereafter, someone shouted out ‘cheer for the Korean independence’ and the whole crowd shouted and shook the Korean flag (instead of the North Korean flag). At the time, the sound of clapping and roars of ‘yes, yes, who sell our land!’ led the crowd into a chaotic state (*Donga News*, 22 May 1946).

In 1947, Pyongyang became a site of fear, resistance, and hatred. The Kim regime tried to strengthen solidarity among its blind followers through spreading fear and hatred. In certain places of the city, curses about the leader of the South Korean government were written in paint (*Donga News*, 24Sep. 1947). On Pyongyang’s streets in 1946, there were posters stating ‘cheer for our leader, Kim Il Sung’, and ‘bury Kim Gu and Lee Seungman (leader of South Korea), the chief of the pro-Japanese’. On these posters, the portraits of South Korean leaders were reversed, with guns aiming their heads and knives stuck into their hearts (*Donga News*, 23Apr. 1946). After visiting Pyongyang in 1947, Ernest Bell, English Labor Union Secretary, said ‘I have never seen as scared Pyongyang as one that installed machine guns throughout the city’ (*Donga News*, 5 Apr. 1947). One South Korean reporter described a gloomy atmosphere in Pyongyang that was comparable with Moscow under the leadership of Stalin:

I took off at Pyongyang station. On my head, the doubt of ‘is this Pyongyang?’ flashed by. In front of the station, a red poster, a red flag, Stalin’s portrait, and the explication of land reform were attached to every street corner. I was faced with Soviet women and children on the roads. In less than a year, the image of Pyongyang had changed a Soviet copy. The streets of Pyongyang were so dark and dry. The faces of merchants in front of their shops were deep gray. The people on the street had heavy

steps and their faces looked depressed (*Donga News*, 8 Apr. 1946).

After 1949, the resistance had grown more powerful with the stopping of rations. While the harvest was growing through peasant mobilization and the improvement of irrigation facilities, the rations for individual enterprises and labors were abolished (*Donga News*, 22Jan. 1949). In the south part of the Deadong River of Pyongyang in 1949, a great peasant resistance occurred and an underground organization named the Anti-communism Youth Association distributed leaflets on the subject 'Overthrow the Kim regime' (*Donga News*, 20Dec. 1949). In 1950, the resistance was growing ever stronger and 200 boys and girls from middle-schools in Pyongyang marched on the streets and attacked and torched public facilities (*Donga News*, 4 Feb. 1950). On the Independence Movement Day in 1950, the Kim regime prohibited all assembly and sounded the emergency alert (*Kyunghyang News*, 5 Mar. 1950). As popular sentiment had been getting increasingly worse, Kim Il Sung started to feel the threat of assassination.³³

One noticeable moment in these all events is that the reign of terror and idolization disappeared in less than a year. In 1946, Pyongyang was criticized as 'the place trying for only one order, one party of power, and one color of politics' (*Donga News*, 7 May 1946).

Despite the continuous efforts of the Kim regime, five years after the independence most of Pyongyang's citizens had not been monopolized. On the process of land reform after 1946, many intellectuals, capitalists, landlords, merchants, and Christians were forced into South Korea or camps. However, the resistance had not entirely disappeared from North Korea. Rather, the number of resistance fighters was gradually growing. Finally, in 1948, about 80 percent of North Koreans became anti-communists and felt their dissatisfaction in the land reform (*Donga News*, 10 Nev. 1948). Thereafter, the Kim regime contrived more radical and effective means to restore mood. To do that, they needed to go to 'war'.

³³ In 1950, Kim bought six cars had same color and shape because of the threat of assassination. When he went out, he did a camouflage with six cars. (*Kyunghyang News*, 14 April 1950)

7.3.2 The massacre and rebirth of a new man

‘To understand the social change of the 20th century is difficult without the methodical realization about the war because of its great influence’ (Giddens 1987: 285). Before the Korean War, the Kim regime could not unify the masses. Kim Il Sung was not an authentic nationalist or communist, so at the time, he did not have an ideology to unify the masses. Thus, the purpose of monopolizing was to inject fear and hatred into the masses. The Kim regime eliminated all of its political opponents and monopolized military power through the War. The massacred civilians during the War gave the masses the same enemy to hate, so monopolizing them.

The Korean War was one of the most tragic civil wars in the 20th century. In just three years and one month, 227,748 South Korean soldiers, 33,629 American soldiers, 3,194 UN soldiers, 900,000 Chinese soldiers, 540,000 North Korean soldiers, and 4.5 million civilians had died. 43 percent of industrial facilities and 33 percent of housing in Korean territory had been destroyed during the War (Lee 2001: 10). The number of civilian deaths was 2.6 times higher than the number of soldier deaths. It means that most victims were not from on the battlefield but from Korea’s towns and cities.

At the beginning of the War, the hatred between South and North Koreans was not distinct. They shared the same language, culture, and a long history of being a unitary state. They shared the same experience of being under Japanese colonial control and shared the same national feeling. In addition, there were plenty of nationalists against the Kim regime in Pyongyang. Contrarily, many South Koreans felt favorable about land reform and communism.

At the starting time of the War, the North Korean army felt an extreme hatred against the ‘Yankee’, because Kim’s regime officially announced the war occurred by the attack of the U.S. army. However, in front of the South Korean army, their emotion was different. Even there was the battlefield, the sense of racial kinship was ahead than the hatred. (Han 2010: 214).

When the War began to massacre civilians, the national feeling started to change to hatred. During a retreat, an army massacred many civilians and political resistances. On October 18, 1950, the North Korean army relinquished its hold on Pyongyang. Before running, they shot 500 political prisoners, among whom numbered the chief rival of Jo Mansik and either

temporarily buried or left the corpses on the banks of Deadong River. The Kim regime could do what they could not before the War because of concerns that the masses would resist. Also, according to one of the North Korean war prisoners, on October 8, 1950, in Pyongyang, the North Korean army killed 1,800 South Korean civilians who were taken from Seoul and Geasung (Han 2010: 200-202).



Figure 7.4: Civilian massacre during the Korean War [Source: <http://bunker1.ddanzi.com/doctuMilitary/15818728>]

The civilian massacre was repeated when the UN and South Korean armies occupied North Korean territory. During the war, the UN and South Korean armies killed between 1-1.5 million civilians, which was 15 to 17 percent of all North Koreans (Han 2010: 182). Moreover, the massacre of civilians was not only carried out by soldiers but also by other civilians. Here, ideology and feelings of revenge were mixed.

The main duty of the civilian police was to purge the collaborator and sweep the remained enemy. Gradually, the bloody revenge was running on.... If someone pointed out a man as a collaborator, all of his or her family members were executed... The member of the civilian police said ‘just do revenge as communists did’. Even Christians said that ‘to kill communists is not guilty of Ten Commandments since they are devils’. (Han 2010: 218)

In Pyongyang, massacres were continuous. On October 22, 1950, the U.S. Army killed 16 labors from eastern Pyongyang since they expressed sympathetic emotion for the North Korean army. In October 1950, for two days, as the South Korean and UN armies were retreating, 4,000 North Koreans fled south and were massacred by airstrikes and machine-gun fire around the Deadong River. Once the North Korean army had recaptured Pyongyang, North Korean police killed a large number of collaborators in October 1950 (see Chapter 3.1 on the concrete example of Lee's family). The number of Pyongyang citizens reduced from 464,000 (before the War) to 181,000 (counted on December 31, 1951). After just one and a half years, only 39 percent of citizens were left (Han 2010: 182-222).

During the Korean War, the main means of civilian massacres in Pyongyang was the air bomb by U.S. fighters. At the time, U.S. air raids had characteristics of psychological warfare and carried out the scorched earth strategy. The U.S. did not regard civilians of North Korea as people to protect but rather to 'first shoot whatever moves'. They indiscriminately killed fleeing civilians, even working peasants in farmland by machine guns on a fighter (Han 2010: 224-239). During the War, the airdrop bombs in North Korea rose to 476,000 tons; much more than in Germany during the Second World War (Kim et al. 2004: 94). In Pyongyang, a total of 428,748 bombs were dropped during 1,431 times air attacks (PLHCC 1957: 498). In October 1951, Tibor Meray, a Hungarian war correspondent, described the 'Pyongyang Great Air Raid'.

Every street of Pyongyang where I could see was filled with broken tiles, bricks, lumbers, clothes, and irons... The railroad was twisted such as a noodle... Between corpses, the wounded person was groaning. Most corpses were women, elders, and children but some [were] of soldiers and policewomen (Han 2010: 211).

The experience of the massacre led the North Koreans to be monopolized based on mutual hatred of the enemy. Before the War, the Kim regime tried to monopolize the masses by their hatred of Japanese colonial suppression. However, the power of the hatred was weak because of the absence of substance. Through the War experience, hatred was readily meted against the U.S. and South Korea. Additionally, resistance to communism was eliminated.

The massacre made the Pyongyang citizen into a new man. Nobody was free from the

experience of the massacre. They were all victims, assailants, and sideliners. As Jean-Paul Sartre says in the preface of *The Wretched of the Earth*:

Make no mistake about it; by this mad fury, by this bitterness and spleen, by their ever-present desire to kill us, by the permanent tensing of powerful muscles which are afraid to relax, they have become men: men *because of* the settler, who wants to make beasts of burden of them - because of him, and against him. Hatred, blind hatred which is as yet an abstraction, is their only wealth (Fanon 1961: 17).

Then also, for the Kim regime, hatred became the most important nourishment for monopolizing the masses and taking control of Pyongyang

7.3.3 Hatred and the underground city

According to Smith, emphasis on studying socialist cities should not only be to understand time differences but also differences in space between ‘partially-changed cities’ and ‘totally new cities’ (Andrusz 1996: 72). During the Korean War, in three years, most of Pyongyang had been destroyed. After the War, the Kim regime reconstructed the new city in its old space, as though it was blank paper. One noticeable point of change is that the reconstructed new city was not so different from the urban space that had stood once before. This is because the aim of the regime, ‘Kim’s monopolized city’ had not changed after the War.

In Pyongyang, one effective means for monopolization was to construct an underground city. Underground space evoked fear of the war and hatred against the U.S. and South Korean and helped monopolize urban space within the citizen’s everyday life.



Figure 7.5: After air bombings of Pyongyang in 1953 [Source: Michel Chossudovsky, *North Korea or the United States: Who is a Threat to Global Security?*, from:<http://www.4thmedia.org/2013/03/north-korea-or-the-united-states-who-is-a-threat-to-global-security/>]

Even though a number of Pyongyang citizens had been killed and most buildings had been destroyed during the War, the citizen did not leave the city. In reality, they did not have any place to which they could escape. South Korea was no longer a refuge for North Korean citizens because their family, friends, and neighbors had been massacred. North Koreans had no other option, except to try their luck with the regime in Pyongyang. As the psychoanalyst, Frankl (1946), who had experienced Auschwitz says, ‘the life of men is only possible when they could expect their future. The hope gives men the reason for living even though they are in a miserable situation’. At the end of the War, the U.S. forces carried out air raids on Pyongyang to bring about truce talks. However, Pyongyang’s citizens were not leaving the city.

The bomb from B-29 shook the sky and split the earth. The napalm bomb wiped out all creatures with the fire rain from the sky. By the way, the Pyongyang citizen didn’t give up their beloved streets. Whether they had the confidence to survive or expected any hope in a new world, it seemed only the citizen defended the city (Joo 1990: 419).

Pyongyang’s citizens were living under-ground in order to avoid the air raids. On the day after the ceasefire agreement, July 28, 1953, the citizens took part in a mass rally for the great

victory of the Korean Liberation War (PLHCC 1957: 498). With their hatred against South Korea and the U.S., North Korean citizens anchored their hopes on Pyongyang and the Kim regime. In reality, they had no other alternative. As a result, the Kim regime was able to eliminate all political resistances and instilled hatred in the mind of the masses. For them, the Korean War was truly a ‘great victory’ and a ‘liberation war’.



Figure 7.6: A mass rally in the Kim Il Sung Square the day after the ceasefire agreement in 1953 [Source: *A Pictorial 'Pyongyang'*, Pyongyang: Chosen Press, 1980]

Just after the truce, the Kim regime announced the reconstruction of Pyongyang and Kim directed the construction of an ideal socialist city. The official aim of the announcement was to wipe out the feeling of suppression and exploitation under the Japanese colonial era and to construct a new ‘democratic city’ for the people’s life and welfare. The details were: a) making housing ‘green’, b) limiting building density to less than 20-25 percent, c) extending living space per person to 6-9 square meters, d) equally placing public facilities, and e) installing windbreak zones around the city (PLHCC 1957: 501).



Figure 7.7: Mobilized workers for the Pyongyang reconstruction in 1953
[Source: Kim 2004]

For the reconstruction of Pyongyang, there was a great deal of assistance from the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries. The Soviet Union assisted with a billion rubles and eight technicians. China assisted with 80 trillion won, without compensation, and 770 technicians, until 1956. In addition, Albania assisted with an asphalt road, Czechoslovakia with a bus, Hungary with a technician, East Germany with dial phones, and Rumania with participation in the central hospital construction. They remained for a long time in Pyongyang and helped to design modern technology (PLHCC 1957: 503-524). ‘Backward countries could achieve rapid industrialization through the introduction of technologies, machines, and know-how under the state-dominated financial system’ (Geschenkron 1976). North Korea could rapidly develop the industry with its technologies under the state lead.

The Pyongyang city plan had a different characteristic and aim compared to the ideal socialist city. In 1917, Lenin suggested the ‘socialist city plan’ thusly: 1) separation between industrial and housing area, 2) job-housing proximity, 3) equal placement of service facilities, 4) preparing the ideology studying space as like the public facilities or monument square, 5) dependence of public transportation, 6) ideological land using (Lee 2000: 112). However, in the North Korean city plan, most of Lenin’s suggestions disappeared with the exception of ‘ideology studying space’.

The aims of the city were written in the North Korean encyclopedia:

1. Preparation of the ideology studying space and arrangement of the Kim Il Sung statue and the revolutionary monument in the middle of the city
2. Restriction of the city size
3. The city of sanitary culture
4. Beautiful city
5. Standard of design
6. Preparation of large and detail plan

(Lee 2000: 136)

At the early time of the truce agreement, the Kim regime was interested in the ‘limitation of building density’, the ‘extension of living space’, and ‘equal placement of public facilities’. However, after the reconstruction had been for the most part finished, the main aim of the urban plan was to prepare ‘the ideology studying space’. The slogan of the urban plan in 1958 was ‘to make Pyongyang a grander and more beautiful city’. The urban plan of Pyongyang aimed to hide the truth of ‘the space for total control with ideology training’ through its image as ‘a grand and beautiful city’.

However, as time passed, the changing aim of the urban plan was not realized. Once all urban space had been demolished after the war, Kim regime’s first direction was not to recover the housing and service facilities but rather to construct the Kim Il Sung Square for a large military parade. In addition, in the case of the newly built facilities in Pyongyang in 1953, the housing facility increased by only 38 percent, even though the facilities of education, politics, and culture for ideology training increased by 53 percent (PLHCC 1957: 500-520). On the other hand, the reconstruction of a streetcar, a necessary part of everyday life, was not undertaken until 1955 (*Kyonghyang News*, 29 Jun. 1955).

Most spaces in Pyongyang were destroyed after the War. However, unlike other socialist countries, the Kim regime did not try to construct the ideal socialist city as had Moscow. It was not only because of a lack of money. The reconstructed space was not much different compared to how it was before but except for the expanding city size and wider streets and for changing the square names to Kim Il Sung, or Victory. The plan of 1957 has not even been achieved completely today. Unlike Lenin’s idea, the Kim regime simply reproduced previous urban space in Pyongyang.



Figure 7.8: The Map of Pyongyang in 1950 and the urban plan for Pyongyangin 1957
 [Source: <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/korea/> and Lee 2000: 132]

Lefebvre (1974: 111) asked ‘do they destroy for reconstruction? Yes, but for what? The existing means of production just produce the same product’. Most buildings in Pyongyang had been destroyed by the War. However, the newly reconstructed city was not so different from the city before the War. Why was this case? It was because the means of production remained the same between before and after the War. The unchanged aim was to construct a city through which the regime could achieve total control.

However, a particular newly space was produced in a new city after the War. A number of public and cultural facilities were constructed under the ground. Japanese writer Hayawipyung said of the situation in 1955:

The space of Pyongyang was disappeared from the earth. On the earth, there were many bulldozers and tractors. Soldiers instead of workers constructed the city. Only Stalin Street in downtown was paved. Most theaters and office buildings were built in the underground. On the earth was desolate. (*Kyunghyang News*, 29 Jun. 1955).

Why did the Kim regime construct its main buildings under the ground? It was not only to

prepare for war. During the War, South and North Koreans, Americans, Soviets, and the Chinese re-balanced the power. Regarding international and external situations, there was little possibility of another war. On the other hand, the construction of the underground city was very unfavorable in light of construction costs, convenience, and management. Even with these disadvantages, the aim of the underground city was to remind citizens of their hatred of what they experienced during the war. As Orwell (1949: 270) says, ‘it was a strategy to produce the blind and fanatical party member through injecting the fear, hatred, and euphoria of victory with the mood of war’.

During the War, the representative underground facility was the Moranbong Theater. In 1952, the theater was installed underground to avoid the air raids. It was called the ‘underground palace’, with 800 seats. One thousand members from 85 clubs regularly performed and gave presentations on how to overthrow the U.S. and become victorious. In Pyongyang, many movie theaters were also constructed underground.

The major underground space in Pyongyang was ‘Democratic Propaganda Place’. In 1946, 100 of these spaces were already installed and 56 were constructed during the war. In 1956, the number grew to 117 and half of their structure had an underground tunnel style. The space served reading, amusement, acting, lectures, meetings, and film screenings for propagating Kim’s regime. It was scattered throughout every small district of Pyongyang (PLHCC 1957: 662).

The construction of the underground city continued until the 1970s when totalitarian ideology and ideas of succession were finally complete. As an example of Moscow's metro for the propaganda of Stalinism (see chapter 4.2), in 1973, a representative public facility of Pyongyang was constructed underground. The facility was installed 100 meters underground; its total length came to 35 kilometers. In these underground spaces, Pyongyang’s citizens could remind the fear of the War and hatred of massacres. At the same time, the gorgeous space of the underground city gives the euphoria of victory caused by Kim Il Sung. The name of the station shows its political aim: it is the station of ‘victory’, ‘glory’, ‘paradise’, ‘peace’, ‘fellow soldier’, ‘golden field’, and so on. In the underground city, the citizen experiences feelings of fear, hatred, and victory in everyday urban life.



Figure 7.9:Pyongyang's underground [Source: Photo taken by [Gilad Rom](http://commons.wikimedia.org/) in <http://commons.wikimedia.org/>]

During the Korean War, the space of Pyongyang had been destroyed. However, the Kim regime reconstructed the existing space again. Throughout the process, the aim of the city plan became clear: to produce a monopolized space for total control. The space hid its own truth and injected totalitarian ideology into people's lives. Especially, the space of the underground in Pyongyang evoked the fear and hatred of the War experience as a tool of monopolizing the citizen.

7.4 Stalin Street disappears, 1967-1974

After 1970, the name Stalin Street was changed to Victory Street. Why did the name of Stalin disappear, and why did it occur around 1970? Why was Kim's regime needed 7 years before proclaimed the Juche ideology after all political opponents disappeared in 1967?

From independence in 1945 and before the market system entrance in 1993, the spatial structure of Pyongyang had changed roughly four times; this was closely related to political change. The first came at around 1958 when the regime tried to make Pyongyang the image of an ideal socialist city. The second came around 1970 when it prepared for totalitarian ideology. The third came in 1982, to prepare for succession. The final came around 1989, to prepare the

Pyongyang Youth Festival in order to show off the good conditions of Kim's regime. The space of Pyongyang produced totalitarian ideology and citizens as a social product. 'To change the life, the space has to be changed' (Lefebvre 1991: 288).

In the case of Mussolini's Fascism, the regime developed the urban space of Rome in phases. The "City of Medicine" was first (the General Hospital, under construction since the late nineteenth century), which was followed by the "City of the Sea" (Ostia Nuova, also founded at the end of the nineteenth century, but renamed "Lido di Roma" in 1933). Then in the twentieth century the "City of Studies" (the University, 1932-35), the "City of Films" (1936-37), the "Military City" and, finally, the "Representative City" (1936-42). The representative city was presented as the "natural conclusion of a design process inspired by the agora of Ancient Greece, and later the Renaissance and Baroque, representing a synthesis of the 'Italic' urban tradition."³⁴

The mood of Pyongyang was radically altered from 1967 onwards (see the real life of the citizen in Chapter 3). In 1956, Kim had purged 10,000 political rivals who criticized Stalin. In 1967, Kim also eliminated all remaining political enemies in North Korea and established the system of sole ideology (Seo 2005; Beck 2010). From 1967, visas were issued to all nations for visiting Pyongyang and additional documents were needed for rightful travel into the country. Any liberal discussion on this topic was prohibited; 'the text of Juche ideology was only to recite, not to discuss. If someone raises a question about Juche ideology or the party policy, he or she is accused of being reactionary' (ISNKA 1997: 23, 170). Arendt (1976: 297) states that 'slavery's fundamental offense against human rights was not that it took liberty away, but that it excluded a certain category of people even from the possibility of fighting for freedom - a fight possible under tyranny, and even under the desperate conditions of modern terror'.

However, Kim was still not satisfied; he wanted complete control. That would only be possible through mental control; it needs the same tactics as those who preach pseudo-religions. Kim's totalitarian ideology would not be complete through only ideological education; it could only be made possible through constant observation of citizens' lives. In other words, a totalitarian space was needed. In 1967, all possibility of resistance against the regime had been

³⁴Maria Luisa Neri (2013), *Landscape and city during Fascism: Enrico del Debbio's Foro Mussolini*, p 22

eliminated. In 1974, Kim's totalitarian ideology was announced and the totalitarian city was established. The space had been prepared before the ideology was broadcast.

Many monumental buildings in Pyongyang were built between 1967 and 1974. In 1967, Kim's regime extended the *Mankyungdae* (birthplace of Kim Il-Sung) Revolutionary Museum. In 1970, the regime built many 15 floors high-rise apartment and *Chollima* (means fine horse with a historical victory in beginning socialist era in NK) Street and many monumental buildings. In 1972, Kim Il-Sung Great Statues was constructed on the hill of Pyongyang with the Joseon Revolution Museum and the Victory Museum of the Korean War. In 1973, the great size of Pyongyang Metro was opened and Pyongyang Gymnasium and Wangjae Mountain Revolutionary Area were constructed. Moreover, in 1974, the main Korean nationalistic style building, the People's Cultural Palace, was constructed in front of Kim Il-Sung square.

'Historically, the conqueror or revolutionary prepared the new society through destroying or changing the existing monument' (Lefebvre 1991: 328). This is because a man who can control the present time can control the past memories, also who can control the memories can control their future (Orwell 1949: 53). From 1967 onwards, after the political enemies had been removed, the Kim regime began to eradicate memories of the past.

The possession of a foreign book was possible after censorship... In 1970s, all historical memories were eliminated if it could be disturbed against 'the system of sole ideology (announced in 1967)'. The citizen couldn't imagine possessing the book without official permission. To read *The Capital* with Marx was also possible only with special permission (ISNKA 1997: 172).

In the process of spatial change, the name Stalin Street changed to Victory Street. The situation was similar to Orwell's description of the totalitarian city:

Winston could not even remember at what date the Party itself had come into existence. He did not believe he had ever heard the word Ingsoc before 1960... Everything melted into mist. Sometimes, indeed, you could put your finger on a definite lie. It was not true, for example, as was claimed in the Party history books,

that the Party had invented aeroplanes. He remembered aeroplanes since his earliest childhood. But you could prove nothing. There was never any evidence (Orwell 1949: 46).

In the case of Pyongyang, any book, space, name, and public memory before 1967 disappeared.



Figure 7.10: Stalin Street, Pyongyang, 1959 [Source: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/kernbeisser/3004384705/>]

Stalin Street was downtown and beside the Deadong River. It had been a symbol of independence, so citizens went on parade, holding large portraits of Kim and Stalin. Just after the War, the Kim regime repaired this street and constructed the Kim Il Sung Square on it. Then, Stalin Street contained another symbol of Kim's socialism.



Figure 7.11: The parade with Kim's and Stalin's portrait after independence on Pyongyang street [Source: http://cafe.naver.com/mamj8836.cafe?iframe_url=/]

However, Stalin Street logically had to fade away from public memory during Kim's regime, because two leaders could not be seen 'in total control' in one area. Kim Il Sung regarded Stalin was a protector of North Korea until Kim could gain sufficient power.

After independence in 1945, North Korea accepted socialism on the trusteeship of the Soviet Union, and Stalin gave Kim material support and political protection. However, the masses that had experienced Japanese fascism wanted to find a national messiah. From the beginning, Kim's role was not only a spokesperson but also more a national messiah. As Hitler was the messiah of the masses, 'the core difference of Jucheism against Marx-Lenin ideology is that the subject of social movement is by the masses instead of the class' (Sea 2001: 4).

In 1967, the Kim regime removed all of its political resistance. The regime additionally achieved independence from the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. Kim appeared as a national messiah not only for avoiding the movement of Stalin criticism but to complete the totalitarian control. Finally, Kim's regime announced the totalitarian ideology of Jucheism in 1974. The ten principles for constructing a single system of ideology, which all citizens had to memorize, are given below:

1. Monopolize all society with the revolutionary ideology by Kim Il Sung
2. Serve Kim Il Sung faithfully

3. Absolutize Kim's authority
4. Accept Kim's word as a creed
5. Keep the unquestionable principle to follow Kim's words
6. Force Kim's ideology and revolutionary unification
7. Get Kim's socialist appearance and revolutionary methodology
8. Reward Kim's great political trust and consideration
9. Construct the powerful rule to make all unified party, nation, and military under the order of Kim Il Sung
10. Succeed and complete Kim's revolutionary works from generation to generation

The totalitarian space had been producing before the ideology pronounced. After 1967, all past space and public memories had disappeared and, instead, the ideology and experience of a new society under totalitarian control was established. As Stalin needed 30 years' preparation to be successful in his totalitarian goal (Arendt 1948b: 15), the Kim regime needed the time around 20 years, at least 1967 to 1974 (more reasonably to 1989), to complete their strategy of totalitarianism. The cry of the socialist revolution and its movement was a stepping-stone to constructing a totalitarian state. The space produced before the change of citizen's mental and life. To construct the place, the role model of Kim was not Lenin's communist city but Stalin's idea for totalitarian control. Pyongyang shucked its socialist garb and was reborn as a totalitarian city where serves the totalitarian experience.

Chapter 8

The totalitarian city on terror and ideology

8.1 The city of terror

The aim of totalitarianism is to break humanity into obedience. It produces ‘a new man’, whose only aim in life is to preserve its own species. The system can only be achieved by injecting the notion of totalitarian ideology and absolute terror.³⁵ The aim of terror here is not extracting a confession but rather remold a man’s mindset and opinions through mental torture. For this, the process needs an adaptable space as a social producer (Arendt 1979; Orwell 1949: 373; Lefebvre 1991). Totalitarianism pushes the natural laws of survival until a new man is created. As Hitler (1926: 38) accepted the natural law as the will of the Creator, totalitarianism accepts history toward the totalitarian movement as destiny.

Both Nazism and Jucheism, as a totalitarian ideology, produced the concentration camp for terror. However, both racisms showed different appearances. While the movement of Nazism had continuously expanded their territories, Jucheism never tried to expand their area but became a closed state (see Chapter 2.1).

The most important difference between the Nazi and the Juche concentration camps is the time continuity. The camps of North Korea had been operating over four generations. It means that many people were born into these camps and had never experienced the outside world. While prisoners of Auschwitz lost freedom and hope, prisoners of North Korean camps had often never seen a society of freedom.

The political prison in North Korea was installed in 1947. After the Kim regime’s elimination of its political opponents in 1956, the feeling in this prison was one of terror. After

³⁵ Even though the totalitarianism also shows other characteristics such as surveillance as like dictatorship (see Chapter 3.1.1), the identified characteristics are first, the own ideology as a logic of messes domination and second, the camp as a motivational force of the totalitarian movement as a matter of injecting fear.

the announcement of Juche ideology and Kim's succession in 1974, the number of prisoners in the camp radically grew (Lee 2013: 18). Just as Stalin started terror since one million party opposition members and organizations had disappeared, the great terror in North Korea took place after 1974 even though most political opponents had already disappeared in 1967. It is clear that the final aim of the terror was not only to eliminate opponents but also 'to inject the real fear over the conquered people' (Arendt 1948b: 75). The terror was enforced in the camp instead of the city, since 'terror is more effective when it conducts in a segregated space for minority group' (Giddens 1987: 349). Another reason is that terror can instill fear into citizens most effectively when they only come to hear of killings through rumor alone.

The shape of most concentration camps in North Korea similar to the Soviet Gulags. According to a recent report, there are five concentration camps in North Korea where around 80,000 to 120,000 people are imprisoned (Lee 2013: 19-37).



Figure 8.1: The location of camps in North Korea
 [Source: <http://www.patheos.com/blogs/frankschaeffer/>]

Near Pyongyang, there had been a concentration camp until 1991 but it was shut down to keep the secrets against the outside world. However, the camp does not have to be located in

the city to inject fear in the citizen. More importantly, the citizen must never doubt its cruel existence as the space of fear and death. The citizens of Pyongyang are indoctrinated with the fear of being in the camps through everyday life and rumor. An escapee from Hakpo coal town next to the 22nd camp in NK said that:

One train stopped for a moment between the station of Saecheon and Sinhakpo that carried political prisoners. The windows were covered by white cloths, but sometimes the cloth was uncovered slightly with the hand of prisoner... Over the cloth, sometimes there was a gray-haired elderly woman with teary eyes, a frightened child, or a girl with a pale face. The look of the face over the cloth was the same whoever it was elder, child, or girl. The fear and urgency (Ji 2019: 59).

Generally, families of forced migration were expelled in the night in secret. Through experience and rumor, most citizens know these migrants have been forced into concentration camps, and it stirs up the fear of death (see Chapter 2.3 on the real situation of forced migration).

The process of forced migration gives the fear of the remained citizen. One of the main reasons for forced migration is not due to simple error but due to the history of the family. 35.7 percent of prisoners in North Korean political camps are a direct result of family history (HRICNK 2009: 10). While the Nazis' discrimination was due to race, North Korean discrimination is due to political or another arbitrary classification. Unlike the Aryans in Berlin, no single citizen in Pyongyang could feel easy about not being considered next.

The reason for imprisoning in the camp is not only a man who regarded the political opponent, a prisoner of war, a believer of God but also an immensely mere trifle such as the dust on Kim's portrait or rolled something with newspaper contained Kim's picture. For this reason, all family members must imprison in the camp without the exception of babies or elders. As Kim Jeongil could get the absolute power because of the son of Kim Ilsung, the son of the prisoner in the camp naturally become the political prisoner (Ji 2019: 57).

The citizens of Pyongyang know about the existence of concentration camps through the

diffusion of rumor. It is driven out of the camp's management and space. The concentration camps in North Korea are broadly classified into two types: 1) total control sector for those sentenced to life imprisonment and 2) a revolutionary service sector for 'metal remolding' for those who need to serve a specific period. Since these two sectors are geographically close, prisoners of the revolutionary service sectors know what it is like to be in the total control sector. The location of the 13th Camp is proximally close to general society and to the Chinese border (HRICNK 2009: 10).

After imprisonment over a few years or a few decades, some prisoners in the revolutionary service sector are released. Even though these prisoners have to take an oath to keep silent about the camp's existence and their ordeals, it is naturally difficult to control completely. The number of security police who live both within the camp and outside is around 270,000. To keep all their mouths shut seems a difficult task. Even though there is no 'visible' terror space for the public, the rumor and the existence of ex-prisoners in neighborhoods give citizens reason to be afraid.



Figure 8.2: The concentration camp in Wyoming, North Korea
 [Source: <http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a12805/4312850/>]

All human rights disappear in the total control sector. Prisoners are called 'tools it can talk' and their life and death are thoroughly ignored. For example, in the 14th Camp, one boy was

executed because he picked a wild berry. To save on bullets, the guard asked other prisoners to beat him to death (Lee 2013: 39). The prisoner works and sleeps in filthy conditions. They live without soap, socks, gloves, underwear, or toilet paper. Some die of malnutrition and prisoners as young as 10 and 11 years old work up to 14 hours a day (Harden 2013).

The concentration camps of North Korea are more totalitarian spaces than were those of the Nazis. Regarding total mental control, the absence of memory is a more effective tool for total control than simple brutality. North Korean camps have been around twice as long as the Soviet Gulags and twelve times as long as the Nazi camps. While some imprisoned Jews suffered their fate in a single day, North Korean prisoners were born in camps with no hope. For example, Donghyuk Sin - the only one escaper from the total control sector prison – had never heard the word of ‘love’, even from his mother. He could not imagine the world outside because he had never experienced it, and certainly, no one talked about it. ‘Unlike those who have survived a concentration camp, he had not been torn away from a civilized existence and forced to descend into hell. He was born and raised there. He accepted his values. He called it home’ (Harden 2013: 8-11).

Viktor Frankl (1946: 80) said that ‘even in the punishing space as like Auschwitz, the prisoner could find the meaning of life through maximizing their inner world by past lovely memories’. However, prisoners of North Korean concentration camps do not have nostalgia or happy memories because they were born in prison without the experience of love. They do not lose their humanity, but they have never learned of such humanity in their lives. They do not even know the meaning of what human existence is.

Since prisoners of total control sectors are regarded as nonhuman, they are free from ideological education. As Orwell (1949) said, ‘the labor and animal are free’ in a totalitarian city, the prisoners in the total control camp in North Korea are free from ideological education because they are not human and do not have any chance to exit the camp. Sin, who escaped from the 14th Camp, had never heard about Juche ideology and had never even seen a portrait of Kim’s family. He was not allowed any books except for one on Korean grammar (Harden 2012: 8-34). He was not asked to be ‘a new man’ for the Kim regime; he had been born as a new man from his birth. For this group of people, the only criterion for life is to obey the security police and the Ten rules of the camp’ instead of the ‘Ten rules of Juche ideology’.

Ten rules of the 14th Camp

1. Don't escape.
2. Don't meet more than three people at a time.
3. Don't steal.
4. Obey the security police.
5. Declare the outsider or stranger immediately.
6. Watch each other and declare at once when you see a strange act.
7. Do your duties sufficiently.
8. No contact between a man and a woman except while working.
9. Repent your fault deeply.
10. Shoot to kill if someone breaks the law.

The space of the total control sector destroys the family system and isolates prisoners. According to Sin's testimony, children are allowed to meet their parents only five days a year. Teachers educate the children as to why they have been imprisoned the 'dirty blood' of their parents. In order to cleanse themselves, children are asked to admit the sins of their parents and to obey the rules of the prison. From birth, the children learn obedience as the first duty of totalitarianism.³⁶ Since they have not experienced any type of love, they regard their parents only as their competitors for the living or origin of their sins. They report all the actions of their parents to a security police officer. Even if their parents were publicly executed due to their children's reports, the children would not feel a guilty conscience. Rather, in Sin's case, it was regarded as a rational act (Harden 2012). With the family system destroyed, sons and daughters become the object of fear for elder generations who have their memories of the past.

In spaces of terror, destroying the humanity of a subject applies to not only the victim but also the assailant. 'Like all social practice, spatial practice is lived directly before it is conceptualized' (Lefebvre 1991: 34). Also, the absence of an essential aim makes the

³⁶ Friedrich(1965: 157) described the educated slogans in totalitarian regimes with the case of Italian Fascism: "'Why are you a Balilla?'" Why are you a "Little Italian girl?" It is not enough to have a membership-card and the uniform! You must be sincere in heart and educated to Fascism! For example, you must learn to obey. What is the first duty of a child? Obedience! The second? Obedience! The third? Obedience!'.

experience very similar to normal life (Arendt 1976: 411). When terror has no single aim, it becomes life itself. Thus, the boundary between victim and assailant in spaces of total terror becomes blurred.

Adolf Eichmann protested his innocence of the holocaust. He said, 'I am not a monster. I was just made like that', 'even though I am guilty in front of God, I am innocent in front of the law'. The laws of civilized lands say, 'you shall not murder'. However, the consensus in Germany under Hitler's rule was, 'you shall murder' (Arendt 1963: 226, 343). It is perfectly reasonable for a security police officer to hit and even murder a prisoner in a North Korean camp. These officers are taught to regard their prisoners not as humans but as beasts. If a security police officer regards a prisoner as human, then he would ideologically stand along with the prisoner (Harden 2012: 75). Camp assailants, in their brutality against prisoners, taste the euphoria of power and triumph over powerless enemies (Orwell 1949: 374), while also being a victim of the fear-mongering in a totalitarian space.

The space of terror is a key tool for total control. In this space, the humanity of both the victim and assailant are destroyed. The concentration camps in North Korea produce a strong sense of fear of death and it supports totalitarian control and ideology. Fear is then spread from the camp into the city and citizens, leading to blind obedience to a fearsome regime.

8.2 The city of ideology

Ideologies do not produce space: rather, they are in space, and of it. It is the forces of production and the relations of production that produce social space (Lefebvre 1991: 210). The produced space of ideology is abstract, but it is not what we might call 'vacant'. Each social place could be understood only with regarding two ways of mutual intrusive. The great movement drags and destroyed the space. Simultaneously, between the gaps of great movement, the minute movement passes and penetrates.

Social space interpenetrates on another and/or superimpose themselves upon one another... Great movements, vast. rhythms, immense waves- these all collide and 'interfere' with one another; lesser movements, on the other hand, interpenetrate. If we were to follow this model, we would say that any social locus could only be properly

understood by taking two kinds of determinations into account: on the one hand, that locus would be mobilized, carried forward and sometimes smashed apart by major tendencies, those tendencies which 'interfere' with one another; on the other hand, it would be penetrated by, and shot through with, the weaker tendencies characteristic of networks and pathways (Lefebvre 1991: 87).

The urban structure of Pyongyang is composed with three symbolic axes and several characteristic districts. The axes are contained ideological monuments and huge size of streets. In northern part of Daedong river, the historical central area contained main political organization is located. In the eastern part, where had been developed during Japanese colonial era, many factories, housing for labor, and embassies are located. After Pyongyang 13th World Festival of Youth and Students in 1989, two newly developed residential districts were constructed in western part of Pyongyang around Gwangbok and Tong-il Streets.




Figure 8.3: Urban structure of Pyongyang

The ideological space of Pyongyang has two folds: The monumental movement (as great

movement) controls and leads the whole urban space, and the daily movement (as lesser movements) penetrate and delete the remained experience and diversity. Through these movements, space is under totalitarian surveillance of ideology. Finally, movement penetrates even the space of the body.

This process of continuous alteration (the original copy destroyed) was applied not only to newspapers, but to books, periodicals, pamphlets, posters, leaflets, films, sound-tracks, cartoons, photographs - to every kind of literature or documentation which might conceivably hold any political or ideological significance (Orwell 1949: 51).

8.2.1 The monumental movement

Kim regime proclaimed ‘the one ideology system’ in 1967 and Juche ideology in 1974. ‘In a totalitarian society without any political enemy, the role of the party is limited only in propaganda and public order. On the process, a political issue is concealed as a cultural one’ (Gramsci 1935: 163). When Kim Jung Il appeared in the frontline for succession in 1967, his title was Section Chief of Culture and Art and, in 1992, he issued a guide-book for ideological space production. In the book, *An Essay on Art and Architecture*, he argued that ‘the most effective means of propaganda is the monumental building’.

The monumental spaces of Pyongyang are classified into three types: 1) abstract space that destroys the experience and monopolizes memory. The shape of this space has the characteristics of geometry, visual, and verticality; 2) symbolic space containing national signs. This space awakens the feeling of hatred during the Korean War and instigates public mobilization for the regime’s cause; and 3) religious space. While abstract and symbolic spaces hide absolute power, religious space openly shows regime power and who is the national messiah; the lord of totalitarian space.

8.2.1.1 Abstract Space

According to Arendt (1929: 69), ‘the desire of eyes tends to understand the nature of things itself more than just the pleasure of seeing. Unlike other senses, it desires to see whether it is

beauty or not. However, even though the desire achieves the aim to know, it couldn't give any benefit to his ego. The desire of eyes let him forget himself as like the audiences in the theater. He forgets all anxieties with immersion in the wonderful spectacle in front of their eyes'.

Lefebvre (1991: 223, 416) also states that 'the visual space is the oppressive space. The visual thing is prior to the idea or other senses. It controls all other senses like the sense of smell, taste, or touch. It absorbs all senses even the desire. The strategy of visualization controls all social experiences. In the space of geometry, the man submits to the visual thing and the sense of vision is concluded in the destruction of experience and monopolization'.

The geometry and monumental space were used in the city plan during Mussolini's Fascism in Rome. During the fascist regime, several different urban development plans were put forward: a) a directional city along the north-south axis, b) a decentralized and unevenly distributed city, c) construction of several monumental complexes (Neri 2013: 22).

In the process of totalitarian city construction, the social and political necessity is returned to abstract space. Abstract space reduces the experience and threatens to replace all social space. Abstract space is produced through the power and works as a tool to destroy difference. The space has the shape of geometry, vision, and phallus (Lefebvre 1991: 105).



Figure 8.4: Perspective view of Paradise Street in Pyongyang, 1975 [Source: Lee 1993]

The geometric appearance of Pyongyang seems no different from other modern cities, but the aim of construction is not. While Le Corbusier's modern city intended 'the city on the park' according to functional distribution, the aim of Pyongyang construction considered the external appearance rather than the function. The high-rise apartment buildings of over 15 floors in Pyongyang were constructed in 1970 at the near time of the name change from Stalin Street to

Victory Street (see Chapter 7.4). As political change increased, the great buildings were constructed with ever-higher blocks. In 2012, the Mansudea Apartment was constructed, with 45 floors, in Pyongyang. The aim of the construction was for visual and political effects instead of effective land use. Also, there was not economical profit because the cost of land in Pyongyang does not rise like other capitalist cities. Instead, some high-rise apartments were sometimes demolished because of their lack of technique (*Seoul News*, 22Nov. 2014). Moreover, the space was very inconvenient for living because of its lack of energy.

In the case of a high-rise apartment in Pyongyang, citizens prefer from five to ten floors. Over 10 floors, dwellers often have to go up and down through stairs even though there is an elevator because of often power failure. Especially, getting drink water and using the toilet is very difficult during frequent cutting off the water. On the other hand, the lower floors are also not convenient. On the ground, piles of waste and sewage from the window make a bad smell and insects (Kim 2003: 411).

As with geometric high-rise buildings, the great streets in Pyongyang are meant for visual effect. The great size of the road is not to accommodate a particular volume of traffic, as is often the case for other modern cities. The roads of Pyongyang are normally empty since not many cars. The attractiveness on the road is cars but rather beautiful female police officers that stand in the middle of the crossroads. The width and height of roads are much great than its function but the eyes of citizens have experienced their daily life within the visual construct.



Figure 8.5: Independence Street, Pyongyang, constructed in 1989
[Source: <http://www.panoramio.com/photo/14241550>]

Considering North Korea's limited national wealth, the construction of great abstract space leads to spatial inequality as a necessity (see Chapter 3.6 on the special mosaics of Pyongyang). Behind these modern high-rise buildings are shabby resident areas. Even though this kind of spatial inequality appears in other modern cities as well, the reason for it existing in Pyongyang is different. This space is not a product of systemic limits but has rather been produced to supporting the system. While spatial inequality shows the leader's significance in society, so too the excluded feel oppressed and are encouraged to remember their lowly position in society.



Figure 8.6: Unequal dwelling spaces in Pyongyang [Source: <http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk03100&num=1716>]

Abstract space breaks down experience and the space becomes empty. The empty space needs some compacted things like the absolute subject. The abstract space must henceforward be considered a highly complex one and it dissolves and incorporates such former 'subjects' as the village and the town; it is true that it replaces them and sets itself up as the space of power. Then what we seem to have is an apparent subject, an impersonal pseudo-subject, and – hidden within it, concealed by its illusory transparency – the real 'subject', namely state (political) power. In the space, the eyes of power never miss all experiences. Finally, the violent of the phallic thing acquires the end of the abstract space (Lefebvre 1991: 51, 417).

We have seen that the visual space of transparency and readability has a content – a content that it is designed to conceal: namely, the phallic realm of (supposed) virility. It is at the same time a repressive space: nothing in it escapes the surveillance of power. Everything opaque, all kinds of partitions, even walls simplified to the point of mere drapery, or destined to disappear. This disposition of things is diametrically opposed to the real requirements of the present situation. The sphere of private life ought to be enclosed, and have a finite, or finished aspect. Public space, by contrast, ought to be an opening outwards. What we see happening is just the opposite (Lefebvre 1991: 147).

In 1987, construction was begun on the Ryugyong Hotel (105 floors, 330 meters high) in the Botong District, the center of Pyongyang (see Chapter 7.2.3 about the mythical meaning of this place). According to Kim's son (1992: 40-43), Ryugyong Hotel has all the characteristics of "great monumental buildings" to show the leader's great ideology. The building is very similar to the 300 meters high flashing pyramid that was described in Orwell's novel *1984*. Even though the hotel does not have three slogans of the party as does the novel, it would be easy to imagine them: 'War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength!'



Figure 8.7: Ryugyong Hotel, Pyongyang (2010)
[Source: <http://www.panoramio.com/photo/44887034>]

Ryugyong Hotel arguably controls all space in Pyongyang. Wherever they are in the city, the citizen cannot escape its gaze. The great glass building forces them to remember a leader who is always observant. According to an interview with Park, he described the citizen sentiment of the high-rise building:

The citizen doesn't get an inspiration when they see high-rise buildings in everyday life. However, sometimes they could feel the pride of Pyongyang citizens within the space of high-rise buildings. In the case of the Ryugyong Hotel, citizens say 'it is not finished until today' but they simultaneously feel pride that the highest building is being in Pyongyang (Park, interview with the author).

The abstract space of Pyongyang has the characteristics of geometry, illusory transparency, and phallus. This abstract space destroys the diversity and the experience of real-life with surveillance and controls the urban space and the citizen.

8.2.1.2 Symbolic space

Both the abstract and symbolic spaces destroy experience but the progress shows different ways. While abstract space expunges time through metaphysics, symbolic space restores time to the past. Schapiro (1972: 73) said, 'fascism was such as a game, but Nazism was as spiritualism'. Absolute control needs symbolism and myth to achieve the public hypnosis and the main tools of symbolic space are the historical national signs.

In order for the party to achieve legitimacy, it was necessary for the Kim regime to construct symbolic spaces with nationalistic signs. On the support of the masses, the Nazis were able to take power, as like Stalin during the socialist revolution. However, the Kim regime took power through outside help (the Soviet Union), so it was needed to establish their own legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. The regime used the masses' hatred against Japanese colonial suppression and the aftermath of the Korean War and the hatred ultimately legitimized Kim as a national messiah.

The Kim regime started to construct the national symbolic buildings from 1960 onwards. At the time, external support from socialist countries was stopped and the regime was left to

construct the city by itself. Thereafter, the spaces of education, theaters, and restaurants in Pyongyang were constructed in nationalistic colors. In *An Essay on Art and Architecture*, Kim (1992: 33) described ‘the form of Juche architecture is nationalistic’. One of the main buildings of the national symbol, the People’s Grand Study House, which was constructed in 1982. The building is located just behind the Kim Il Sung Square. The space reminds its users of not only a merciful leader allowing them to study but also the national suppression with past memories.



Figure 8.8: The Grand People’s Study House in Pyongyang
[Source: http://www.snpeace.or.kr/bbs/tb.php/bgrou7_3/19]

‘The symbolic space is full over with national signs. However, the icily abstracted sign passes the death through the word, image, and sound. The sign, notifying some invisible thing, threatens the visible one (Lefebvre 1991: 217)’. The symbolic space is backward-facing: past memories are relived and the past encroaches on present experience. Abstract signs make the space of death beyond the present. For total control, it is important to govern the past: ‘A man who rules the past can control the future’ (Orwell 1949: 53).

Symbolic space leads to mass hypnosis. National signs evoke both hatred of opponents and the leader’s own power and mercy. In the place, past and present are overlapped and a new network of time is fabricated. In the end, the spatial experience becomes homogeneous and makes citizens believe their leader is a national messiah.

The national sign of North Korea symbolizes death and hatred. It has appeared in the five

revolutionary operas in North Korea. Among these operas, four are concerned with the brutal violence of the Japanese colonial era and one another with the Korean War. The most representative operas are *The Bloody Sea* and *A Virgin Selling Flowers*. Most of the content of these operas involve suppression, death, hatred of the colonial era, where through the war comes a national messiah (Kim) to save his people.



Figure 8.9: A scene from the opera, *The Bloody Sea* [Source: http://m.blog.daum.net/_blog/_m/articleView.do?blogid=0MIhw&articleno=8626548#]

Symbolic space thus reverses and distorts time through national symbols and it fabricates the past memories and reforms and destroys their experience. While abstract space achieves homogeneity through silence, symbolic space destroys diversity through the repetition of signs and symbols.

8.2.1.3 Religious space

Totalitarianism is based upon the loneliness of the atomized masses. Loneliness is counter-intuitive to the communal life, but the totalitarian regime never let the masses alone: they get a sense of belonging under the totalitarian control. For the masses, cruel totalitarian movements seem an escape from the loneliness of their real life (Arendt 1976: 281-283). An automaton without consciousness does not need to feel lonely or anxious through homogeneity with millions of other automatons (Fromm 1972: 157). The totalitarian movement is similar to religious performance, overcoming loneliness and getting a sense of belonging through group acts. These acts need the religious space to have been produced somewhere in the city.

Lenin predicted ‘a new type of state’ by separating religion and politics. ‘With combining

the religion and politics, the new state would be surrounded by the ideology of pseudo-religion as like the Roman Empire or autocracies (Friedrich 1965: 6). Schapiro (1972: 97) also compared the union between church and state in the 16th century. He stated that ‘in a sense, the ruler as a spreader of ideology had to be a church himself or to be its substitute’.

The ruler of totalitarianism has to play the role as churches are doing, but the space of the ‘pseudo-church’ is different from absolute space in a modern city. While absolute space in modern society hides their power behind transparency, religious space in totalitarian cities plainly reveals their lord.

In Pyongyang, the representative religious space is manifest in Kim’s statue and his tomb. The first statue of Kim was made at the beginning time of the socialist regime’s construction in 1948. In 1972, when the Juche ideology had been constructed, the great statue of Kim Il Sung was built on the hill of Mansudae in the center of Pyongyang. Before 70 years, in the 1900s, the place was used as a women’s bible school, but under the Kim regime, the place became a pseudo-religion space with two Kim’s statues. Kim’s son said ‘the main aim of the statue construction in the city is to announce who is greater of the city and to praise his immortal achievements’ (Kim 1992: 44). There are about 38,000 statues of Kim’s family in North Korea, and 19 of which are in Pyongyang.³⁷



Figure 8.10: The Kim Il Sung statue in Mansudae, Pyongyang
[Source: by Steven Denney/Sino-NK]

³⁷ Database Center For North Korean Human Rights: <http://www.nkdb.org:8080/atlas/#>

Repeated religious experiences are more and more change their beliefs. The actions of citizens in front of the statue are not down to their faith. In this 'religious' space, no one has any other choice but to worship. According to the interview with Kim, during a public holiday, since citizens know that doing nothing could be regarded as a crime, they bring flowers and worship in front of the statue. 'A humiliating experience could change one man's emotion' (Orwell 1949: 409). The experience in pseudo-religious space is a tool for total control because 'the characteristic of a man is decided not by the rationality but by the belief' (Gramsci 1935: 181).

When the experience of religious space has continuity from generation to generation, the ideology of pseudo-religion can be solidified.

If he is a person naturally orthodox, he will in all circumstances know, without taking thought, what is the true belief or the desirable emotion. But in any case an elaborate mental training, undergone in childhood and grouping itself round the Newspeak words CRIMESTOP, BLACKWHITE, and DOUBLETHINK, makes him unwilling and unable to think too deeply on any subject whatever (Orwell 1949: 266).

According to an interview with Park, son of high class in Pyongyang, teachers lead their students to worship through the system of reward and punishment.

Even though there is a class of ideology in elementary school, real education is studied through award and punishment in daily life. For example, if a student didn't worship Kim's statue on Kim's birthday, the teacher asks other students to criticize his idea. On the other hand, for a better presented student, the teacher gives an award such as a seat of class president. An absent student has to criticize himself and then he finally [has] to admit a fault because all others point out his conduct (Park, interview with the author).

The other representation of religious space in Pyongyang is the Sun Palace of Kim's tomb. It is located northeast part of Pyongyang near Chosun Middle Zoo and Daesung Mountain Park where the citizens are often visiting. It is covered by a great mass of granite and inside, the

mummy of Kim and his son are preserved at great cost. The space is both beautiful and fearsome. While the exterior is glorious and beautiful with gray granite, the interior directly imagines death. The space asks for silence. Lefebvre (1991: 225) states that ‘monuments are also liable to possess acoustic properties, and when they do not this detracts from their monumentality. Silence itself, in a place of worship, has its music’. Music praises the lord of the city.



Figure 8.11: The Sun Palace in Pyongyang [Source: http://imnews.imbc.com/news/2013/politic/article/3309195_11199.html]

As opposed to splendor, religious space in Pyongyang directly symbolizes ‘death’. ‘Absolute space is thus also and above all the space of death, the space of death's absolute power over the living. Tombs and funerary monuments belong, then, to absolute space, and this in their dual aspect of formal beauty and terrifying content (Lefebvre 1991: 235). These great religious spaces revive death and give legitimacy and absolute power to the present regime. For the reason, the most common propaganda slogan after Kim’s death became ‘the great leader, Kim Il Sung is with us forever’.



Figure 8.12: Propaganda stated ‘Kim Il Sung is with us forever’ in Pyongyang [Source: <http://www.flickr.com/photos/11959181@N00/14096995498/in/photostream/>]

The monumental space in Pyongyang has a significant role in producing the ideological city. The three types of monument space, that is, abstract, symbol, and religious, overlap. Abstract space achieves homogeneity through the logic of vision – symbolic space through hatred. Religious space shows who is the lord of the past, the present, and the future – even in death for this city.

8.2.2 Daily movement

While monuments control space in Pyongyang, daily space demolishes any remaining experiential space between the gaps of monumental movement. Daily activities define a man and his beliefs; ‘it is impossible that a man is to be a fascist in politics but he is to be an unfascist in school and home’ (Schapiro 1972: 50).

Daily activities in Pyongyang are classified into three spaces: 1) the space of propaganda, to occupy the interval between monuments, 2) the space of collectivism to let all citizens feel a sense of unity, and 3) the space of the body for seizing any residual resistance to the regime.

8.2.2.1 Propaganda space

Friedrich (1965: 4) said that ‘totalitarian dictatorship may, in a preliminary, be called an

autocracy based upon modern technology and mass legitimation. Its main tool is propaganda'. The tools of propaganda are various: radio, television, newspapers, education, and so on. 'The production of images is part of everyday life, and available media and technologies spread and expand its consumption' (Eckardt 2008b).

Totalitarianism is not satisfied with the puppetry of the masses but aims instead for the masses to be enthusiastic supporters of its ideology. According to Schapiro (1972), for the aim, totalitarian power has to 1) keep citizens' silence against the regime, 2) lead citizens' praising for the regime, and 3) make party's wish as their citizens' will.

Hitler (1926: 79) said that 'the propaganda is only needed forever. As much as the number of the masses, their intellectual level has to be downed. Since the large mass acts emotionally, like a woman, the propaganda has to be short and repeated continuously'. Friedrich (1965) said, 'the illustration of totalitarian propaganda serves an effective role to control the thought of the mass'. The masses under a totalitarian regime cannot trust the official information. Due to this lack of trustworthy information, rumors abound. However, without any basis of trust, man's thoughts cannot expand. As they do not trust information, they become equals (Orwell 1949). Without any trust information, the brain of citizens becomes a vacuum condition. In this vacuum, colorful illustrations and slogans serve as effective tools for controlling citizens' beliefs.

The 'basic color' of Pyongyang is gray. Its space is expressionless; it neither speaks nor is spoken to. The abstract space asks the citizen to be silent, but ideological space is not satisfied with silence. It asks citizens to repeatedly shout aloud words associated with the party. In this space, silence is associated with guilt. On the gray city of Pyongyang, colorful points are painted. Propaganda is clearly displayed on the streets, subway, roofs of high-rise buildings, gates of schools, and public halls.



Figure 8.13: Propaganda on the streets of Pyongyang [Source: <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/>]

Most propaganda is about praising Kim, North Korean unity, the overthrowing of America, or following party orders, and are: “Thanks! Father, Kim Jung Il leader”, “Give brutal punishment to American imperialism”, “The military is the party, the nation, and the people”, or “Unite together!” Through researching the map of Google Earth, it is clear that propaganda and monuments in Pyongyang have been distributed evenly in the whole urban space. At their center, the downtown, the large circle is the location of Kim’s great statues and the square is the Juche ideology tower of 170 meters.




Figure 8.14: Distribution of propaganda and monuments in Pyongyang

‘Space commands bodies, prescribing or proscribing gestures, routes, and distances to be covered. It is produced with this purpose in mind; this is its *raison d’être* (Lefebvre 1991: 143).

The citizens of Pyongyang always pass propaganda, wherever they are going in the city. Walking the streets in Pyongyang, one will hear party broadcast. A propaganda vehicle patrols the city with propaganda blaring from its speakers. This propaganda sows the seeds of ideology into the citizen’s brains, barking what they should or should not do, and who their Dear Leader is.

8.2.2.2 Collectivistic space

Mass gymnastics for students in Pyongyang began in 1949, just a year after Kim’s regime was installed. The regime had paid careful attention to producing a space for group physical activity. After the Korean War, even though most urban facilities were destroyed Kim Il Sung ordered to construct a playground and swimming pool in each school, factory, and countryside (PLHCC 1957: 667). The regime intended to unify the masses through spaces of group physical activity.

On every May Day, in the Kim Il Sung Stadium, 100,000 people perform mass gymnastics for 90 minutes. They present displays of gymnastics, dance, acrobatics, or taekwondo to music. Thousands of students create a fantastic atmosphere with 170 pages card section. Kim Jung Il insisted that these mass games are important training for shaping ‘a new men’ to have a collectivist mindset.

Developing mass gymnastics is important in training children to be fully developed communist people, to be a fully developed communist man, one must acquire a revolutionary ideology, the knowledge of many fields, rich cultural attainments and a healthy and strong physique... The schoolchildren, conscious that a single slip in their action may spoil their mass gymnastic performance, make every effort to subordinate all their thoughts and actions to the collective³⁸.

³⁸ Recite in wikipedia.org, in: Kim Jong Il, *On Further Developing Mass Gymnastics*, April 11, 1987

The gender ratio of Pyongyang is imbalance since many women are needed for mass gymnastics. The number of women in Pyongyang is 1.23 million, while the man is 0.88 million (*Weekly Chosun News*, 17 Oct. 2011). According to the interview with Lee, who attended in ‘Bonggi middle school,’ named for mass gymnastics in Pyongyang, described her experience of mass gymnastics in 1979:

We stayed together and trained every day from January to April. The training was hard, especially rehearsal and practical performance was. We had to turn over huge pages for several hours without any moving in their seats. Even though the main running time was 90 minutes, it needed several hours when it contained entrance and exit time. The hardest thing was not hunger but not being able to use the toilet. Since nobody could move from their position, even women had to resolve their physiological needs where they sat (Lee, interview with the author).

‘Mobilization contributes to all people enslavement through the lead of ultimate control about private property’ (Schapiro1972: 56). The space for group activity trains the citizen for absolute obedience and collectivist attitudes. According to Lee, before 1989, the North Korean did not mind being mobilized into the mass gymnastics because the performance gave them a chance to visit Pyongyang and win prizes such as food supplies.



Figure 8.15: The card section by children in Kim Il Sung stadium of Pyongyang
[Source: <http://www.shapeways.com/blog/archives/>]

Another representative of group mobilization in Pyongyang is the great military parade. It takes place on the day of the party's formation, the victory day after the Korean War, and Kim's birthday. The parade cries out strong messages that 'even despite economic difficulties and disruption that other socialist countries have faced, Jucheism will remain forever. 100,000 soldiers and one million citizens take part in these parades (*Yonhap News*, 10 Oct. 1995).



Figure 8.16: The military parade in Kim Il Sung square of Pyongyang in 2012 [Source: <http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/photo-contest/2012/entries/170287/view/>]

According to an interview with Park, who took part in the military parades in the 2000s as a student of the Kim Cheak College of Engineering in Pyongyang, both participants and spectators could feel a sense of catharsis from this collective action. He said that Kim Il Sung square was normally calm. Most users of the Square were university students or intellectuals. They usually visited the People's Study Center, just behind the square, to avoid the cold or the heat. However, on the day of the military parade, this place became completely different. Around 100,000 people trained for over three months for the parade; not only soldiers but also citizens and college students. To increase numbers, college students from other regions were registered and had to stay in training camps before the event. They did not consider their mobilization as being forced, nor did they with for compensation. They thought that if the party

ordered them, then it was their duty to obey. They did, in fact, welcome the mobilization, as then they were relieved of their studying duties. In reality, their social standing was not decided by ability but by bloodline. Also, students from other regions could get a chance to visit Pyongyang without such permission. Park said:

Each college student trained in broad space like in front of Juche Ideology Tower, the People's Cultural Palace, or the Triumphal Arch. Before one month of the parade, they trained to pass Kim Il Sung Square together. One time of passing needed a day or a half of a day. Sometimes it was hard but there was a little fun. In the practical parade, I felt a strong catharsis that would be never forgotten in my life. Simultaneously, I felt a strong pride as a member of the party (Park, interview with the author).

‘The square is an absolute place to combine the political and religious spaces’ (Lefebvre 1974: 351). The military parades in the Kim Il Sung Square look like a march of automatons. However, they are not just following orders but feeling a cathartic sense of belonging. They feel relief and pride in the legitimate member of the party. The collective action confirms the identity and prevents citizens from feeling lonely.



Figure 8.17: The student collectivistic demonstration against U.S. and South Korean government in Pyongyang Stadium in 1965

[Source: Nodong Newspaper, 29 Aug. 1965, published in Pyongyang]

Collectivistic space regards silence as synonymous with guilt. The masses in this collective space have to express what the party expects them to say through often-exaggerated words and actions. During their battle cries, their own beliefs change regardless of rationality. 'The substance of their talking is not their head but throat' (Orwell 1949: 78). Collective space produces a unified man and takes the loneliness from the masses. 'An automan has thrown out his personal ego and cannot feel loneliness or anxiety. He stands among millions of atomized people' (Fromm 1972: 157).

Sometimes with especial mood, I could feel a thrilling inspiration toward Kim Jung Il. It led me to praise him. It was a realistic experience different from worshipping God in the church. While God is not invisible, we can see Kim with our eyes (Park, interview with the author).

8.2.2.3 Fabricated smile space

In totalitarian society, since nothing can be solidified as true, the masses cannot distinguish between myth and fact. Orwell (1949: 45) says that 'the past, he reflected, had not merely been altered, it had been actually destroyed. For how could you establish even the most obvious fact when there existed no record outside your own memory?' Their criteria of right and wrong are not to do with experience but rather the opinions of the party. The final aim of totalitarianism is not to believe all falsehood as reality but to believe anything that the party declares. 'The fact that the forgery is being believed is more important than the (historically speaking, secondary) circumstance that it is forgery' (Arendt 1976: 7). It is through continuous training that a 'new man' is formed, who believes anything that the party says. For the training, fabricated smiles are frequently seen in everyday life.

There is laughter because there is nothing to laugh about. Laughter, whether reconciled or terrible, always accompanies the moment when fear is ended. It indicates a release, whether from physical danger or from the grip of logic. Reconciled laughter resounds with the echo of escape from power; wrong laughter copes with fear by defecting to the agencies which inspire it (Adorno and Horkheimer

1969: 112).

The representative producer of fabricated spaces in Pyongyang is the group dance on national holidays in broad urban spaces such as the Kim Il Sung Square or the Triumphal Arch. These spaces are full of North Korean flags and slogans such as “it couldn’t be better” or “we are happy in the paradise” (Kim 2003: 179). Men and women in good suits move with the same motion to songs praising Kim or war. They all smile, clap, and cheer. Whether their smiles are false or real is not important. The significance is that they are smiling apart from real life. The main aim of this training is not to change falseness to the truth but instead to destroy the boundary between them. If citizens truly smile, training can be said to be finished. If they regard it is not true, they still need training.



Figure 8.18: A group dance on Kim’s birthday in Pyongyang, 2012 [Source: <http://blogs.reuters.com/photographers-blog/2012/04/23/window-to-north-korea/>]

Every national holiday in Pyongyang is full of dancing and smiling. These fabricated spaces destroy the boundary between truth and falseness. Through continued training, fabricated smiles eventually make citizens lose their own rational, adopting instead all party lies as their own belief blurring.

8.2.2.4 The space of the body

The totalitarian regime changes geographical place through ideological space. In this gray city of Pyongyang, the Kim regime's ideology is loud and clear. Citizens meet with party slogans or the leader's portrait in every workplace, square, subway, street, and even their own room. They never escape the eyes of the party and its leader. All urban space is occupied with ideology - only their own body is exempt and is the zero point of the world.

My body: it is the place without recourse to which I am condemned... The body is the zero point of the world... My body is like the City of the Sun. It has no place, but it is formed in all possible places, real or utopian, emerges and radiates (Foucault 2006: 229-233).

It is true that space partly controls the body. Nevertheless, without the body, space cannot be experienced. The space is perceived, experienced, and produced through the body. 'The means of the body that space is perceived, lived – and produced. On the far side of the readable/visible, it remains power' (Lefebvre 1991: 162). Spatial awareness does not come from outside but rather from within. The only way to retain subjectivity in a space awash with totalitarian ideology is to preserve the space of the body.

Before producing effects in the material realm (tools and objects), before producing itself by drawing nourishment from that realm, and before producing itself by drawing nourishment from that realm, and before reproducing itself by generating other bodies, each living body is space and has its space: it produces itself in space and it also produces that space (Lefebvre 1991: 170).

If totalitarian power could occupy the masses' body? Foucault (2006: 232) states that 'in any case, the mask, the tattoo, the make-up, are operations by which the body is torn away from its proper space and projected into another space'. According to the Kim regime's order, all citizens have to attach the leader's portrait to their lapel or breast pocket.



Figure 8.19: Citizens with the badge of Kim's portrait attached to their lapels in the Pyongyang subway [Source: <http://www.foxnews.com/>]

The badge with Kim Il Sung's portrait has been supplied to citizens from 1970 with the proposal of his son during the period of power succession. The badge is divided into four classes: party officer, soldier, citizen, and overseas nation. It is mandatory to have the badge. If citizens to out without a badge, they could be suspected of disloyalty. Therefore, Pyongyang's citizens always bear the leader's portrait in their hearts. Thus, even their reflection is not free from ideology, and so citizens' bodies are also controlled by ideological space.

In the totalitarian city of Pyongyang, these small badges control the space of the body, 'there isn't his own space only except a few cubic centimeters of his brain' (Orwell 1949: 42).

Chapter 9

Entering the market system and location game

9.1 Unequal strategy for the poor totalitarian state

In the aftermath of other socialist countries collapsing and awaking numerous internal economic problems, the 3rd seven years plan of North Korea from 1987 to 1993 was failed. The four main economic problems were the lack of food, energy, material, and foreign currency. After 1990 and for nine years, the GDP of North Korean decreased by 30 percent. From the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the system of food distribution started to become shaky. At first, distribution was delayed, then its amount was reduced, and finally - between 1994 and 1995 - the system was completely stopped (Yang 2010: 16, 416). As a result, between 1994 and 2000, at the lowest estimate, 630,000 and a maximum of 1.12 million people died of starvation (Lee 2004: 136-141).

To understand North Korean society, it is not necessary to study not only the causes but also the repeated phenomenon itself, because ‘the opinion in that the economic crisis directly caused the general event of history by itself is obviously false’ (Gramsci 1929: 210).




Figure 9.1: The GDP growth of DPRK, 1986-2018
[Source: Index Mundi and The Bank of Korea]

Unlike the Chinese economic path, Kim’s regime tried to solve the problem by political means than economic routes. The reason for Kim’s regime selected the political route is as

follows: first, the regime missed the time of economic reform and the afraid of failure was growing since other socialist countries were in the process of collapsing after the 1990s. Second, the regime reported a number of distorted information to the public, especially regarding South Korean society, so they were afraid to show that it had really lied. Third, the most important reason is the regime already had completed the close system of totalitarian control. Reasonably, it seemed that the regime, to keep their power, should protect the news of external situations and brutally control the tamed nations by political means instead of recovering the economic difficulty first.

To solve the economic problem by the regime was naturally progressed by the political route and one of the main practices was, in 1989, the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students in Pyongyang. With the awareness of the Seoul Olympics in 1988 and the collapse of other socialist countries, the Festival aimed to show off North Korea's political and economic stability and to promote 'Juche state's superiority' to the inside and the outside world. The festival caused significant costs to the regime,³⁹ and what resulted were not only small political outcomes but also side effects for propaganda.⁴⁰ At the beginning of the 1990s, Kim's regime tried to recover the radically worsening economy after the festival by cutting and myth-making. In 1991, Kim's regime implemented the campaign of eating twice a day and so food distribution was cut by 10 percent for all excepting soldiers and heavy workers. On the other hand, in Pyongyang, Kim's regime prepared the space for ideology and myth by constructing the substantial size of buildings such as Suksum Revolutionary Site, Three Main Revolution Museum, the Mullet Soup Restaurant, and Moonsu Theme Park. In 1994, the regime constructed, the Dangoon Royal Tomb, the space of Korean racial origin myth, in Pyongyang to design a collective identity.⁴¹

³⁹ The Soviet Union criticized the preparing cost of the festival with the title of 'Pyongyang festival was too expensive' (*Donga News*, 1 Jul. 1989)

⁴⁰ For a political propaganda, Kim regime highlighted Sukyong Im, who was a visitor for the festival as a representative student of South Korea, in broadcast to show Kim regime's superiority. However, citizens were shocked with her casual clothes, liberal acting and thought. As a result, citizens doubted the regime's propaganda about South Korea (Lee, interview with author).

⁴¹ To mention the identity or origin of the rice has a high possibility to using by political tool and the outcome is the political result. Tajfle (1974: 66) said, 'in order for the members of an ingroup to be able to hate or dislike an outgroup, or to discriminate against it, they must first have acquired a sense or discriminate against. Much of

The shortage of food was from the local area but in 1994, even Pyongyang came under comestible difficulties. However, the situation had already been foreshowed in Pyongyang. In a letter from an assistant manager in a Pyongyang factory to Japanese relative, the situation of Pyongyang in 1988 was described.

In North Korea, murders, thefts, and bribes are rampant and the food lacking and the black market is overflowing. The citizen cannot imagine the General's State. It became a fearful society. In the night, we cannot go out, even to buy a pack of cigarettes or an egg, sellers ask Japanese currency. We cannot buy any needs except in the Foreign Currency Shop. Since there is nothing in the official shop, citizens have to go to black markets. Even black markets only foreign currency is accepted. Since last year, the price has been sharply rising and there is not enough food for a living. In past days, I could get 'high-quality distribution' but almost nothing in the present-day (*Donga News*, 7Sep. 1988).

Even though all these had already been forecast, how could the ruling classes remain calm? They could because 'long-term ruling is possible when poverty and ignorance are premised' (Orwell 1949: 267). The solution of the economic problems of totalitarian power is to let the public live in poverty and political ignorance. It is similar to the Soviet Union's forced labor camp system where '200 grams of bread controlled all life of in the camp' (Solzhenitsyn 1962).

During the great starvation (also called the March of Hardship), food distribution was only provided in a monthly amount during a year and the black market overflowed with people who needed items just to survive (Yang 2001: 44). From 1994 to 1998, many child beggars from other regions appeared near the Botong River station and Pyongyang station. Crime rates increased and many deaths from starvation occurred in Pyongyang (Park, interview with the author). There was frequent public execution only because they stole a few potatoes in 1994 (Ji 2019: 31). The work hour rate for preparing food during a day, in case of the office worker, increased from 3.5 to 50 percent (Yang 2010: 20). During the March of Hardship, citizens relied

the tradition in the literature (not only in social psychology) ascribes the acquisition of this sense of belonging to the existence of outgroups perceived as threats, common enemies, etc.'

on their own abilities than the party's.⁴²

The people who gave the loyalty to the party starved to death first... Without [stealing], [you] couldn't alive. Everyone became a thief. We knew we were [thieves] but we never [knew] the regime was the biggest one... After losing my leg and hand (while stealing coal on the train), my father noticed the true face of the party (Ji 2019: 47, 90).

Paradoxically, the starvation justified inequality and collecting wealth in the urban society of Pyongyang. The worsening of food distribution was not the same for all classes.⁴³ Some districts of Pyongyang appeared the people who lost most of them such as television, books, and even house because of starvation, but high-level party members did not suffer from hunger (Park, interview with the author). If someone has a high-party relative, he or she could be relied on for the food supply. In the situation, the authority of the party member became higher both inside and outside the family. If there was nobody in a position of authority in their family, they had to sell all they had to get food. At the beginning of the black market, citizens only sold goods such as used clothes and electronics, but finally, permissions for dwelling were sold on the black market (Im 2010: 150). The high class of citizens could accumulate their property just with some food. The value of helping a neighbor disappeared and the public believed only his or her own capacity, with the slogan: "a survivor is a patriot".

The changed value of life gave an advantage to North Korea's rulers. As upper classes of Russia could keep their higher social position during transforming (Andrusz 1996: 149), the ruling class in North Korea easily collected wealth by getting exclusive trade rights (*Wark*) in the first and second economy field (Cho 2010: 41). On the other hand, the public not only lost

⁴² Seo (2001: 130) argues that 'now Juch Ideology could transform to revolutionary ideology by awareness of Juch (subject oneself)'. The author's view, however, since the public's spiritual judgment was already distorted and they depend on the ruling class to keep their life, the people's revolution by Juch Ideology seems difficult.

⁴³ According to Yang (2010: 49), the order of food distribution was as follows: 1) high party members, 2) soldiers, 3) officers of munitions factory and special enterprise and their family, and 4) laborers, teachers, doctors, and workers in service part. In the case of farmer, there was not food distribution because they could get some of their own products.

goods and housing but also had to accept increasing dependency on the ruling classes. The public hated the rulers and emerging capitalists (*Donju*) because of their extorting, but also regarded them as a capable man as an object of envy. Similar to Weber's argument that 'the public dreams to take the social honor by coping the high class' consumption style even they structurally never take it'(Morris 1995), Pyongyang's citizens tried to learn the accumulating way of ruling classes even the slight possibility.

After the great starvation, the ruling class in Pyongyang claimed political and economic vested rights, but also justified collecting wealth within a market system. They could live in luxurious houses⁴⁴ and buy fresh fish from the Foreign Currency Shop or black market that had been impossible before. Cooperators of Kim's regime wanted to keep their advantage in this totalitarian society.⁴⁵

For North Korea's rulers, continuous poverty for the public could be an alternative to keep totalitarian control and satisfy the cooperator's desire. Inequality, for them, was not a task to be solved but a tool to be kept for the power.

The system of inequality produces its own space. To keep their power and effective control, the ruler considers their cooperator rather than the tamed masses. Unlike the masses, in the time of trade growth, the cooperator recognized the regime's fabricated works. Nevertheless, the ruler needs them for making foreign currency since they have extensive trading experience and correct judgment. In return for leading active obedience, the ruler has to give cooperators not only the fear of terror but also the gift. Giving a gift is an effective strategy for autonomic obedience. According to Mauss (1925), 'gifts are voluntary but, in fact, they are given and repaid under obligation'. The ruler of North Korea introduced the market system not only for recovering from the economic depression but also for preparing the gift. Since 'amount of government's energies is never changed' (Rousseau 1762: 216), for the poor regime, inequality is an inevitable mean of preparing the gift.

⁴⁴ According to the interview with Lee, for getting a food, famous artists or athletes sell their good houses that they received from Kim Jung Il for a gift. Hence, capitalists buy it.

⁴⁵ According to the interview with Lee, capitalists and high-ranking officials of Pyongyang don't want to radical social change or the regime collapsing because they want to keep their advantage and also have a fear of a new society after showing Russia and Eastern Europe's high-ranking fallen after 1989.

In the process, Kim's regime 1) reduced receivers who had lived in Pyongyang, 2) gave remained citizen the emptied space, and 3) allowed the cooperator the right of special space using. For the reason, many of Pyongyang's citizens were forced into coal mines and camps after 1980, and Pyongyang's administrative district was reduced by half in 2011. The exclusive Foreign Currency Shop was then opened in Pyongyang for a high-level class in 1984, even though the country was economically hard up at the time.

Even though the economic system destroyed, the Great Starvation awaking and 'the Wall' collapsed in 1989, Kim's regime could keep its power until now. It was possible through 1) the legacy of totalitarian ideology and practical control and 2) the strategy of market control. The market worked not only preparing goods and food for the public but the gift for the cooperator to keep their silence and obedience.

9.2 Location game with market entrance, 1980-1984

The citizen's life behavior is influenced by where they live. The change of location means to change the distribution of social surplus. 'Location is socially produced. The production of spatial configurations can then be treated as an "active moment" within the overall temporal dynamics of accumulation and social reproduction' (Katznelson 1992: 108).

Worsening relations with China and the Soviet Union led to the economic stagnation of North Korea after the 1960s. Kim's regime looked for a new method to keep power. Like the competition between the Soviet Union and the US, North Korea had continued its economic race with South Korea until the 1970s. After the economic defeat of North Korea, the myth, Kim's country is the best in the world, started to dissolve (Oh 1995). Reacting to the defeat, in 1976, the regime injected the fear of war into the people through armed conflict in the Demilitarized Zone between South and North Korea. After the time, Pyongyang citizens were classified and forced to relocate. It aimed not only to extort their property and labor but also to unify the people into the party.

Between 1967 and 1974, Kim's regime had completed the totalitarian state not only through politics and its military but also through injecting Juche ideology into society. However, with the oil shock and Teng Hsiaoping's economic reformation in the 1970s, foreign loans of North Korea grew rapidly. Kim's regime partly accepted the market system to recover the economic

depression. The market entry was used for political means. It was used as a tool to make gifts for remainders and for cooperators.

The spaces are produced as political products and strategic spaces. The social relations of production have a social existence to the extent that they have a spatial existence; they project themselves into space, becoming inscribed there, and in the process producing that space itself (Lefebvre 1991: 84, 129). The new space of the market in Pyongyang produced new social relations and practices. It was also using for strategic space to prepare the carrot and stick. In a state that prohibits freedom of residency, even live in the capital means a citizen has received a favor of the regime. Around 1980, Pyongyang citizens were classified into three classes. The lowest class regarded as opponents were forced into to coalmine sand camps, and the second class of dutiful remainder stayed in Pyongyang with the right of the market using. The third class of cooperators became receivers of the gift at the Foreign Currency Shop. Location changing produced the new social relationships and gave citizens the obedience and loyalty to the ruler without additional surplus production.




Figure 9.2: Location game of Pyongyang after 1980

9.2.1 The labor camps for excluders

The forced migration of Pyongyang after 1976 was not a new phenomenon. During the Japanese colonial period, Pyongyang's citizens had been displaced for labor and military service into Manchukuo or Japan. When the socialist regime was established around 1948, many capitalists and nationalists fled to South Korea in fear. After the Korean War, the Kim regime continually conducted these 'displacements (*called Sogae*)'. However, the

characteristics of the purge around 1980 appeared different characters. It did not set out to destroy political opponents but instead to maintain the power it had already achieved. Orwell (1949: 58) describes that ‘perhaps the thing had simply happened because purges and vaporizations were a necessary part of the mechanics of government’.

In 1967, on the process of achieving a totalitarian state, Kim’s regime classified the citizens into three classes: the core class (28%), the unrest class (45%), and the hostile class (27%) (Kim 2012: 212). However, according to Lee, before 1976, the regime did not restrict the hostile class in terms of their everyday life in Pyongyang (see Chapter 2.3 for detail).

End of my family’s name, the brand of ‘executed family’ and ‘Christian family’ was always followed. However, until 1976, my family could not feel any social discrimination. For example, my father could graduate the college in Pyongyang and could become a technician. At the time, migrants from South Korea regarded as future workers for the reunified era. However, after 1976, the social mood of Pyongyang was radically changed and in 1980, many branded citizens were displaced (Lee, interview with the author).

Sometimes ‘the war is fought by the ruling group against the people’ (Orwell 1949: 279). Fear of war by Kim’s regime between 1976 and 1980 was used to control the masses. It has four aims: 1) to reduce receivers of Pyongyang, 2) to take over labor power, 3) to give available space to those who promise loyalty, and 4) to instill the fear into the remained citizens in Pyongyang.

From the Japanese colonial period, North Korea inherited the legacy of ‘the great bureaucratic system’ for effective surveillance (Cumings 1981) and completed the totalitarian state in 1974. However, ‘a significant amount of politics can ruin their foundation’ (Rousseau 1962: 200). With the economic depression in the 1970s, the ruling class tried to avoid the danger of regime collapse. One effective way of reducing the burden was excluding the receivers with a brand of political reactionary.

With the 2nd seven years plan in 1978, the increased labor power was needed necessary. Kim proposed that the main method to complete the plan was through the mobilization of manpower.

At the time, the cheap oil supply from China and the Soviet Union was stopped (Yang 2010), so, as alternative energy, the need for coal extraction grew. As ‘the need for day labor makes the urban poor’ (Marx and Engels 1846: 92), the need for reducing the number of receivers and creating labors brought the excluders into labor camps and the coalmines.

The continuous unsupplied distribution led the shutdown of Hakpoo coalmine (near the camp in 1996), but the 22nd camp was producing the coal as much as before. The camp produced 1,200 tons of coal per day. ‘How is it possible even all society has been already collapsed?’, ‘Are there awful actions what the outside never know?’... There was no way to know, but also no matter for us what did inside. Naturally, our village people decided to steal it and began to ride on a running coal train (Ji 2919: 60).

Also, to reduce the receiver as a Pyongyang citizen, in 2011, Kim's regime officially excluded one-third Pyongyang area.




Figure 9.3: Excluded one-third Pyongyang area in 2011

On the other hand, the emptied space as a social product, caused by excluders, remained in the city. Who is the receiver of 'these social surplus' according to the process of displacement?

Pyongyang has always suffered from a housing shortage, from the very beginning of urbanization in 1894. In constructing a socialist state, Kim's regime aimed for Pyongyang to be a city of ideologies. As a result, Pyongyang became a hub for education, transportation, culture, and nature beyond any other cities in North Korea. Accordingly, citizens could get good quantitative and qualitative distribution through their living in Pyongyang. For the reason, most North Koreans hoped to live in Pyongyang. Even though housing was continuously constructing for awaking the myth of urban development and preparing the gift for the loyal citizen, there was always a housing shortage in Pyongyang. The situation was, conversely, advantageous to the ruler because of the increasing shortage of housing made a greater reward. Hence, the emptied spaces after forced migration were filled with the citizen who swore loyalty to Kim's regime.

Even though my flat had one room type and the members of my family were five, I have an experience of living together with other households. At the beginning of the 1970s, Kim Jung Il conducted a campaign for housing construction. Many labors were mobilized into Pyongyang from regions with their families. In the process, one household stayed in my flat together for four months. Thereafter, the family got a housing certificate as a reward and left someplace of Pyongyang (Lee, interview with the author).

'Receivers of gifts feel the obligation of returning the favor, larger than they received' (Mause 1925). In the process of replacement, the excluder fell into hard labor under discrimination and surveillance. On the other hand, Receivers could get rewards and simultaneously they had to show their loyalty to avoid the position of excluders what they saw (see Chapter 7.1 for the condition and role of labor camps). Through the displacement, the ruler could get the unconditional labor power and the loyalty of the remainder by the practical education.

9.2.2 The market for the remainder

After the process of displacing, citizens remained. Then, with such a limited surplus, how

could the ruler attract the remainder's loyalty? It was easy because the spirit of the citizen had already been distorted by totalitarian controlling through successive generations. Generally, 'the public can notice the immediate benefits but not the future danger' (Rousseau 1754: 107). The ruler instilled loyalty in the remainder in three ways: 1) the fear of displacement and injecting ideology, 2) making the myth of the ideal city so that the public would not notice their real contradiction, and 3) after 1980, using the market to control the public's desire.

In 1980, injecting fear into Pyongyang's citizens began through forced migration. Thereafter, the meaning of living in Pyongyang was not only received special favors from the regime but also feared displacement through being under special surveillance. Kim's regime disregarded regional discrimination but regarded a requirement to keep and reinforce their ruling.

Kim's regime continuously reinforced the totalitarian ideology. Kim's group purged North Korea of all political opposites in 1967 and officially triumphed in making the country a totalitarian state with announcements of 'the hereditary succession of power' and 'Kim Il Sung's ideology for all of society' in 1974. Then, the totalitarian ideology (Jucheism) was announced with the 10th rule for establishing ideology in 1974 (see Chapter 7.4).

The main problem for Kim's regime was how to keep their rule even with the shortage of surplus. One of the key solutions, the regime could consider, was fabricated all urban space. As fish cannot escape from water, it became necessary to drive citizens into totalitarian urban space because 'Social processes are spatial' (Harvey 1973: 11).

The citizen of Pyongyang was forced to live in totalitarian space. In 1982, Kim's son announced Juche Ideology and constructed the Juche Tower in the center of Pyongyang – at 170m, the highest in the world. Citizens can see the tower of ideology at every point in Pyongyang. Also, from the tower, the ruler can see the movements of all his citizens. According to an interview with Park on the high buildings of Pyongyang, there was a room for observers to watch visitors or the high class. The portrait of Kim's family hung on all available spaces, from public offices, through subway stations, to individual rooms. Propaganda was dotted around the city (see Chapter 8.2.2.1). The citizen's living in a totalitarian space allowed them to lose their judgment and become a tamed public.

The second method of control was to make the space of myth that would let the public forget their current pain and look at the future myth of the Golden Age. For the tamed and poor citizen by continuous totalitarian controlling, even a slight dream could regard as a glorious dream.

The endless myth of North Korea after the Korean War to today is just, ‘eating good food, wearing a silk cloth, and living in tile-roofed house’ (*Kyonghyang News*, 10 Jan. 2010). The main key to make the myth is not objectives but continuous repeats (Adorno and Horkheimer 1969). The most important factor is ‘the believable myth for the public’ (Weber 1919).

Having propagated a believable myth, there became a necessity to set it in motion, not unlike phantom trick devices such as kaleidoscopes. Pyongyang seems to be always changing, even though nothing changes. Russian student Lankov said the process of making kaleidoscopes in the middle of 1980:

Diplomats appraised of constant and quite inexplicable re-building is going on in Pyongyang. Opposite the Soviet embassy was a newly-constructed apartment block, completed just a few months earlier. Suddenly, builders appeared again on the site. They first demolished the upper floor of the structure and then built two or three more floors. Sometime later, another house in the neighborhood was first almost demolished and then rebuilt with one additional floor. Such strange cases were then typical in the center of Pyongyang (Lankov 1995).

Between 1980 and 1982 in Pyongyang, Kim’s regime led the campaign of construction to reinforce the myth. The names of constructed buildings during the campaign were Pyongyang Childbirth Facility – with the image of Kim’s father – Changkyangwon of a public bath, People’s Great Study House, the large Triumphal Column, Kim Il Sung Arena, and Mankyungdea Theme Park. These spaces considered Kim’s ideological and cultural monuments. As political matters are considered together with cultural matters (Gransci 1929), citizens of totalitarian societies lose their political sensitivities by way of cultural amusements. Against the meaning of buildings, the space was occupied by the privileged classes (*Seoul News*, 6 Dec. 2011). Until now, the dwarfed labor of Pyongyang continuously constructs cultural facilities and housing with the name of ‘for the people’ but it was not for them.

The third method Kim used on remainders in Pyongyang was the market, reducing the burden of distribution and allowing the chance of desire expression as rewards. The market entry by Kim’s regime began in 1980, more than ten years before the Great Starvation. It

signifies that the market was not entered into passively but rather actively. From 1980 to the present day, the main aim for market entrance was not to improve economic conditions for the people, but instead to ensure the ruler's political power on the condition of lack of production.




Figure 9.4: Markets in Pyongyang, 2013

Towards the 1980s, the regime could not keep the system of distribution because of the continuous economic recession. National production could no longer cope with national distribution. Due to that problem, Kim regime entranced the market system and allowed partial ownership. In 1980, the farmer's market reformed to become a daily market and group land reclamation and farming was allowed for citizens. In 1982, due to distribution reduction, individual food preparation was allowed. With the '8.3 Product Movement' in 1984, the public could produce their own goods and the industrial goods offer expanded into the market. Lee said the following of the situation of Sung sin market in 1985:

In eastern Pyongyang, there were many factories for daily necessities. At the starting point, the Sungsin furniture factory began to sale the production in the market. Then, other factories followed. I visited the market in 1985. The market had been elder women just sold vegetables or fishes before 1980, but in that time, it grew a great market. In Pyongyang 1st department (official) store, the citizen had to stand in a long queue just to buy toothpaste, but in the Sungsin market, there were various and quality

goods. In the case of electronic goods, there were products even from Japan. In the time, in Pyongyang, there was a rumor that “Kim Il Sung is testing Chinese style of marketization” (Lee, interview with the author).

The market brought new energy in the 1980s. Citizens were given space not only for exchanging goods but also for consuming purchased products. Citizens used money instead of ration tickets. They could consume what they wanted, instead of what they had been given. At first, it was a necessity to recover from their lack of distribution by farming vegetable gardens or pocketing goods from factories. As the days passed, the desire for consumption and ownership grew.

Then, how could the ruler control the public who already escaped from their rule according to the distribution? How could control them who have these new desires with the market? The answer was simple: as Kim’s regime ruled the means of production in the revolution of 1958, they could govern the desire for consumption by controlling the market. It was made possible because North Koreans had already been educated totalitarian dictatorship during several generations. In March of 2008, over 10,000 tradeswomen protested in the Chyunggin market against the age limitation of market sellers (*Good Friends*, March 2008). However, this protest did not induce riots or a new revolution, even when the regime ignored their desire because:

Until they become conscious they will never rebel, and until after they have rebelled they cannot become conscious (Orwell 1949: 90).

The North Korean economic system could not produce sufficient goods for public distribution. Thus, the ruler tried to allow and control the marketplace in order to absorb the new type of labor power. They attempted to take the masses’ desire for autonomy away from the market and to control consumerism, giving it as a reward for good citizens.

9.2.3 Foreign Currency Shop for the receiver

To maintain political power, Kim’s regime considered the cooperator than the tamed nations. With the stagnation of the economy at the beginning of 1980, Kim’s regime used the carrot and stick strategy for the cooperators. The strategy had two components: 1) to have the cooperator

fall into a situation where they could not obtain surplus without the ruler's permission, and 2) to prepare the space that governed consumer desire. The main space for this strategy was the Foreign Currency Shop.

After independence in 1945, Kim's regime tried to stand as a self-sufficient economic system. It inherited its approach from the Japanese wartime economy and aimed to avoid political and economic interference from neighboring countries. In 1970, North Korea had difficulty keeping the heavy industry first policy because of a narrow market, non-oil nation, and inefficient coal mining, but the regime continued the policy because of economic competition against South Korea. Accordingly, the regime needed the energy source of oil and constructed a great oil refinery, purchasing oil on a 'friendship' price with assistance from the Soviet Union and China. North Korea was asked the trade with other countries to make enough foreign currency to buy oil. Naturally, the amount of trade in North Korea was highly expanded at the beginning of the 1970s. In 1984, the regime introduced a joint-venture enterprise for Korean businessmen who resided in Japan. In 1991, the oil assistance from the Soviet Union stopped and the 'friendship' prices of China were revoked, even the necessity of trade became more serious (Yang 2001). Then, the regime had created the Free Trade Area in Naging and Sunbong, from 1965 to 1990 the trade volume of North Korea radically increased.




Figure 9.5: The trade amount of DPRK, 1965-2017 (units in 100 Million US dollars, not including trade with South Korea) [Source: Statistics Korea]

In the 1980s, trade became the main national enterprise and it asked the cooperator who had the right judgment and knowledge of the outside world. Simmel (1908) said, 'A tradesman as a stranger has a more opened, objective, and liberal thought'. Since the poor and closed-off totalitarian state of North Korea had injected a fabricated myth of being 'the best country' to the public for such a long time, the most threatening factor for Kim was a person who knew

the country's truth. For the ruler, the tradesman is both a threatening person and a cooperator. According to the number of tradesmen grew with trade extensions, Kim's regime regarded buying their silence with the gift than removing because they had a knowledge and experience on the situation of trade expansion.

To prepare the gift, the regime introduced a special space where new desires could be served. This consuming space was the Foreign Currency Shop (FCS). The FCSs in North Korea are located in active trading areas such as Pyongyang, Nampo, Geasung, and Sinuiju (*Yonhap News*, 19 Feb. 1994). The FCS units contained many foreign goods and the right of use was allowed to not only foreign tourists but also cooperators such as traders, elites, and emerging capitalists (*called Donju*). In the space, elites and capitalists exchange their desire for the free voice for free consumption.

Politically, FCS units premise the possibility of control. The first FCS in Pyongyang was installed in 1972. The shop had no signs and was only there for foreign use, exchanging goods in US dollars (*Daily Economic News*, 1 Sep. 1972). In 1984, the using right of FCS expanded to citizens who had checks issued in the North Korean central bank. It means that Kim's regime could easily control FCS users because customers had to reveal their identity in the time of exchanging money. As a result, the general markets on the urban fringes were used by labors, lowly bureaucrats, athletes, and artists. On the other hand, downtown FCS units were for the elite, foreigners, and high-ranking traders.




Figure 9.6: The official market and FCS in Pyongyang (the data of the official market is from Google Maps; FCS from *Yonhap News*, 19 Feb.1994)

The FCS, in light of social change, revealed and encouraged social inequality. Before the FCS had been introduced, the visual gap between equality and inequality was not great. All people received fixed distributions with rations tickets and all classes received the same foods and clothes. Moreover, the gap between classes was not visible since all goods were made in domestic factories and were of similar shapes, colors, and qualities. After the FCS was introduced, however, the appearance and life of Pyongyang's citizens dramatically changed. Since 90 percent of goods in FCS were foreign-made,⁴⁶ the gap between users of the markets and users of the FCS was visually evident. The price of goods in the FCS was 10 times greater than those found in general shops and the quality was in no way comparable. Pyongyang citizens took off the gray cloth of the Mao style and began to follow fashion, especially South Korean one - they preferred to watch the drama and movie from South Korea even it was illegality. Now citizens could see the hidden inequality on the streets and metro stations in Pyongyang.

The evident inequality was stimulated the tamed public for accumulating money instead of resistance. At the time of distribution, citizens did not feel the necessity to accumulate money because there was no space for consumption. In a closed-off state, the way to use money is as important as to make money. According to the interview with Park, in 2005, the price of a pack of Marlboro cigarettes in FCS units was as much as a family's monthly living expenses. It meant cooperators could consume as much money as they had accumulated. Opening the FCS allowed Pyongyang citizens to open their eyes about the true value of money, and gave them the motive to acquire it.

Kim's regime allowed for this limited space for consumer desire so that cooperators would obey and keep their watching outside. According to Lee, in an interview with the author, upper classes and new capitalists want Kim regime's go-ahead because they are afraid of losing their existing rights and the way of money accumulating. Kim gave cooperators some privilege, and then they became afraid of losing it.

⁴⁶ In 1994, only 10 percent of all goods in FCS were made in North Korea. 50 percent were from Japan, 15 percent from Russia, 15 percent from Hong Kong's, and 10 percent from China (*Yonhap News*, 19 Feb. 1994).

9.3 Instability of market control

The controlling of the market and FCS by Kim's regime became increasingly difficult because of growing desire. The desire was connected to a possessiveness that made it easy to control with an afraid of losing, but it also awakened the greater desire. The control of the space of the market and FCS by Kim's regime became, more and more days, difficult because it produces a new type of desire continuously.

After the FCS had been introduced in 1984, women's dress of Pyongyang was changed.⁴⁷ 'The woman's sharpened senses of fashion means they awake the desire to show their "individual character" among shared common sense (Simmel 1895: 63)'. The regime had allowed Pyongyang citizens the liberties in the limited place of market and FCS that could be easily controlled. However, since the characteristic of desire had been changed after the food shortage in 1994, its control became difficult. Polarization between the 'haves' and 'have nots' increased and the area of ownership expanded. The public became the seller; on the other hand, the upper classes such as the elites, party members, and capitalists became the buyer. Objects of selling expanded from food to goods, housing, and even the human body itself in sex labor. People's desire also grew from finding resources for living to wanting social honors conferred on them:

In times past, a girl approached me in front of the Foreign Currency Shop in Pyongyang with the words, "Sir, my family has been starving for a long time. Please help us. I will do anything you want". In the 2000s, however, prostitution became a job. Girls watched for their customers near the FCS. They made money not just to live but to buy cosmetics and good clothes. Thereafter, even brokers of prostitution emerged (Park, interview with the author).

Kim's regime reformulated the market after July economic measures in 2002. In the

⁴⁷ The dress only of white jacket and black skirt was changed in 1984. In February of that year, Kim Jung Il ordered 'produce the good dress fixed the time'. Kim Il Sung also instructed 'man wear the western style suit instead of Mao jacket'. In that time the movie 'useless interference' about the dress was run (*Donga News*, 30 Jan. 1994).

following year, even though a number of large markets had opened in Pyongyang, the space aimed to preside over citizens by controlling their desires rather than to supply goods. Reudige Frank said that ‘Kim’s regime tried to control the market to take energies and powers such as riding horses. Its ride on is easy at the beginning, but get off from running horse is very difficult’.⁴⁸ As a result, the marketization of North Korea by Kim’s regime has been repeated development and regression (Jo 2010).




Figure 9.7: History of marketization in North Korea, 1980-2010 [Source: Jo 2010]

These repeated the process leads the more its power and energy becomes. Since the market system was introduced in North Korea, the size and international trade have been growing and it brings the desire to know the truth of the outside world.

⁴⁸ Frank said that ‘North Korea regarded that the regime could control the market such as horse; control speed and forward. They consider “use energies from markets but control it”. However, in reality, its process is on trial and error’ (*market changes North Korea*, KBS broadcast, 2007).




Figure 9.8: Total and intraregional exports and imports, 1990-2013 (Unit in billions of US dollars) [Source: Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2014]

This desire to know the outside world came from primary instinct and curiosity. Lee's interview makes it clear what the inside of Pyongyang was changing.

At that time (near 1996), I felt a strong mind to know the outside world. For the reason, I preferred to watch Mansudea TV instead of the main channel because it often introduced the culture and city of other countries. Thereafter, I illegally watched South Korean News and TV, smuggled from China, because of the desire to know the outside of cultures, fashions, splendid cities, and news (Lee, interview with the author).

According to an escaped pilot in 1983, the motive of escaping North Korea was the awareness of better living conditions in South Korea. Someday, he gained a noodle packet from South Korea by the sea and be sure the true condition of outside (*Kyunghyang News*, 4 Oct. 1983). One might ask the question: what would be occurred if North Korean know the real situation of other post-socialist countries have economically grown that they just believed it had been demolished?




Figure 9.9: GDP (PPP) Comparison between North Korean and post-socialist countries, 1989-2013 [Source: Index Mundi and Statistics Korea]

It is apparently difficult for Kim's regime to keep continuously control the market and citizens desires. As 'freedom is a good horse to ride, but it rids somewhere' (Harvey 2005: 6), the nature of the marketplace will spread in all kinds of directions; even though Kim's regime might try to control the market, it will grow of its own volition. With the inevitable expanding of trade and market system, the gap between growing markets and citizen desires would be growing until the regime could not control

Chapter 10

Conclusion

This thesis has described the processes and characteristics of the totalitarian city Pyongyang and the connections between the space and the society. According to Eckardt and Hassenpfulg (2014), a place is “not only the stage of human interaction but also a decisive influence for or that it presupposes urban life.” In the context of Pyongyang’s spatial transitioning from a free society to one with a single ideology, power was closely intertwined with the transformation of space. In the process, the spatial transition led the social variation as a social producer.

The main questions of the research are the following: Through what processes has Pyongyang become a totalitarian city? What are the totalitarian characteristics of Pyongyang? Which of those characteristics are different from those of other totalitarian cities? How it is changing today after market entrance?

Through what processes has Pyongyang become a totalitarian city?

Chapter 2 presents the history of Lee’s family to provide insight into urban life under political change. During the Japanese colonial era and the Korean War, Lee’s grandparents could not prevent their being caught up in the political situation. While trying to survive, Lee’s family was branded, a practice that stemmed from discrimination that had existed for generations. Until the 1960s, the citizens of Pyongyang had hoped that an ideal socialist state would be constructed and this faith could create a partly religious gathering. Entering the 1970s, however, the society of Pyongyang was constricted with uniformity and terror because of the practice of branding classes, which routine in the early 1980s.

Chapters 5–7 describe the long process of turning Pyongyang into a totalitarian city, which took about seventy years. Chapter 5 studies the process of how unconstrained masses formed during the transforming of Pyongyang into modern society. Unlike absolutism, totalitarianism requires modern technology, administrative ability, and unified masses. Similar to how modern technology makes automobiles, totalitarianism produces standardized persons with a modern administrative system. To produce an atomized citizen, the first step was to unchain the past

slave classes in order to let them become the masses. A Christian liberal ideology and oppressive open in the colonial era helped to form the modern masses from the slavish status. However, rapid social change and urbanization situated the masses at the lowest class, which did not have any social connections.

Chapter 6 deals with how the atomized masses changed into the mob. The Japanese colonial government's control divided the urban space of Pyongyang between rulers and subordinates. Similar to other colonized Asian cities and unlike Western ones, the nationalism in Pyongyang germinated for the aim of independence. Even though the nationalism sought freedom at first, the violence of its character with exclusiveness burgeoned. During modernization, the slave-like people of Pyongyang not only escaped from traditional restrictions but also lost the minimal protection provided by human relations, and they eventually became urban squatters and part of the mob, which could explode with anger anytime. Even the Christians who had instilled a liberal ideology in Pyongyang disregarded the miserable lives of labors and the neglected class. As a result, the mob took on a violent character of nationalism and it toward massacring Chinese who were the main target of racial discrimination in Pyongyang in 1931.

Chapter 7 describes the myth of the socialist city and the process of total control implemented during the Korean War. In 1945, at the end of World War II, the Pyongyang society seemed to recover some freedom from Japanese colonization. Under the influence of the Soviet Union, North Korea accepted the socialist system and the idea of establishing equitable societies in all nations. The land belonged to the state and was again distributed to the peasants. In Pyongyang, during a brief period, much infrastructure (such as the bank at Botong River and schools) and the cultural space that the people had hoped for, was established. In that time, according to Lee's testimony, the citizens of Pyongyang constructed the city not only with propaganda and suppression but also through hope for their future lives. Simultaneously, however, the statues of Kim Ilsung had been constructed for the idolization and space evoked the limitation of action and the political bias. After the Korean War, North Korea lost the route of escape into South Korea and the remained citizens in Pyongyang had to be absorbed as members of the construction process for establishing a totalitarian city. In 1967, all political opponents against Kim's regime were eliminated, and the totalitarian ideology of Jucheism was proclaimed in 1974. The original space of Pyongyang was undressed, and the mask of a socialist city was discovered to shape the space of the totalitarian city.

What are the totalitarian characteristics of Pyongyang?

Chapter 8 reviews the spatial characteristics of the totalitarian city in Pyongyang. One of the main features of totalitarianism is “total control by terror.” Totalitarianism positively requires a space of terror, and the space can be the witness of totalitarian society existence. After Juche ideology was proclaimed and the process of power succeeding to his son around 1980, many branded people were deported from Pyongyang to a labor camp. In the camp, nobody could claim their human rights, and political prisoners could not escape the camp, except through death. Because of the unsafe closed space, according to Lee’s testimony about camp 14th, prisoners always feared death. They were never educated, even Juche ideology and the name of Kim Jung Il. As citizens and prisoners near the Nazi camps feared death because of the rumors of gas and trains containing many Jews, the Pyongyang citizens realized the existence of the camp when they observed their neighbors’ being deported and it taught them the result of disobedience. Even though the camp was not located in the city of Pyongyang, everyday experience and rumors instilled the fear of death to the remaining citizens.

Similar to a fish that cannot escape its fishbowl, a citizen’s life in a totalitarian city means he or she lives within the space of inescapable ideology every day and everywhere. Pyongyang has many abstract, symbolic, and religious monument buildings and these large or national style buildings inspired citizens to feel not only awe but also the fear. Across Pyongyang, propaganda structures were erected to praise Kim’s family, and sometimes the citizen themselves became the vehicles of the propaganda by attending group actions or marches. Finally, the space of the totalitarian city led to people’s fake smiling, and finally, the totalitarian system tried to rule the space of citizen’s body itself, their own space at the last. The space of Pyongyang has been used as a producer to establish total control over the citizens. However, the totalitarian space of Pyongyang was not just a result of political actions but it produced the system on the progress of totalitarianism.

Which of those characteristics are different from those of other totalitarian cities?

In the space of terror, most totalitarian cities have massive political and religious buildings with a classical style. As mentioned in chapter 4, the urban space of Pyongyang shares most of the characteristics that the cities of Nazism and Stalinism used. Hagen (2006: 176) has

mentioned that “unlike the military parades staged in North Korea, the Nuremberg rallies were able simultaneously to fascinate, awe and intimidate”. However, the space and the parades in Pyongyang inspired feelings of awe in citizens, as well as pride in being members of a powerful state—feelings similar to those produced by pseudo religions (see chapter 8.2.2.2).

In the context of totalitarian cities, on the other hand, the urban space of Pyongyang has unique characteristics. Nazis changed their urban structures by producing dull-colored buildings with gray stone; Stalinists preserved historical structures and added more decorations and splendor to their public spaces. In essence, Pyongyang’s urban construction was similar to the Stalinists’ plan, but it also produced a unique style based on the citizens’ history. In the time of socialism entering, constructivism and the Western neoclassical style were implemented in the construction of monumental buildings in Pyongyang, similar to the Soviet Union. However, around 1970, when the Juche ideology was budding, many monumental buildings with a Korean style from the period of the monarchy were built. Unlike the cities of Nazism and Stalinism, which adopted the classical styles of Rome and Greece, Pyongyang incorporated a historical Korean style to evoke nationalistic emotion. Also, after the Korean War, Kim’s regime reconstructed the city with the historical urban fabric instead of great axes.

The main difference between Jucheism and Nazism or Stalinism is the temporal permanence. Nazism achieved the most control over its society by instilling terror and a pseudo-religion, but this hypnotic experience did not last longer than 13 years. Meanwhile, the totalitarian society by Kim’s regime has been constructed through three generations for 75 years and it persisted until now. In addition, racial discrimination for Jews already existed in Europe, but Kim’s regime had to create a new target for discrimination and terror. The regime proclaimed its unique ideology in 1967, and the ideology has survived for nearly 50 years. This durability explains why North Korea, unlike other socialist countries, has not collapsed, despite the country’s suffering great starvation and the market entrance. According to Lee’s testimony about camp 14, many adults who were born in the camp never experienced the outside world. This new generation is not only in the camp but also in the urban space of Pyongyang. They have lived within the mythical and propagandist urban spaces based on Juche ideology. They cannot realize their past and future, which have been fabricated for them, because they do not have any experience or documents for comparison.

Unlike other totalitarian cities, a sense of temporal permanence obscures the boundary

between propaganda and everyday life and produces a varied space in Pyongyang. The massive glass pyramid of Rukyong hotel is located at the city's center, but currently, Pyongyang's urban space does not adhere to only one or two styles. In this totalitarian urban space, of which the construction has continued for a long period, various styles of buildings coexist, such as neoclassic and constructivism, and the transparent space that reflects the spaces of modern capitalist cities. Today, many markets are being established, and many citizens have mobile phones in their hands. The urban space of Pyongyang is diverse because of its long history of development, which was based on passing several ideologies.

How is Pyongyang changing today?

Chapter 8 analyzes the transition of Pyongyang after the market system. The main strategy of the poor totalitarian state to keep its power is to retain and control the obedience of cooperators. The use of certain incentives namely, "the gift" makes the strategy possible, but it creates much inequality within the state with its existing poor conditions. The unequal strategy of Pyongyang has incorporated the game of location exchange through punishments and rewards in the market. For this strategy, three main spaces were used: the camp, market, and the Foreign Currency Shop. These spaces are used as a means of control, and they arouse the desire for consumption. Over time, the desire targets not only material objects but also the concepts of freedom and truth. Currently, these movements have been shaking the past foundation and space of Pyongyang.

Over the span of four generations, Pyongyang citizens who encountered Japanese fascism have experienced the transformation of the totalitarian city. The new generation does not have memories of past liberal society. The people of this generation believe their experiences than in their thoughts because all thoughts have been fabricated in the totalitarian city. This belief is reflected in the following statement:

The experiences and thoughts are different. Pyongyang citizens don't have any chance to experience the outside world. Even if they heard or thought something as a truth, it wouldn't bring the real feeling. It seems the public couldn't feel any emotion for a rich man's life on a TV drama. It is an envious thing but couldn't bring any feeling (Park,

interview with the author).

Nevertheless, Pyongyang is changing. The new generation, called *Jangmadang* (market) generation⁴⁹, feels a certain desire to experience the market. They are more sensitive toward hunger and desire than toward rational thought. Since they are “only a rebel from the waist downwards” (Orwell 1949), they can easily desire things that are unapproved, which can be an opportunity for them to experience freedom.

Jangmadang (market) is the fruit of the tragic time during the great starvation instead of the time of revolution. The name of *Jangmadang* generation was not defined by the regime but was a neologism that reflected the present social change. This generation regards someone as a back number who didn't know the popular movie or drama from South Korea. Their parents' generation regarded this conduct as a crime they have to report, but they regard it as a hobby. The prevalent word of ‘never touch my skin’ during the *Jangmadang* generation directly shows their individualistic tendencies (Ji 2019: 177).

In actuality, North Korea's economic structure has already collapsed (Yang 2001), and the unequal strategy reveals its limitations. Accordingly, Kim's regime should have no choice but to accept the use of outer capital. Moreover, the movement of neoliberalism, especially the Chinese capital power, would substantially affect North Korea because a cheap labor pool and many underground resources are there. This view is expressed in a comment of Eckardt and Hassenpfulg (2004): “The globalization with its borderless flow of money, people, goods, ideas, and political concepts would find its echoes in urban arenas.” The transformation of Pyongyang would follow the way of other post-socialist cities:

⁴⁹ Kim's regime categorized the generation according to the history of revolution; the 1st generation is ‘Anti-Janapn Palji mountain generation’ who struggled to Japanese colonization on the mountain with Kim Il-Sung, the 2nd is ‘*Chollima*(swift horse) generation’ who participated the restoration after Korean War, the 3rd is ‘Revolutionary generation’ who lived in the time of constructing Juche ideology and succession of the power, and the 4th is ‘the March of hardship generation’ who had an experience of the great starvation (Ji 2019: 176)

East and Central European cities are not simply transforming from one system to another but be caught in a globalizing process that overlaps, constrains, fosters and hinders those aspects of transformation addressed by the classical transformation theory, i.e. the establishment of a market economy and a liberal democracy. (Eckardt 2005a)

The globalization could generate polarity between the wealthy and the poor inhabitants with unequal access (Eckardt 2004). However, globalization could scatter the ideas of equality and liberty, which are by-products of having money (Simmel 1896).

Several things can be made available in preparation for a liberal society. First, the presence of free space could produce liberty. This is conveyed in the following statement: “An isolated individual is never free. The origin of liberty is not inside a human but in the space between humans. Liberty needs the space. A human is free only when he or she is in Polis” (Arendt 2005). A place such as Pyongyang needs free space much like a “space market” (Eckardt 2006) in the eastern part of Germany because “if one such totalitarianism disappeared, others may appear to take its place, owing to the endemic conditions that have given rise to them” (Friedrich 1965: 378).

This research began with numerous limitations. One of the main difficulties is prohibited Pyongyang visiting and it led the limitation of showing the diverse behaviors in Pyongyang citizens’ real life. For the following research, the book *Nothing to Envy* by Barbara Demick deserves is enough to refer in the light of describing the individual life as a controlled society of Pyongyang. As this description, follow-up research should implement an inductive methodology to study the authenticity and transition in the urban space of Pyongyang. In addition, through the comparative study of post-socialist cities, Pyongyang’s potential to be a global city should be studied, such as in the case of “Berlin as a Global City” (Eckardt 2005b).

Bauman (1989: 156) has suggested two reasons why the problem of the Holocaust could not be reduced to a subject of a philosophical incident: First, after this astonishing affair, the direction of history has not changed. Second, the main reason for the Holocaust has not disappeared. In addition, for better or worse, Auschwitz's effect extended human consciousness

to that of the moon landing and this disaster can occur anywhere in modern society again. On the contrary, Arendt (2005) provides the way of escape in his comment “A new birth guarantees a new beginning.” For a person in a modern society who has tasted the banality and evil of totalitarianism, no other ways to escape exist—except through the new birth of freedom.

April 27, 2018, South and North Korean leaders, new generations who did not experience the Korean War, met and set 'denuclearization'. Also, June 30, 2019, Donald J. Trump and Kim Jong-un met in the Military Demarcation Line on the Korean Peninsula. Then now, any preparations for establishing a liberal society, unified Korea have to consider the duplex effects stemming from the experience of totalitarianism and have to plan a space of freedom.

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Ausstellung

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